In Kinne v. Duncan (Abst.), 323 Ill. App. 363, 55 N.E.2d 545 (1944), an earlier case, decided before the proviso in section 3 of the interest statute became effective, the court cited and quoted with approval from State ex rel. Southern Real Estate Financial Co. v. City of St. Louis, 234 Mo App 209, 115 S.W.2d 513 (1938), which sets forth the rationale of cases disallowing interest to dissatisfied judgment creditors who by appeal have delayed and prolonged the payment of judgment until a final affirmance by courts of review.Summary of this case from Pinkstaff v. Pennsylvania R. Co.
Opinion filed May 26, 1944.
INTEREST, § 70 — as running from date of decree rendered after remandment of cause by Supreme Court. In action for accounting, where appeal was taken from judgment of trial court and Supreme Court reversed the decree with respect to certain amounts and remanded the cause with directions, held it would be inequitable to assess interest from the date of the first decree which was erroneous in so many important particulars, and interest should begin to run from the date of the decree rendered after the remandment.
See Callaghan's Illinois Digest, same topic and section number.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Clinton county; the Hon. JOSIAH T. BULLINGTON, Judge, presiding.
Reversed and remanded with directions. Heard in this court at the May term, 1944.
Andrew O. Niehoff, for appellants;
Russell Wilson, for appellee Dick Duncan.
Not to be published in full. Opinion filed May 26, 1944.