In re Horton

19 Citing briefs

  1. PEOPLE v. BLACKBURN

    Respondent’s Reply Brief on the Merits

    Filed January 22, 2014

    Third,it is reasonable to infer legislative intent to place the attorney at the helm as captain, not merely due to this threshold showing of mental impairment, but also becausethe attorney is authorized, presumed, and indeed, obligated to make these kinds oftactical decisions to assert or waive statutory rights with the best interest of the client in mind. (Barrett, at p. 1105; People v. Montoya (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 825, 831; Cadle, supra, 144 Cal.App.4that p. 510; In re Horton, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 95) | Appellant’s reliance on People v. Hofferber (197) 70 Cal.App.3d 265, 269, is inapposite as it considered counsel’s authority over the defendant’s constitutional right to enter a plea, i.e., to refuse to plead NGI contrary to advice of counsel, and observed that competencyat trial is based on “Thetest for trial competence, as set forth in Dusky v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 402, is whether a defendant “ ‘has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree ofrational understanding and whetherhehasa rationalaswell as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.’ ” standardsdistinct from those determining sanity during a crime.

  2. PEOPLE v. PALMER

    Respondent’s Answer Brief on the Merits

    Filed January 25, 2013

    Such stipulations resolve contested issues standing by themselves, and do not require reference to additional documentary support. (See People v. Adams, supra, at pp. 578-579; People v. Horton, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 95.) 25 Stipulations are not permitted only in limited circumstances.

  3. PEOPLE v. CLARK (WILLIAM CLINTON)

    Respondent’s Brief

    Filed October 16, 2006

    As discussed in ArgumentI, ante, a criminal defendant’s counsel “has general authority to control the procedural aspects ofthelitigation and, indeed,to bindthe client in these matters.” (in re Horton, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 94.) At a November6, 1995, hearing on Clark’s discovery request, the trial court asked Clark’s counsel, “{I]f these defendants are severed, for example, then would you even be asking for this discovery?

  4. PEOPLE v. ROMERO (ORLANDO) & SELF (CHRISTOPHER)

    Appellant, Christopher Self, Opening Brief

    Filed September 25, 2006

    ) Finally, the waiverof the right to an impartial jury cannotbeascribed to “defense strategies and tactics.” (In re Horton, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 94.) “The question of whetherto seat a biased juror is not a discretionary or strategic decision.”

  5. PEOPLE v. SOUZA (MATTHEW ARIC)

    Appellant's Opening Brief

    Filed January 18, 2005

    Finally, the waiver ofthe right to an impartial jury cannot be ascribed to “defense strategies and tactics.” (In re Horton, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 94.) “The question of whetherto seat a biased juror is not a discretionary or strategic decision.”

  6. PEOPLE v. MIRACLE

    Respondent’s Brief

    Filed September 16, 2015

    ) Where there is a conflict between counsel and defendant about whetherto present a defense at a guilty phase of a capitaltrial, the defendant’s wishes must prevail. (in re Horton (1991) 54 Cal.3d 82, 95, emphasis added; accord, People v. Hinton, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 874; People v. Freeman (2004) 8 Cal.4th 450; see Cookev. State (Del.

  7. PEOPLE v. PENUNURI

    Appellant’s Reply Brief

    Filed November 12, 2014

    ” (/d. at p. 972.) In re Horton (1991) 54 Cal.3d 82 involved defense counsel’s stipulationto trial by a temporary judge (as opposed to a regularly elected or appointed superior court judge), which could be made without the consentof the client because it did not involve a fundamental constitutional right of the defendant. (/d. at pp. 93-95.)

  8. PEOPLE v. SIVONGXXAY (VAENE) (To be called and continued to the December 2016 calendar.)

    Appellant’s Reply Brief

    Filed December 31, 2013

    Defense counsel introduced those documents at the guilt phase, andfailed to object at the penalty phase to the trial court’s consideration of the walkaway as a circumstance ofthe crime under section 190.3, factor (a). (AOB 75-77.) The attorney is the captain of the ship (In re Horton (1991) 54 Cal.3d 82, 95), and a failure to object to error may be imputed totheclient and result in forfeiture of a claim. But application of the forfeiture rule is not automatic.

  9. PEOPLE v. POWELL

    Appellant’s Reply Brief

    Filed November 13, 2013

    The right to trial by jury is amongthatelite of constitutional rights that can be waived only through express, personal waiver by the defendant. (People v. Collins (2001) 26 Cal.4th 297, 307-308; People v. Ernst (1994) 8 Cal.4th 441; Inre Horton (1991) 54 Cal.3d 82, 95.) This places a high responsibility on the trial court to act without prompting wheneverit appearsthat the right to an impartial jury is about to be compromised.

  10. PEOPLE v. AMEZCUA

    Appellant, Joseph Flores, Reply Brief

    Filed August 14, 2013

    In contrast, the decision as to whetheror not to enter a guilty plea is a right that requires a personal waiver by the defendant. (In re Horton (1991) 54 Cal.3d 82, 95; People v. Ernst (1994) 8 Cal.4th 441.) Indeed, the legal requirement that the defendant must waive that right is included in the California Constitution.