finding that denial of treatment for HCV consistent with facility guidelines amounted to a difference of opinion about medical treatmentSummary of this case from Odoms v. Aranas
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
D.C. No. 2:13-cv-02080-GMN-PAL MEMORANDUM Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada
Gloria M. Navarro, Chief Judge, Presiding Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and SILVERMAN, and RAWLINSON, Circuit Judges.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Matthew J. King, a Nevada state prisoner, appeals pro se from the district court's summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment for defendants Cox and Byrne because King failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the course of treatment chosen to treat his hepatitis C was "medically unacceptable under the circumstances, and was chosen in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to [King's] health." Id. at 1058 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (a difference in medical opinion does not rise to the level of deliberate indifference).
King's appeal of the denial of his motion for preliminary injunction is moot. See Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v. Madigan, 954 F.2d 1441, 1450 (9th Cir. 1992) (when underlying claims have been decided, the reversal of a denial of preliminary relief would have no practical consequences, and the issue is therefore moot).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying King's motions for appointment of a medical expert and an investigator because King failed to show that these appointments were necessary. See Walker v. Am. Home Shield Long Term Disability Plan, 180 F.3d 1065, 1071 (9th Cir. 1999) (setting forth standard of review).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying King's motion for appointment of counsel because King did not show exceptional circumstances warranting such an appointment. See Palmer v. Valdez, 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting forth standard of review and explaining the "exceptional circumstances" requirement).
We do not consider arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).