Hurtado v. Statewide Home Loan Co.

4 Citing briefs

  1. GAINES v. FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY

    Respondents, Aurora Loan Services LLC and Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., Answer Brief on the Merits

    Filed July 15, 2014

    Even though contrary findings could have been made,an appellate court should defer to the factual determinations made bythetrial court when the evidence is in conflict. This is true whether the trial court's ruling is based on oral testimony or declarations. [Fn. 4: Any contrary implication in Hurtado v. Statewide Home Loan Co. (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 1019 is hereby disapproved.]” Shamblin, supra, 44 Cal.3d 474, 479[Emphasis in original].

  2. PEOPLE v. REED

    Appellant’s Reply Brief

    Filed December 24, 2013

    Even in abuseof discretion cases, an appellate court may conduct an independentreview whereit is in as good of a position as the trial court to decide the issue. (Hurtado v. Statewide HomeLoan Co. (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 1019, 1024-1027.) 2. Respondent Omitsall of the Proceedings Leading Up to the Request Respondentomitsall of the timeline set out at pages 48 through 57 of appellant’s Opening Brief, demonstrating the defense was in 21 contact with witness Galindo as early as September2, 1998, and that Galindo remained available during all of the prosecution-created delays — including protracted indecision by the District Attorneyas to whetherto seek the death penalty.

  3. PEOPLE v. POTTS

    Appellant’s Opening Brief

    Filed April 30, 2009

    of a reviewer of the record to observe witnesses' demeanor l22 and the limited capacity of such a person to 12ISullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. 275, 279; Satterwhite v. Texas (1988) 486 U.S. 249, 263 (cone. opn. of Marshall, J.) 122People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425,451. 204 develop a "'feel' for the emotional environment of the courtroom"; 123 the inherent unknowability of what goes into the subjective weighing with which jurors are charged when deciding penalty,124 their being permitted to rely on mercy or sympathyl25 and required to exercise their own normative judgment as to the significance of each fact they find,126 and, as a consequence, the surprise life verdicts that juries sometimes agree on in highly aggravated cases; 127 the principle that reversal is required if one juror might have decided differently if not influenced by error; 128 and the 123People v. Keene (Ill. 1995) 660 N.E.2d 901, 913; see also Caldwell v. Mississippi (1985) 472 U.S. 320, 330, 340, fn. 7; Hurtado v. Statewide Home Loan Co. (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 1019, 1024-1025. 124Deck v. Missouri (2005) 544 U.S. 622, ,[61 L. Ed. 2d 953, 965; 125 S. Ct. 2007, 2014] [factors are "are often unquantifiable and elusive"]; Satterwhite v. Texas (1988) 486 U.S. 249, 258; People v. Robertson (1982) 33 Ca1.3d 21, 54; People v. Hamilton, supra, 60 Ca1.2d 105, 136-137; People v. Hines (1964) 61 Cal.2d 164, 169, disapproved on another ground in People v. Murtishaw (1981) 29 Ca1.3d 733, 774, fn. 40. 125People v. Caro (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1035, 1067; People v. Easley (1983) 34 Ca1.3d 858, 875-880.

  4. PEOPLE v. ROMERO (ORLANDO) & SELF (CHRISTOPHER)

    Appellant, Orlando Gene Romero, Reply Brief

    Filed May 17, 2011

    '°Satterwhite v. Texas, supra, 486 U.S. at p. 258. Sullivan y. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. 275, 279; see also Satterwhite v. Texas (1988) 486 U.S. 249, 263 (conc. opn. of Marshall, J.) 103 demeanor’and the limited capacity ofsuch a person to develop a “‘feel’ for the emotional environment of the courtroom”;'” ° the inherent unknowability of what goes into the subjective weighing with whichjurors are charged,'”’ their being permitted to rely on mercy or sympathy’ and being required to exercise their own normative judgmentasto the significance of each fact they find;'*° ° as a consequence of the previous factors, the surprise life verdicts that juries sometimes agree on in highly aggravated cases, which demonstrate the dangers of guessing what a jury would have done;’*° '' People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 451. 'People v. Keene(Ill. 1995) 660 N.E.2d 901, 913; see also Caldwell v. Mississippi, supra, 472 U.S. 320, 330, 340, fn. 7; Hurtado v. Statewide HomeLoan Co. (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 1019, 1024-1025. 'SDeck v. Missouri (2005) 544 U.S. 622, _, [61 L. Ed. 2d 953, 965; 125 S. Ct. 2007, 2014] [factors are “are often unquantifiable and elusive”]; Satterwhite v. Texas, supra, 486 U.S. 249, 258; People v. Robertson (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21,54; People v. Hamilton (1963) 60 Cal.2d 105, 136-137; People v. Hines (1964) 61 Cal.2d 164, 169, disapproved on another ground in People v. Murtishaw (1981) 29 Cal.3d 733, 774, fn. 40. 'People vy. Caro (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1035, 1067; People v. Easley (1983) 34 Cal.3d 858, 875-880.