January 3, 2008.
Determination of respondent Fire Department's Commissioner, dated May 22, 2006, terminating petitioner's employment as a firefighter, unanimously confirmed, the petition denied, and this proceeding (transferred to this Court by order of Supreme Court, New York County [Rolando T. Acosta, J.], entered March 22, 2007), dismissed, without costs.
Watters Svetkey, LLP, New York (Jonathan Svetkey of counsel), for petitioner.
Michael A. Cadozo, Corporation Counsel, New York (Deborah A. Brenner of counsel), for respondents.
Before: Tom, J.P., Andrias, Gonzalez and Sweeny, JJ.
Petitioner tested positive for cocaine during a random drug test, and the Fire Department terminated his employment. Such determination was supported by substantial evidence ( see Matter of Powell v City of Newburgh, 284 AD2d 334, lv denied 96 NY2d 720; Matter of Gibson v Koehler, 165 AD2d 768). Petitioner's contention that the Department's random drug testing policy is unconstitutional is without merit ( see Matter of Seelig v Koehler, 76 NY2d 87, cert denied 498 US 847), and the penalty of termination for substance abuse does not shock the conscience ( Matter of Reinhard v City of New York, 34 AD3d 376, 378, lv denied 8 NY3d 808 ).
Although alcohol dependency qualifies as a disability under the Human Rights Law (Executive Law § 292; see Matter of McEniry v Landi, 84 NY2d 554), drug abuse does not ( Gilmore v University of Rochester Strong Mem. Hosp. Div., 384 F Supp 2d 602 [WD NY 2005]; and see Weinstock v Columbia Univ., 224 F3d 33, 42 n 1 [2d Cir 2000]). Petitioner failed to establish that his drug abuse was causally related to his alcoholism, and thus did not state a prima facie case of employment discrimination under Executive Law § 296 (1).