Filed October 23, 2014
Of course, that is precisely what Plaintiff has alleged in the FAC, and Hourani held that money laundering did not proximately cause defendant’s injury. See Hourani v. Mirtchev, 943 F. Supp. 2d 159, 167 (D.D.C. 2013) (holding that merely receiving some money in bank accounts and post-extortion money laundering in the U.S. is too “isolated” and “peripheral” to support a RICO claim). V. PLAINTIFF’S STATE-LAW CLAIMS ARE IMPROPERLY PLED As moving defendants show in their Motion, Plaintiff’s state law claims fail for lack of jurisdiction (Mot.
Filed August 21, 2015
In any event, even if the allegation of money in a U.S. account were plausible, it wouldn’t matter: As this Court noted, “to the extent the Bank of China fraud [in Chao Fan Xu] ‘was predicated on extraterritorial activity, it is beyond the reach of RICO even if the bank fraud resulted in some of the money reaching the United States.’” Op. 13 (quoting Chao Fan Xu, 706 F.3d at 978); accord, e.g., Hourani v. Mirtchev, 943 F. Supp. 2d 159, 164, 167–68 (D.D.C. 2013) (cited with approval at Op. 15), aff’d on other grounds, No. 13–7088, 2015 WL 4590324 (D.C. Cir. July 31, 2015). So too here: even if the supposed Mexican bribery scheme resulted in money reaching the United States, it would still be beyond the reach of RICO.
Filed March 26, 2015
Dressel-WBG v. Wong, No. C09-1786-JCC, 2014 WL 1047946 at *10 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 14, 2014) (discussing extraterritoriality in dicta, as the court held that the PSLRA precludes securities fraud as a RICO predicate); Hourani v. Mirtchev, 943 F. Supp. 2d 159, 168 (D.D.C. 2013) (finding the predicate acts and “‘challenged conduct’ took place entirely abroad”); United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 783 F. Supp. 2d 23, 29 (D.D.C. 2011) (“[D]omestic conduct was not the basis for its RICO liability in this case. At trial the Government never argued that BATCo’s domestic activity provided an adequate basis for RICO liability.”)
Filed July 19, 2015
22, at n.3, the injuries Plaintiffs allege in their Complaint are derivative of the injuries they alleged in the claims stayed in the S.D.N.Y. action, and they cannot conjure up a RICO claim premised on alleged subsequent money laundering of funds illicitly obtained abroad. See, e.g., Hourani v. Mirtchev, 943 F. Supp. 2d 159, 166 & n.9 (D.D.C. 2013) (“Krull Corporation’s involvement was limited to the money laundering scheme, in which Dariga paid Defendant Mirtchev with money partially derived from Plaintiffs’ businesses, through Krull (and other) bank accounts located both within and outside of the United States. Post-extortion money laundering between U.S. and foreign bank accounts is not sufficient to render a RICO scheme domestic.”)
Filed August 30, 2013
53 Gulf States Reorganization Group, Inc. v. Nucor Corp., No. 11-14983, 2013 WL 3490824 (11th Cir. July 15, 2013) .................................................................. 57 Hear-Wear Techs., LLC v. Oticon, Inc., 551 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (N.D. Okla. 2008) ................................................................................................ 53 High Tech. Careers v. San Jose Mercury News, 996 F.2d 987 (9th Cir. 1993) ................................................................................................................... 37 Hourani v. Mirtchev, No. 10-1618, 2013 WL 1901013 (D.D.C. 2013) .................................................................................... 53 In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112 (3d Cir. 1999) .................................................................................................................... 51