In re Coordinated Pretrial Proc. in Pet. Prod

15 Citing briefs

  1. Keller v. Electronic Arts Inc. et al

    RESPONSE

    Filed April 27, 2015

    “It is well-established that an award of attorneys’ fees from a common fund depends on whether the attorneys' specific services benefitted the fund—whether they tended to create, increase, protect or preserve the fund.” In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Products Antitrust Litig., 109 F.3d 602, 608 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Class Plaintiffs v. Jaffe & Schlesinger, P.A., 19 F.3d 1306, 1308 (9th Cir.1994)). Here, despite Mr. McIlwain’s inflated claims of having “originated the right of publicity theory of liability for athletes against [EA],” McIlwain Decl.

  2. In Re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litigation

    MOTION for Attorney Fees Costs and Incentive Awards

    Filed March 11, 2014

    The Ninth Circuit has stated that “[i]t is reasonable for the district court to compare the lodestar fee, or sum of lodestar fees, to the 25% benchmark, as one measure of the reasonableness of the attorneys' hours and rates.” Petroleum Products, 109 F.3d at 607; see also Vizcaino, 290 F.3d at 1050 (calculating the lodestar in an effort measure the attorneys’ investment of time into the case “provides a check on the reasonableness of the percentage award”). The 25% benchmark rate is thus “a starting point for analysis,” and “[s]election of the benchmark or any other rate must be supported by findings that take into account all of the circumstances of the case.”

  3. In re: Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Acceleration Marketing, Sales Practices, and Products Liability Litigation

    MEMORANDUM in Support of MOTION for Attorney Fees 3562

    Filed April 23, 2013

    9% and median of 25%.65 And the Ninth Circuit has rejected the notion that fee percentages should decline as settlement sizes increase.66 Indeed, there have been many class settlements throughout the country 63 Fitzpatrick Decl., ¶ 15. 64 Powers, 229 F.3d at 1256; Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1029; In re Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 109 F.3d at 607; Torrisi v. Tucson Elec. Power Co., 8 F.3d at 1376; see also Adderley v. NFL Players Ass’n, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115742, at *7; Briggs, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50990, at *26. 65 Fitzpatrick Decl., ¶ 20; see also Vizcaino, 290 F.3d at 1051-52 (including table of percentage-based attorneys’ fee awards in common fund cases of $50-200 million from 1996 through 2001); Omnivision, 559 F. Supp. 2d at 1047 (28% fee award); Knight v. Red Door Salons, Inc., 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11149, at *15 (30% fee award); In re Pacific Enters.

  4. In Re: TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litigation

    MOTION for Attorney Fees Reimbursement of Expenses, and Incentive Awards

    Filed October 28, 2011

    The use of a current hourly rate for all hours billed is a permissible way to account for delay in payment. Petroleum, 109 F.3d at 609; In re Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys.

  5. MDL No. 1917 In Re: Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litigation

    REPLY

    Filed February 4, 2016

    II ¶ 22. 58 St. John Objection at 23 (citing In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Products, 109 F.3d 602, 608 (9th Cir. 1997): “[A] lawyer is not entitled . . . to compensation for hours a reasonable lawyer would not have spent, hours unreasonably spent, or work done so badly it is of no value to the common fund beneficiaries.”) 59 Id.

  6. LAFFITTE v. ROBERT HALF INTERNATIONAL (BRENNAN)

    Respondent, Mark Laffitte, Answer Brief on the Merits

    Filed August 26, 2015

    For this additional reason, this Court should approve the continuing use of the percentage method as a permissible means for ensuring that a fee awardedis reasonable. See In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Products Antitrust Lit., 109 F.3d 602, 607 (9th Cir. 1997) (““Reasonableness is the goal, and mechanical or formulaic application of either [the percentage methodor the lodestar] method, where it yields an unreasonable result, can be an abuseofdiscretion.”); see also In re Wachovia Corp. ERISA Litig., 2011 WL 7787962, *2 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 24, 2011) (“The percentage methodalso gives courts ‘more flexibility to award attorneys for the efficient settlement of a case.’”) (quotation omitted); Newberg, § 13:80 - 43 - at 498 (“Givingtrial courts the flexibility to decide between percentage and lodestar allows the fairest determination of reasonable attorney’s fees in eachsituation.”).

  7. Gaos v. Google Inc.

    MOTION for Settlement

    Filed July 25, 2014

    1); see Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1043, 1047 (9th Cir. 2002); In re Coordinated 4 A “clear sailing” provision refers to a settlement term in which a defendant agrees not to challenge class counsels’ fee request up to an agreed amount. Case5:10-cv-04809-EJD Document65 Filed07/25/14 Page25 of 29 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 21 FINAL APPROVAL BRIEF 5:10-CV-4809-EJD Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Products Antitrust Litig., 109 F.3d 602, 607 (9th Cir. 1997). Finally, although not dispositive, the presence of a mediator supports a finding of non- collusion.

  8. Beauperthuy et al v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc. et al

    MOTION for Attorney Fees

    Filed August 9, 2013

    Fischel, 307 F.3d at 1008; see also In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 109 F.3d 602, 609 (9th Cir.1997). The “lodestar multiplier” is calculated by dividing the percentage fee award by the lodestar calculation.

  9. American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California et al v. Drug Enforcement Administration

    MOTION for Attorney Fees AND LITIGATION COSTS; MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT

    Filed May 10, 2012

    Time is reasonably spent and thus compensable if the work is reasonably directed to achieving the client’s goals, even if it does not produce a favorable result. See Balla v. State of Idaho, __F.3d __, 2012 WL 1293410 at *9 (9th Cir. 2012) (fees “directly and reasonably incurred” where attorneys “work was what one would expect of a lawyer working for a client that could afford its efforts but that was not indifferent to the cost”); Coordinated Pretrial Proceeding v. Exxon Corp., 109 F.3d 602, 608 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Good legal representation regularly includes some work which does not bear fruit”). Once the plaintiff has presented a fully-documented claim, “[t]he party opposing the fee application has a burden of rebuttal that requires submission of evidence to the district court challenging the accuracy and reasonableness of the hours charged or the facts asserted by the prevailing party in its submitted affidavits.”

  10. Ray Pizarro et al v. International Coffee and Tea LLC

    MEMORANDUM in Support of Unopposed Motion for Attorneys' Fees, Reimbursement of Expenses and Incetive Award

    Filed May 12, 2008

    See also In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust Litig., 109 F.3d 602 (9th Cir. 1997) (comparison of the lodestar fee to the percentage fee is an appropriate measure of a percentage fee’s reasonableness); Heritage Bond, 2005 WL 1594389, at *16 (same). The starting point for calculating the amount of a reasonable fee is the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate.