Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson

21 Citing briefs

  1. Lindsay Lohan, Appellant,v.Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., et al., Respondents.

    Brief

    Filed February 7, 2018

    ; Simeonov v. Tiegs,602 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (Civ. Ct., N.Y. Cty. 1992) (sculptures intended for sale not made “for the purposes of trade”); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 397 (1967) (“That books, newspapers, and magazines are published and sold for profit does not prevent them from being a form of expression whose liberty is safeguarded by the First Amendment” (quoting Joseph Burstyn, Inc.,343 U.S. at 501-03)). Consistent with this precedent, dismissal is appropriate where the use of a person’s “name, portrait, picture or voice” is used for the purposes of constitutionally-protected expression, even where that expression is sold for profit.

  2. Lindsay Lohan, Appellant,v.Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., et al., Respondents.

    Brief

    Filed February 7, 2018

    Winters, 333 U.S. at 510. 13 The Supreme Court reversed this Court again in 1952, Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 501, rejecting Binns’ premise that works of fiction were actionable if they “enriched” their authors. 210 N.Y. at 58.

  3. Karen Gravano, Appellant,v.Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc. et al., Respondents.

    Brief

    Filed February 7, 2018

    ; Simeonov v. Tiegs, 602 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (Civ. Ct., N.Y. Cty. 1992) (sculptures intended for sale not made “for the purposes of trade”); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 397 (1967) (“That books, newspapers, and magazines are published and sold for profit does not prevent them from being a form of expression whose liberty is safeguarded by the First Amendment” (quoting Joseph Burstyn, Inc., 343 U.S. at 501-03)). Consistent with this precedent, dismissal is appropriate where the use of a person’s “name, portrait, picture or voice” is used for the purposes of constitutionally-protected expression, even where that expression is sold for profit.

  4. Lindsay Lohan, Appellant,v.Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., et al., Respondents.

    Brief

    Filed February 7, 2018

    This conclusion holds true regardless of whether an expressive work is fact- based or “fictionalized.” See Joseph Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 501-502 (noting that the message it conveys.” Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 566 (2011) (citation omitted).

  5. Lindsay Lohan, Appellant,v.Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., et al., Respondents.

    Brief

    Filed February 7, 2018

    Winters, 333 U.S. at 510. 13 The Supreme Court reversed this Court again in 1952, Burstyn, 343 U.S. at 501, rejecting Binns’ premise that works of fiction were actionable if they “enriched” their authors. 210 N.Y. at 58.

  6. Between the Lines Productions, L.L.C. v. Lions Gate Entertainment Corp. et al

    REPLY IN SUPPORT OF RULE 56 MOTION for Summary Judgment as to Counts I-V of Summit's Counterclaims 93

    Filed November 3, 2014

    Id. at 343 U.S. 495. In what’s known as the “Miracle Decision,” the U.S. Supreme Court outlawed censorship of speech content deemed “sacrilegious” on grounds that well-known religious organizations did not need Government’s protection from the dissemination of countervailing viewpoints.

  7. Karen Gravano, Appellant,v.Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc. et al., Respondents.

    Brief

    Filed February 7, 2018

    24, 831 (11th Cir. 2016) (rejecting suit by heirs of civil rights activist Rosa Parks against Target for alleged right-of-publicity violations based on Target’s sale of non-fiction books and film, and a plaque documenting Parks’ role in the civil rights movement); Rhoads v. Margolis, No. B249800, 2015 WL 311932, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2015) (rejecting misappropriation claim by family members of deceased guitarist Randy Rhoads based on biographical book, finding First Amendment protects reporting on matters of public interest), as modified on denial of reh’g (Feb. 17, 2015) (unpublished); Dora v. Frontline Video, Inc., 15 Cal. App. 4th 536, 542-44, 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790, 792-94 (1993) (documentary film about surfing protected). 4819-0149-5626v.10 0067328-000018 8 This same broad constitutional protection consistently has been applied to misappropriation and right-of-publicity claims purporting to arise from fictional or dramatized works. Sixty-five years ago, in Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501, 502 (1952), the United States Supreme Court confirmed that fictional films are “a significant medium for the communication of ideas” entitled to full First Amendment protection, and these constitutional protections are not diminished by the fact that “they are designed to entertain as well as to inform.” Id. at 501.8 Accord Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948) (explaining that both entertainment and news are fully protected by the First Amendment because “[t]he line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the protection of that basic right”). Following this rationale, courts repeatedly have found that the First Amendment protects fictional or semi-fictional works from misappropriation and right-of-publicity claims, just as it protects news reporting and other fact-based publications. For example, in Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions, 25 Cal.3d 860 (1979), the California Supreme Court rejected a right-of-publicity claim brought by actor Rud

  8. Forsyth v. Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) et al

    MOTION to Strike 1 Complaint, Defendants' Notice of Motions and 1 Special Motion to Strike Pursuant to California Anti-SLAPP Statute, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code Section 425.16 et seq., or, in the alternative, 2 Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12

    Filed April 29, 2016

    Indeed, movie ratings have a greater claim to being “conduct in furtherance” of protected speech than credit ratings because the subject matter of movie ratings—movies—is itself protected speech on a matter of public concern. See Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 25 Cal. 3d 860, 865 (1979); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952); see also Gangland Prods., 730 F.3d at 956 (California courts look to the “broad topic of [a] defendant’s conduct” to assess link between speech and public interest). Movie ratings, in sum, fit squarely within the range of practices that courts have found protected as “in furtherance” of the creation of television or movie content.

  9. Anita Chanko,, et al., Appellants,v.American Broadcasting Companies Inc., et al., Respondents, Anil S. Ranawat, et al., Defendants.

    Brief

    Filed February 18, 2016

    Numerous respected television critics disagree with Appellants’ characterization of the program, but in any event such labels are irrelevant to whether the subject-matter of the program concerns a matter of public interest. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) (“The importance of motion pictures as an organ of public opinion is not lessened by the fact that they are designed to entertain as well as to inform.”); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948) (“[t]he line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the protection of that basic right [of a free press]…What is one man's amusement, teaches another's doctrine.”)

  10. National Abortion Federation v. Center for Medical Progress et al

    RESPONSE

    Filed August 3, 2015

    “Audio and audiovisual recording are media of expression commonly used for the preservation and dissemination of information and ideas and thus are ‘included within the free speech and free press guaranty of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.’” ACLU v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 595 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952)). “The act of making an audio or audiovisual recording is necessarily included within the First Amendment’s guarantee of speech and press rights as a corollary of the right to disseminate the resulting recording.”