Filed March 4, 2019
Instead, he must identify “with reasonable particularity the evidence that precludes summary judgment” because the duty of the courts is not to “scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact.” Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). As noted further below, Zouvas has not identified any factual dispute that would merit sending this case to the trier of fact.
Filed June 26, 2017
In order to make this showing, the non-moving party must “identify with reasonable particularity the evidence that precludes summary judgment.” Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir.1996). A plaintiff may not meet this burden by relying on inadmissible evidence, such as hearsay or speculation.
Filed May 26, 2017
. “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position” is insufficient, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, and it is not the Court’s responsibility “to scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact,” Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). See also Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch.
Filed December 15, 2016
(“[I]n construing the enforcement sections of the FLSA, the courts had consistently declared that injunctive relief was not available in suits by private individuals but only in suits by the Secretary.”); Keenan v. Allan, 889 F. Supp. 1320, 1382 (E.D. Wash. 1995), aff'd, 91 F.3d 1275 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Individuals may not sue for FLSA injunctive relief.”).
Filed August 10, 2016
But Svenson has pointed to no evidence that YCDroid did so, and this Court has no responsibility on summary judgment to “scour the record in search of a genuine issue of fact.” Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). Finally, even if her Buyer Information was shared (it was not), it would not necessarily be a breach of Defendants’ privacy policies.
Filed December 17, 2008
In determining whether to grant or deny summary judgment, however, it is not a court’s task “to scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact.” Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (internal quotations omitted). Rather, the court relies on the nonmoving party to identify with reasonable particularity the evidence that precludes summary judgment.
Filed September 29, 2008
It is not the Court’s obligation “to scour the record in search of a genuine issue of triable fact.” Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). The mere existence of a “scintilla” of evidence is not enough to create a “genuine issue of material fact.”
Filed August 15, 2008
triable fact." Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). I16 i1 B. LS&CO.
Filed June 10, 2008
7 The principal purpose of summary judgment procedure is to require the 8 nonmoving party to identify any genuine evidence that precludes summary 9 judgment. Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). Without this showing 10 by the nonmoving party, the Movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Filed January 17, 2008
16 Accordingly, the non-moving party must "identify with reasonable particularity 17 the evidence that precludes summary judgment." Keenan v. Allan, 91 F.3d 1275, 18 1279 (9th Cir. 1996). If the non-moving fails to meet its burden, the moving party 19 is entitled to summary judgment as a matter oflaw.