Huber v. Taylor

8 Citing briefs

  1. CE Design Ltd. v. Cy's Crab House North, Inc.

    MEMORANDUM status hearing, set/reset hearings 412

    Filed August 31, 2011

    As a matter of law, the June 23, 2008 letter did not meaningfully disclose any conflicts. See Huber, 469 F.3d at 82 (holding that a disclosure of conflicts of interest must be “full and meaningful * * * by which we mean something beyond form disclosures, as clients must understand a conflict to give their consent to an intelligible waiver”). Shoquist and Samore emphasize that the June 23, 2008 letter advised Defendants that they could select counsel of their own choosing and that Defendants elected not to do so, and they opine that Defendants thereby impliedly waived the Peppers conflict by allowing SA to continue to represent them.

  2. THE MICHAEL S. RULLE FAMILY DYNASTY TRUST v. AGL LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY

    Memorandum of Law re MOTION to Dismiss the Amended Complaint and Certificate of Service

    Filed July 28, 2010

    If no relevant difference is found, then there is no conflict, and the states’ laws may be referred to interchangeably. Huber v. Taylor, 469 F.3d 67, 74 (3d Cir. 2006). If, however, “there are relevant differences between the laws, then the court should examine the governmental policies underlying each law, and classify the conflict as a ‘true,’ ‘false,’ or ‘unprovided-for’ situation.”

  3. Airgas, Inc. v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore, LLP

    REPLY to Response to Motion re MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings In Further Support

    Filed July 19, 2010

    That is not the law in Pennsylvania or anywhere else. As an initial matter, while the issue appears unsettled in the Commonwealth, see Huber v. Taylor, 469 F.3d 67, 77 (3d Cir. 2006), no Pennsylvania court has ever held that fees paid to an attorney constitute “injury” for purposes of a breach of fiduciary claim, and many out- 10 Indeed, Airgas acknowledges that “injury” is an essential element of a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty. See Opp’n Br.

  4. THE MICHAEL S. RULLE FAMILY DYNASTY TRUST v. AGL LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY

    MOTION to Dismiss the Amended Complaint

    Filed May 18, 2010

    If no relevant difference is found, then there is no conflict, and the states’ laws may be referred to interchangeably. Huber v. Taylor, 469 F.3d 67, 74 (3d Cir. 2006). If, however, “there are relevant differences between the laws, then the court should examine the governmental policies underlying each law, and classify the conflict as a ‘true,’ ‘false,’ or ‘unprovided-for’ situation.”

  5. THE MICHAEL S. RULLE FAMILY DYNASTY TRUST v. AGL LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANY

    MOTION to Dismiss

    Filed March 26, 2010

    If no relevant difference is found, then there is no conflict, and the states’ laws may be referred to interchangeably. Huber v. Taylor, 469 F.3d 67, 74 (3d Cir. 2006). If, however, “there are relevant differences between the laws, then the court should examine the governmental policies underlying each law, and classify the conflict as a ‘true,’ ‘false,’ or ‘unprovided-for’ situation.”

  6. Rogers et al v. Gentex Corporation

    BRIEF IN OPPOSITION re MOTION to Dismiss Counts IV-VII MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM of Plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint

    Filed May 8, 2017

    Although Skipworth did not explicitly recognize a cause of action under Section 876, the opinion has since been interpreted as implicitly doing so by the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court. See Koken, 825 A.2d at 731 (“[T]his Court is convinced by this language in Skipworth that Section 876 is a viable cause of action in Pennsylvania.”); see also Huber v. Taylor, 469 F.3d 67, 79 (3d Cir.2006) (implying that Pennsylvania recognizes the tort of aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty). This Court agrees with the Koken court's reading of Skipworth.

  7. Saltzman v. Pella Corporation et al

    MOTION

    Filed August 27, 2014

    See, e.g., Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Law Offices of Melbourne Mills, Jr., PLLC, 676 F.3d 534 (6th Cir. 2012); Huber v. Taylor, 469 F.3d 67 (3d Cir. 2006) (suing class counsel for breach of fiduciary duty); Achtman v. Kirby, McInerney & Squire, LLP, 2005 WL 2277719 (2d Cir. Sept. 19, 2005); Pigford v. Veneman, 292 F.3d 918, 926 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (remedy is to sue class counsel for malpractice); Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., 100 F.3d 1348 (7th Cir. 1996); Durkin v. Shea & Gould, 92 F.3d 1510 (9th Cir. 1996); Diaz v. Sheppard, 85 F.3d 1502 (11th Cir. 1996); Johnson v. Nextel Commc’ns, Inc., 293 F.R.D. 660 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); Hays v. Pearlman, 2010 WL 4510956 (D. S.C. Nov. 2, 2010) (denying motion to dismiss putative class plaintiffs’ professional malpractice, breach of fiduciary, and negligent misrepresentation claims); City of Dubuque v. Iowa Trust, 519 N.W.2d 786 (Iowa 1994); Janik v. Rudy, Exelrod & Zieff, 119 Cal. App. 4th 930 (Cal. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2004); Smith v. McCleskey, Harriger, Brazill, & Graf, L.L.P., 15 S.W.3d 644 (Tex. App. 2000).

  8. Robinson et al v. Wolters Kluwer Health, Inc. et al

    MEMORANDUM AND/OR OPINION RE: PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REMAND TO THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF PHILADELPHIA

    Filed December 2, 2011

    “However, ‘[b]efore a choice of law question arises, there must first be a true conflict between the potentially applicable bodies of law.’” In re6 Flonase Antitrust Litig., - - - F. Supp. 2d - - -, No. 08-cv-3301, 2011 WL 4464823, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 26, 2011) (citing Huber v. Taylor, 469 F.3d 67, 74 (3d Cir. 2006)). “‘If a true conflict exists, the court must then determine which state has the greater interest in the application of its law.