Johnson v. Weld Cty.

10 Citing briefs

  1. Hannah v. Northeastern State University et al

    Second MOTION for Summary Judgment

    Filed August 15, 2016

    These hearsay statements lack any indicia of reliability because: the statements were not made to Dr. Hannah by Dr. Cowlishaw and Dr. Hannah has not identified the person who reported the statements to him or provided any authentication by the person who reported the statements to him. Gross v. Burggraf Const. Co., 52 F.3d 1531, 1541-1542 (10th Cir. 1995) (only admissible evidence considered on reviewing summary judgment order); Johnson v. Weld County Colo., 594 F.3d 1202, 1208-1209 (10th Cir. 2010) (derogatory statement by an employee heard by other employees and reported to plaintiff inadmissable hearsay); Miller v. Gaston, 358 Fed. Appx. 573 (5th Cir. 2009) (denial of qualified immunity based on what plaintiff heard others had heard defendant say is manifest error requiring reversal and rendering of judgment for defendant); Jones v. McNeese, 746 F.3d 887, 899 (8th Cir. 2014) (plaintiff’s testimony he was told of statements made to a third party by a defendant are inadmissable hearsay and cannot be used to defeat qualified immunity on summary judgment); Howell v. New Mexico Dept. Of Aging & Long Term Services, 398 Fed.Appx. 355, 358 (10th Cir. 2010) (report of statement of discriminatory animus by an employee as well as statement in the report are hearsay); Risdal v. Nixon, 589 Fed.Appx. 801, 803 (8th Cir. 2014) (unsworn and hearsay statements are inadmissible such that defendant’s account of event is uncontradicted on qualified immunity summary judgment); Cotton v. Costco Whol

  2. Hull v. KapStone Container Corporation

    REPLY

    Filed March 21, 2018

    In any event, even if Plaintiff’s allegation is true that Moza is no longer employed by KapStone (for whatever reason), this fact is not probative of pretext. See Johnson v. Weld Co., Colo., 594 F.3d 1202, 1212 (10th Cir. 2010) (holding even if the chosen candidate later proved incapable of performing his duties, as the plaintiff alleged, the candidate’s qualifications as they appeared to the employer when the selection was made were arguably superior, and certainly not overwhelmingly inferior, to the plaintiff’s qualifications). Case 3:17-cv-00641-K Document 26 Filed 03/21/18 Page 16 of 21 PageID 322 DEFENDANT’S REPLY IN SUPPORT OF ITS SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION PAGE 12 cases with no explanation as to how they support her unfounded position.

  3. Kennedy v. New Mexico Orthopaedic Surgery Center, L.P. et al

    First MOTION for Summary Judgment and Memorandum in Support

    Filed January 12, 2018

    He or she must come forward with evidence that the employer did not really believe its proffered reasons for action and thus may have been pursuing a hidden discriminatory agenda.” Johnson v. Weld Cty., Colo., 594 F.3d 1202, 1211 (10th Cir. 2010). Kennedy is unable to demonstrate a material fact issue with respect to NMOSC’s proffered reasons for her placement on leave.

  4. Boggs v. Cedar Creek LLC

    MOTION for Summary Judgment and Brief in Support

    Filed November 1, 2017

    Unfortunately for Plaintiff, the only actions in that list that could be considered “materially adverse” for purposes of her retaliation claim are Cedar Creek’s reassignment of job duties and Cedar Creek’s decision to terminate her employment. See Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 555 F.3d 1182, 1184 (10th Cir. 2009) (“an employer’s actions are ‘materially adverse’ if they are ‘harmful to the point that they could well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination’”); Johnson v. Weld Cnty., 594 F.3d 1202, 1216 (10th Cir. 2010) (supervisors giving employee “cold shoulder” and trying to avoid and to distance themselves from her not sufficient to support retaliation claim). While Plaintiff merely alleges she was “stripped” of job duties once she requested her FMLA leave, the record reflects an entirely different scenario.

  5. Sotunde v. Safeway Inc.

    MOTION for Summary Judgment and Supporting Brief

    Filed August 26, 2016

    Sotunde cannot prove pretext by showing that Safeway’s rationale for hiring Cesario or Pawelcik was somehow so “incoherent, weak, inconsistent, or contradictory” as to be unworthy of belief. Johnson, 594 F.3d at 1211. Summary judgment should be granted in Safeway’s favor because Sotunde was not more qualified than the successful candidate, he provides no evidence whatsoever that Safeway’s hiring decisions were based on race, color, or national origin, and Safeway had legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for its hiring decisions.

  6. Hebert v. Sinclair Wyoming Refining Company et al

    MOTION for Summary Judgment

    Filed August 15, 2016

    The Court may only consider evidence that is admissible at trial—inadmissible evidence should be disregarded. Johnson, 594 F.3d at 1209. The Supreme Court of Wyoming has held that a plaintiff’s knowing encounter with an open and obvious danger consisting of a transient, variable, and unpredictable condition of nature, such as the accumulation of snow and ice, constitutes a primary assumption of risk, from which a landowner generally has no duty to protect him.

  7. Willard v. AHS Oklahoma Physician Group, LLC

    REPLY to Response to Motion

    Filed June 20, 2018

    This is because Title VII licenses us not to act as a “super personnel department” to undo bad employment decisions …. Johnson v. Weld County, Colorado, 594 F.3d 1202, 1211 (10th Cir. 2010) (emphasis added); see also Aman v. Dillon Companies, Inc., 645 F. App’x 719, 726 (10th Cir. 2016) (inconsistencies were “simply too minor to give rise to an inference of pretext”); Jackson v. NTMedia, LLC, 233 F. App’x 770, 781 (10th Cir. 2006) (affirming judgment as a matter of law where plaintiff failed to show age bias, noting that “the sheer number of [the plaintiff’s] allegations of error cannot substitute for their lack of substance”); Romero v. City of Albuquerque, 190 F. App’x 597, 606 (10th Cir. 2006)(affirming judgment as a matter of law based on insufficiency of pretext evidence). Significantly, “consistency of [the employer’s] explanations cuts against a finding of pretext.”

  8. Mullahkhel v. State of Utah et al

    MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM and Memorandum in Support

    Filed December 23, 2016

    .................................................................................................. 13 Case 2:16-cv-00921-EJF Document 5 Filed 12/23/16 Page 3 of 28 iv Fullwiley v. Union Pacific Corp., No. 2:04-CV-671 TS, 2006 WL 266615 (D. Utah February 1, 2006) ...................................... 11 Gallagher v. Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063 (10th Cir. 2009) ................................................................................................ vii Garrett v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 305 F.3d 1210 (10th Cir. 2002) ................................................................................................ 13 Johnson v. United Auto Workers-Labor Employment and Training Corp., No. 1:15-cv-0099-BCW, 2016 WL 1092483 (D. Utah March 21, 2016) ..................... vii, 14, 15 Johnson v. Weld County, Colorado, 594 F.3d 1202 (10th Cir. 2010) ................................................................................................ 16 Johnson v. Weld County, Colorado, No. 06-cv-02362-JLK, 2008 WL 4402247 (D. Colo. September 24, 2008) ............................ 16 Kelly v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 14-cv-01692-CMA-KMT, 2015 WL 4600732 (D. Colo. July 31, 2015) .......................... 12

  9. Pea v. Elavon, Inc.

    BRIEF in Support of 36 MOTION for Summary Judgment

    Filed August 5, 2016

    This is because Title VII does not authorize courts to act as a “super personnel department to undo bad employment decisions.” Johnson v. Weld County, Colorado, 594 F.3d 1202, 1211 (10th Cir. 2010). A. Plaintiff Admits To Performance Errors Sufficient To Justify Discipline And Termination Plaintiff argues that Velasquez got it wrong -- that he erred in imposing discipline against Plaintiff and terminating his employment.

  10. Freeman v. Mohawk Industries et al

    Memorandum in Support regarding 60 MOTION for Summary Judgment

    Filed May 30, 2012

    e here fall short of materially adverse under the Burlington standard. See Tepperwein v. Entergy Nuclear Operations, 663 F.3d 556, 568 (2d Cir. 2011) (no materially adverse action where employer investigated the plaintiff three times for alleged misconduct, counseled him, threatened to discharge him twice and forced him to switch from day to night shift); Quinn v. St. Louis County, 653 F.3d 745, 751-52 (8th Cir. 2011) (no actionable employment action where the plaintiff’s office was moved, she was excluded from meetings, she lost job responsibilities, and her new boss—formerly the attorney who represented the employer regarding her discrimination charges—called her a “problem employee,” yelled at her and unfairly accused her of turning work in late); Fercello v. County of Ramsey, 612 F.3d 1069, 1078-79 (8th Cir. 2010) (reassigning the plaintiff’s parking space, moving her to less desirable office and excluding her from meetings are petty slights and not materially adverse); Johnson v. Weld County, 594 F.3d 1202, 1216-17(10th Cir. 2010) (no materially adverse action where, after her complaints, the plaintiff got the “cold shoulder” and her supervisors sat farther away from her at meetings, became too busy to answer her questions and tried to avoid her); McCullough v. Kirkum, 2006 WL 3786043, at *3 (5th Cir. 2006) (relocation to another desk and vague negative comments by co-workers not actionable); Holley v. N.C. Dep’t of Admin., --- F. Case 5:10-cv-00522-BR Document 61 Filed 05/30/12 Page 24 of 32 25 1895375.1 Supp.2d ---, 2012 WL 441175, at *24 (E.D.N.C. 2012) (heightened scrutiny of the plaintiff’s work, inconsistent reviews of her work, and unnecessary delays in approving her work and consequent damage to her relationships with end users and vendors did not amount to materially adverse action); Rose, 2006 WL 173690, fn.