From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

Joel v. United Water Delaware Inc.

Superior Court of Delaware, New Castle County
May 5, 2009
C.A. No. 07C-07-070 JAP (Del. Super. Ct. May. 5, 2009)

Opinion

C.A. No. 07C-07-070 JAP.

Submitted: April 24, 2009.

Decided: May 5, 2009.

On Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

GRANTED.

L. Vincent Rammuno, Esquire, Rammuno Rammuno, P.A., Wilmington, Delaware.

Sean J. Bellew, Esquire, David A. Felice, Esquire, Ballard Spahr Andrews Ingersoll LLP, Wilmington, Delaware.


Dear Counsel:

Before the Court is Defendant United Water Delaware Inc.'s motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs brought this action against Defendant for its alleged negligence in failing to maintain two fire hydrants near Plaintiffs' house. Plaintiffs seek damages for the resulting damage to their home and for emotional distress. The issue is whether a limited liability provision in Defendant's tariff, which was filed with the Delaware Public Utilities Commission, precludes recovery in this case under the "filed rate doctrine." Because, a damages award in this case could have the effect of changing Defendant's approved rates, Plaintiffs claims are barred by the filed rate doctrine and therefore, Defendant's motion is GRANTED.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

A fire started at Plaintiffs' home in the early morning hours of December 20, 2005. Plaintiffs' neighbor called the fire department to report the fire at 4:52 a.m. Chief Eric Haley, the commanding officer, arrived at the scene with two paramedics in a fire company command vehicle at 4:59 a.m. Upon his arrival, Chief Haley determined that Plaintiffs' home was "fully involved." The first fire engine arrived at 5:01 a.m. and three other fire engines arrived minutes later. Due to "the involvement of the house and the danger to the personnel," Chief Haley made the decision that the firefighters would not enter the house, but would stay outside to attack the fire.

Def. Mot., D.I. 36, at 3.

Id.

The two paramedics connected a hose to the nearest fire hydrant but they were unable to turn on the water. Apparently, they were turning the valve in the wrong direction because the arrow on top of the hydrant, which indicates the correct direction to turn to open the valve, had been painted over. According to the dispatch records, that hydrant was reported "dead" at 5:08 a.m.

At 5:12 a.m., firefighters attempted to connect to a second hydrant, but they were again unable to do so. The dispatch records indicate that the second hydrant was reported "frozen" at 5:24 a.m. Inspections performed in 2004 and 2005 on this hydrant reported that it was "very hard to open." A continuous water supply was finally established at 5:31 a.m.

Plaintiffs filed a complaint in this Court alleging that Defendant was negligent in that it failed to properly maintain the two fire hydrants. As a result of Defendant's negligence, Plaintiffs claim the firefighters were not able to effectively minimize the fire and resulting property damage to their home. Plaintiffs additionally allege negligent infliction of emotional distress and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Court previously dismissed Plaintiffs' claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiffs now seek summary judgment on the remaining two claims.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

III. DISCUSSION

Super. Ct. Civ. R. 56(c)

Mason v. USAA, 697 A.2d 388, 392 (Del .1997).

Merrill v. Crothall-American, Inc., 606 A.2d 96, 99 (Del. 1992).

[t]he filed rate doctrine specifies that a filed tariff has the effect of law governing the relationship between the utility and its customers, operates across the spectrum of regulated utilities, and applies where state law creates a state agency and a statutory scheme pursuant to which the state agency determines reasonable rates; it thereby ensures that the governing regulatory body determines the reasonableness of the utility's rates and prevents discrimination in prices among customers receiving the same service.

64 Am. Jur. 2d Public Utilities § 62.

Accordingly, the filed rate doctrine will bar "the court's imposition of a remedy that would change a rate approved by [a regulatory agency]."

Indeck Main Energy, L.L.C. v. ISO New England Inc., 167 F. Supp. 2d 675, 691 (D. Del. 2001). See also AT T Corp. v. JMC Telecom, LLC, 470 F.3d 525, 535 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that the filed rate doctrine barred the defendant's state law counterclaims of breach of contract, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing brought against a telephone company).

Delaware courts have recognized and applied the filed rate doctrine. For example, in Woloshin v. Diamond State Telephone Company, two lawyers filed a complaint against the telephone company for the omission of their listing from the yellow pages of the phone book. The telephone company's tariff included a provision which limited the company's liability for damages arising out of the errors or omission in its directories. There was also a contract between the parties which had a limited liability provision. As for the tariff provision, the Delaware Court of Chancery explained that "[t]he theory is this that, since it renders a service affecting the public, the state shall regulate and control it in order to prevent injustice, and further, in consideration of such regulation and control, its liability is and should be defined and limited." The Chancery Court "accept[ed] that of the vast majority of cases having to do with general tariffs and specific contracts" and limited the telephone company's damages either to the amount provided for in the contract or "as provided for in the general tariff."

380 A.2d 982 (Del.Ch. 1977).

Id. at 984 (quoting Correll v. Ohio Bell Telephone Co., 27 N.E.2d 173 (1939)). See also Southwestern Electric Power Co. v. Grant, 73 S.W.3d 211, 217 (Tex. 2002) (stating that "a tariff's limitation on liability for economic damages is reasonable because a utility: (1) must provide nondiscriminatory service to all customers within its area; (2) must maintain uniform rates and reduce costs; (3) cannot accurately estimate its exposure to damages or efficiently insure against risks; (4) cannot increase rates for all customers based on losses one specific class of customers incurs; and (5) must comply with [Public Utilities Commission] regulations").

Id. See also Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Abbott Supply Co., 74 A.2d 77 (Del. 1950) (holding where the plaintiff brought suit against the defendant for its delay in sending a telegram that the defendant's liability was limited by its filed general tariff).

Pursuant to title 26 of the Delaware Code, the Delaware Public Utilities Commission ("DPUC") has "exclusive original supervision and regulation of all public utilities and also over their rates. . . ." To that end, public utilities must file with the DPUC "complete schedules of every classification employed and of every individual or joint rate, fare or change made, charged or executed by the public utility for any regulated product or service supplied or rendered within this State."

26 Del. C. § 201.

Id. at § 301.

Defendant filed its tariff with the DPUC in accordance with title 26 of the Delaware Code. The tariff, which was approved by the DPUC and in effect on the date of the fire, provides that:

The Company shall not be considered an insurer of property or persons or to have undertaken to extinguish fire or to protect persons or property against loss by fire or otherwise. The Company does not guarantee any special service, pressure capacity or facility other than what is provided by its ordinary and changing operating conditions as they exist from day to day. It is agreed by the parties receiving service that the Company shall be free and exempt from any and all claims for injury to persons or property by reason of fire, water, failure to supply water pressure or capacity.

Def. Mot. at Ex I.

Plaintiffs contend that the controlling precedent in this case is Haynie v. Sheldon. In Haynie, this Court held that, despite a contract with a no liability clause, a water company could be liable in tort where the plaintiffs claimed that the company "negligently failed to supply an adequate quantity and pressure of water for the purpose of fighting fire." However, there is no discussion in Haynie about the water company's tariff or the filed rate doctrine. In fact, the Court stated that "[t]he cost of defending and paying claims would doubtless eventually be borne by consumer of water through higher rates." This is precisely the result that the filed rate doctrine seeks to avoid. Therefore, because Defendant's approved tariff bars recovery in this case, Defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

1985 WL 549295 (Del.Super.).

Id. at *1.

Id. at *3.

Plaintiffs contend that the filed rate doctrine should not apply here because Defendant's insurance will pay any damages that result from this case. Plaintiffs further allege even if Defendant did incur a loss, it could just include that expense in a subsequent tariff. Plaintiffs, however, cite no authority in support of these arguments.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. IT IS SO ORDERED.

Because Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the filed rate doctrine, the Court need not address Defendant's arguments that Plaintiffs cannot prove proximate cause or damages.

oc: Prothonotary


Summaries of

Joel v. United Water Delaware Inc.

Superior Court of Delaware, New Castle County
May 5, 2009
C.A. No. 07C-07-070 JAP (Del. Super. Ct. May. 5, 2009)
Case details for

Joel v. United Water Delaware Inc.

Case Details

Full title:Joel and Iris Brown v. United Water Delaware Inc

Court:Superior Court of Delaware, New Castle County

Date published: May 5, 2009

Citations

C.A. No. 07C-07-070 JAP (Del. Super. Ct. May. 5, 2009)