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In re Baletti

United States District Court, E.D. California
Jan 2, 2007
CASE NO. CIV. S-06-1507 WBS, CIV. S-06-1801-WBS (Bankruptcy Court No. 05-27329-C7), (Adversary Proceeding No. 05-2302) (E.D. Cal. Jan. 2, 2007)

Opinion

CASE NO. CIV. S-06-1507 WBS, CIV. S-06-1801-WBS (Bankruptcy Court No. 05-27329-C7), (Adversary Proceeding No. 05-2302).

January 2, 2007


MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION


Currently before the court is Appellant A. Lewis Chandler's motion for reconsideration of the court's order of October 26, 2006, dismissing Chandler's appeal from several orders of the United States Bankruptcy Court denying summary judgment and denying his request for a jury trial because the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

The court will consider Chandler's motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) because it seeks relief from a previous order. Reconsideration is an "extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources." Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000). Rule 60(b) "provides for reconsideration only upon a showing of (1) mistake, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) fraud; (4) a void judgment; (5) a satisfied or discharged judgment; or (6) `extraordinary circumstances' which would justify relief." Id. Under Rule 60(b), reconsideration is generally only appropriate where the district court (1) is presented with newly discovered evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision was manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in controlling law. See United States v. Westlands Water Dist., 134 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1131 (E.D. Cal. 2001).

Under Local Rule 78-230(k)(3), motions for reconsideration must also set forth "what new or different facts or circumstances are claimed to exist which did not exist or were not shown upon such prior motion, or what other grounds exist for the motion." In addition, the moving party bears the burden of showing the necessary grounds for granting relief. See Cassidy v. Tenorio, 856 F.2d 1412, 1415 (9th Cir. 1988). The court must take the moving party's factual allegations as true. Id. Mere legal conclusions, general denials, or simple assertions that the movant has a meritorious defense are insufficient to justify upsetting the underlying judgment. Id.

Jurisdiction over an appeal from an order of a bankruptcy court is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 158. That section vests the district courts with jurisdiction to hear appeals "from final judgments, orders, and decrees . . . and with leave of the court, from other interlocutory orders and decrees." 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(a) (c). Thus, only "final" rulings may be appealed as a matter of right; a party seeking to appeal any other order must seek leave of the court. In re Frontier Props., Inc. v. Elliot, 979 F.2d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir. 1992). Chandler argues that the court committed clear error in ruling that it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal because the Bankruptcy Court had in fact entered a final judgment. Chandler relies on In re Rains, 482 F.3d 893, 901 (9th Cir. 2005). InRains, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court, acting in its appellate capacity, had jurisdiction to hear an appeal from an interlocutory order of the bankruptcy court approving a settlement agreement. Id. at 901 ("Whatever prematurity existed in Rains's appeal from the order approving the settlement agreement was cured by the subsequent entry of a final judgment."). In its previous order, because it was not made clear that Chandler's appeal of final judgment was also before this court, the court did not consider the effect of that appeal upon the court's jurisdiction. The court accordingly erred in dismissing the entire appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

1. Appeal of Jury Demand Denial

Chandler appealed the bankruptcy court's denial of his demand for a jury trial. An appellant may appeal from certain kinds of interlocutory orders after the entry of final judgment.Am. Ironworks Erectors Inc. v. N. Am. Constr. Corp., 248 F.3d 892, 897 (9th Cir. 2001) ("A party may appeal interlocutory orders after entry of final judgment because those orders merge into that final judgment."); Munoz v. Small Business Administration, 644 F.2d 1361, 1364 (9th Cir. 1981) (noting that "an appeal from the final judgment draws in question all earlier non-final orders and all rulings which produced the judgment"). Because the matter was heard and decided ultimately by the court without a jury, the denial of Chandler's request for jury trial led ultimately to the judgment. The court therefore erred in finding that it did not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal from that denial. Accordingly, Chandler's motion for reconsideration will be granted with regard to his appeal from the order of the Bankruptcy Court denying his demand for jury trial.

2. Appeal of Summary Judgment Denials

Chandler also appealed the Bankruptcy Court's two denials of his summary judgment motions. The court did not commit a clear error in finding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal from those orders.

Rains held that "even if the order approving the settlement agreement were interlocutory, we are not necessarily deprived of jurisdiction because `subsequent events can validate a prematurely filed appeal.'" Rains, 428 F.3d at 901 (quotingEthridge v. Harbor House Rest., 861 F.2d 1389.) The subsequent events in Rains included appeals from court orders enforcing the settlement agreement. Id. at 898-99. Specifically, the Rains bankruptcy court granted an ex parte application for entry of judgment pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreement. An appeal of the Rains bankruptcy court's judgment thus naturally drew into question the interlocutory order approving the settlement agreement. Cf. Munoz, 644 F.2d at 1364.

An appeal of a denial of summary judgment is materially different. An order denying summary judgment does not ordinarily become appealable after a trial on the merits. Allahar v. Zahora, 59 F.3d 693, 695 (7th Cir. 1995) ("Once a trial has been completed and all the facts presented, it is almost always immaterial whether or not summary judgment should have been granted at an earlier point in the proceedings."); see also Haberman v. The Hartford Ins. Group, 443 F.3d 1257, 1264 (10th Cir. 2006) ("The denial of summary judgment based on factual disputes is not properly reviewable on an appeal from a final judgment entered after trial."). The proper redress for a denial of a summary judgment based on a factual dispute "would not be through appeal but subsequent motions for judgment as a matter of law . . . and appellate review of those motions if they were denied." Whalen v. Unit Rig, Inc., 974 F.2d 1248, 1250-51 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 973 (1993).

Further, the question of the propriety of considering Chandler's summary judgment motions is jurisdictional. E.E.O.C. v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 839 F.2d 302, 354 n. 55 (7th Cir. 1988) (whether to make an exception to the normal rule that an order denying summary judgment is not appealable goes to the jurisdiction over a particular appeal.) The court does not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal from the denial of summary judgment motions based on factual disputes even after final judgment has been entered. An appellant may contest the final judgment and all non-final orders which produced the final judgment. Munoz, 644 F.2d at 1364. Because Chandler was afforded an opportunity to contest the facts at a hearing subsequent to the Bankruptcy Court's denials of his summary judgment motions for the reason that material facts remained, those denials were immaterial to the Bankruptcy Court's final judgment. Accordingly, the court will deny Chandler's motion for reconsideration of that part of this court's previous order dismissing his appeal from the bankruptcy court's orders denying his motions for summary judgment.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that:

(1) appellant Chandler's motion for reconsideration be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED IN PART, as to the jury trial denial; and DENIED IN PART, as to the denial of the motions for summary judgment;

(2) the court's October 26, 2006, order is VACATED IN PART, insofar as the court dismissed the appeal of the jury demand denial for lack of jurisdiction.

Appellant is given fifteen days to file an Opening Brief consistent with this order. Appellee's Opening Brief shall be due fifteen days after service of appellant's Opening Brief.


Summaries of

In re Baletti

United States District Court, E.D. California
Jan 2, 2007
CASE NO. CIV. S-06-1507 WBS, CIV. S-06-1801-WBS (Bankruptcy Court No. 05-27329-C7), (Adversary Proceeding No. 05-2302) (E.D. Cal. Jan. 2, 2007)
Case details for

In re Baletti

Case Details

Full title:In re: MICHELLE MARIE BALETTI Debtor, PREM DHAWAN, Plaintiff and Appellee…

Court:United States District Court, E.D. California

Date published: Jan 2, 2007

Citations

CASE NO. CIV. S-06-1507 WBS, CIV. S-06-1801-WBS (Bankruptcy Court No. 05-27329-C7), (Adversary Proceeding No. 05-2302) (E.D. Cal. Jan. 2, 2007)