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Jung v. K. D. Mining Co.

U.S.
Apr 28, 1958
356 U.S. 335 (1958)

Summary

holding that a district court order dismissing the complaint with leave to amend within twenty days was not a final decision until it formally entered an order—two years later—dismissing the case and entering judgment under Rule 58

Summary of this case from Williams v. Taylor Seidenbach, Inc.

Opinion

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT.

No. 619.

Decided April 28, 1958.

On May 10, 1955, the Federal District Court dismissed petitioners' first amended complaint in this case and granted petitioners 20 days from that date to file an amended complaint. On May 27, 1955, the Court overruled petitioners' motion to vacate that order but granted petitioners leave to file an amended complaint within 20 days from that date. Petitioners did not file an amended complaint; but, on March 25, 1957, filed a paper electing to stand on their first amended complaint. On the same day, the Court dismissed the cause of action. On April 16, 1957, petitioners filed notice of appeal "from final judgment entered in this action on March 25, 1957." The Court of Appeals held that the District Court's order of May 27, 1955, became its final judgment when petitioners failed to file an amended complaint within the 20 days allowed thereby, and it dismissed the appeal as untimely. Held: The final judgment in the case was the District Court's order of March 25, 1957, dismissing the cause of action, and the appeal was timely under Rule 73(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Pp. 335-338.

246 F.2d 281, reversed and cause remanded.

Zeamore A. Ader for petitioners.

Samuel J. Wettrick and Floyd F. Shields for respondents.


Petitioners seek our writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the Court of Appeals dismissing their appeal as untimely.

The facts are undisputed. Petitioners brought this action to recover the purchase price of securities alleged to have been worthless and fraudulently sold to them by respondents in violation of § 12 of the Securities Act of 1933, as amended ( 48 Stat. 84, 15 U.S.C. § 77 l), and of § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended ( 48 Stat. 891, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b)). Respondents moved to dismiss petitioners' first amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. On May 10, 1955, the District Court sustained the motion, dismissed the complaint, and granted petitioners "twenty days from this date within which to file an amended complaint." On May 27, 1955, petitioners moved to vacate the order of May 10 dismissing the first amended complaint or, in the alternative, to extend the time to file an amended complaint. On that date (May 27, 1955) the Court overruled petitioners' motion to vacate the order of May 10, but granted leave to petitioners to file an amended complaint within 20 days from May 27, 1955. Petitioners did not file an amended complaint. On March 25, 1957, petitioners filed an instrument in the case by which they elected to stand on their first amended complaint. On that day (March 25, 1957) the Court ordered that "this cause of action be and it hereby is dismissed without costs." On April 16, 1957, petitioners filed notice of appeal "from final judgment entered in this action on March 25, 1957." Respondent moved in the Court of Appeals to dismiss the appeal as untimely. The Court of Appeals, holding that the order of May 27, 1955, became the District Court's final judgment in the case when petitioners failed to file an amended complaint within the 20 days thereby allowed for that purpose, sustained the motion and dismissed the appeal of April 16, 1957, as not taken within 30 days from the entry of the judgment. 246 F.2d 281.

We think that the District Court's order of May 27, 1955, denying petitioners' motion to vacate the order of May 10, 1955, but granting further leave to petitioners to amend their complaint, did not constitute the final judgment in the case. It did not direct "that all relief be denied" (Rule 58 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure) but left the suit pending for further proceedings "either by amendment of the [complaint] or entry of a final judgment." Missouri Kansas Interurban R. Co. v. City of Olathe, 222 U.S. 185, 186. The situation did "not differ from an order sustaining a demurrer with leave to amend; another order of absolute dismissal after expiration of the time allowed for amendment is required to make a final disposition of the cause." Cory Bros. Co., Ltd., v. United States, 47 F.2d 607. Cf. United States v. F. M. Schaefer Brewing Co., 356 U.S. 227; Clark v. Kansas City, 172 U.S. 334; Crutcher v. Joyce, 134 F.2d 809; Western Electric Co. v. Pacent Reproducer Corp., 37 F.2d 14, and Riverside Oil Rfg. Co. v. Dudley, 33 F.2d 749.

Although to be sure nearly two years elapsed between the time petitioners were given leave to file an amended complaint and their motion of March 25, 1957, the defendants also did not, as they so easily could have done, nor did the District Court exercising power sua sponte over its own calendar, take any step to put a definitive end to the case and thereby fix an unequivocal terminal date for appealability. The undesirability of useless delays in litigation is more than offset by the hazards of confusion or misunderstanding as to the time for appeal.

It was the District Court's order of March 25, 1957, dismissing "this cause of action," that constituted the final judgment in the case. It directed "that all relief be denied" and required "the clerk [to] enter judgment" accordingly (Rule 58). The appeal of April 16, 1957, was taken within 30 days from the date of entry of the judgment and hence was timely under 73(a) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The writ of certiorari is granted and the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the cause is remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

So ordered.


Summaries of

Jung v. K. D. Mining Co.

U.S.
Apr 28, 1958
356 U.S. 335 (1958)

holding that a district court order dismissing the complaint with leave to amend within twenty days was not a final decision until it formally entered an order—two years later—dismissing the case and entering judgment under Rule 58

Summary of this case from Williams v. Taylor Seidenbach, Inc.

holding that a court order "dismissing 'th[e] cause of action'"—not the clerk's subsequent entry of a judgment—is what "constituted the 'final judgment' in the case," even though the Rule 58 clock to appeal did not start to tick until separate entry of that judgment (second internal quotation marks added)

Summary of this case from Orlando Residence, Ltd. v. Nelson

holding that an order by the district court granting defendant's motion to dismiss with leave to amend was not a final appealable order because "[i]t did not direct `that all relief be denied' . . . but left the suit pending for further proceedings"

Summary of this case from In re Tile Outlet, Inc.

focusing the finality inquiry on the district court's actions and its "power * * * over its own calendar" to "fix an unequivocal terminal date for appealability"

Summary of this case from N. Am. Butterfly Ass'n v. Wolf

In Jung v. K. D. Mining Co., 356 U.S. 335, 78 S.Ct. 764, 2 L.Ed.2d 806 (1958), the Supreme Court held that where a district court dismissed a complaint but granted the plaintiff a specific period of time to refile, the initial dismissal was not final, and an appeal could be filed after a later final order of dismissal.

Summary of this case from Garcia-Goyco v. Law Envtl. Consultants, Inc.

In Jung, the plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging violations of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.

Summary of this case from In re U.S.

In Jung, the district court granted a motion to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted on May 10, 1955, and on May 27, 1955, granted plaintiffs leave to file an amended complaint within twenty days. Plaintiffs chose not to file an amended complaint: yet, on March 25, 1957, plaintiff filed "an instrument in the case in which they elected to stand on their first amended complaint."

Summary of this case from Schuurman v. Motor Vessel Betty K V

explaining that an order dismissing a complaint with leave to amend is not a final judgment, and leaves "the suit pending for further proceedings either by amendment of the (complaint) or entry of final judgment"

Summary of this case from Lee v. Forest River, Inc.

In Jung the Court determined that an order granting a defendant's motion for dismissal with leave to the plaintiff to file an amended complaint within twenty days was not a final order.

Summary of this case from Thompson v. Thompson

stating order dismissing complaint after plaintiff refused to amend the complaint was final judgment

Summary of this case from Standage v. White Mountain Vacation Vill. Subdivision Ass'n
Case details for

Jung v. K. D. Mining Co.

Case Details

Full title:JUNG ET AL. v . K. D. MINING CO., INC., ET AL

Court:U.S.

Date published: Apr 28, 1958

Citations

356 U.S. 335 (1958)
78 S. Ct. 764

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