Filed September 28, 2015
At best, [defendant] identifies fruitful areas for discovery, such as the degree to which [there] are reasonable substitutes for [the relevant product] and whether [supply] on the other side of the planet is ‘readily available’ [in the alleged geographic market].” 913 F. Supp. 2d at 54. As the Second Circuit cautioned in Todd, the market definition in this case requires “a deeply fact-intensive inquiry.”
Filed September 17, 2015
At best, [defendant] identifies fruitful areas for discovery, such as the degree to which [there] are reasonable substitutes for [the relevant product] and whether [supply] on the other side of the planet is ‘readily available’ [in the alleged geographic market].” 913 F. Supp. 2d at 54. As the Second Circuit cautioned in Todd, the market definition in this case requires “a deeply fact-intensive inquiry.”
Filed July 1, 2016
It is well-settled that allegations such as these plausibly support an inference of anti-competitive intent. See New York v. Actavis PLC, 787 F. 3d 638, 659 (2d Cir. 2015) (finding ―willingness to forsake short-term profits to achieve an anticompetitive end‖ indicative of anti-competitive behavior); In re Adderall XR Antitrust Litig., 754 F.3d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 2014) (defining anti-competitive conduct as ―conduct without a Case 1:15-cv-09689-JGK Document 69 Filed 07/01/16 Page 41 of 45 34 legitimate business purpose that makes sense only because it eliminates competition‖); Meredith Corp. v. SESAC, LLC, 1 F. Supp. 3d 180, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (conduct may be characterized as exclusionary if it ―does not further competition on the merits or does so in an unnecessarily restrictive way‖); Crude Oil, 913 F. Supp. 2d at 56 (―the Complaint alleges that [Defendant] acquired its dominant share of physical WTI despite having no commercial need for it, only to sell it at an uneconomic time. This supports an inference of anticompetitive conduct.
Filed July 14, 2015
For Plaintiffs’ earlier CEA claims, “Defendants bear a heavy burden in establishing” that Plaintiffs knew or through reasonable diligence should have known of their injuries. Crude Oil, 913 F. Supp. 2d at 59 (“Inquiry notice exists only when uncontroverted evidence irrefutably demonstrates when plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the . . . conduct.”).
Filed November 9, 2015
Case 1:15-cv-04878-VM Document 14 Filed 11/09/15 Page 24 of 32 19 supposed to be set by freely-competitive market forces.19 Losses stemming from artificially high prices attributable to Barclays’ antitrust violations is “a quintessential antitrust injury.” In re Crude Oil, 913 F. Supp. 2d at 57. Barclays asserts that Merced’s injury is too remote because Merced’s losses arose from changes in the Dow Jones Daily Index, rather than the ICE Daily Index, which Barclays directly manipulated.
Filed April 24, 2015
Plaintiffs thus were the intended target of defendants’ scheme. In re Crude Oil Commodity Litigation, 913 F. Supp. 2d 41 (S.D.N.Y. 2012): The purpose of defendants’ scheme was to profit on futures trades. Plaintiffs were traders who purchased the offsetting side (either long or short) of defendants’ trades.
Filed September 28, 2018
In addition, defendants bear a heavy burden in establishing the Statute of limitations defense. See, In re Crude Oil, 913 F. Supp. 2d 41, 59 (S.D.N.Y 2012). Ordinarily, questions of timeliness are left for summary judgment (or ultimately trial) at which point the court may determine compliance with the statute of limitations on a more complete factual record.
Filed September 28, 2018
In addition, defendants bear a heavy burden in establishing the Statute of limitations defense. See, In re Crude Oil, 913 F. Supp. 2d 41, 59 (S.D.N.Y 2012). Ordinarily, questions oftimeliness are left for summary judgment (or ultimately trial) at which point the court may determine compliance with the statute of limitations on a more complete factual record.
Filed February 1, 2016
G. Plaintiffs’ Claims Are Not Time-Barred Because “[t]he statute of limitations is an affirmative defense,” dismissal “on statute of limitations grounds at the complaint stage ‘is appropriate only if a complaint clearly shows the claim is out of time.’” In re Crude Oil Commodity Futures Litig., 913 F. Supp. 2d 41, 58 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (quoting Harris v. City of New York, 186 F.3d 243, 250 (2d Cir. 1999)); see also BPP Ill., LLC v. Royal Bank of Scot. Grp.
Filed May 4, 2015
Defendants rehash and attempt to distinguish McCready; Crimpers; Ice Cream Liquidation, Inc. v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 2d 262 (D. Conn. 2003); and In re Crude Oil Commodity Litigation, 913 F. Supp. 2d 41 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). See Def.