Hoffmanv.Impact Confections

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth CircuitMar 4, 2010
369 Fed. Appx. 823 (9th Cir. 2010)

No. 09-55019.

Submitted February 16, 2010.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed.R.App.P. 34(a)(2).

Filed March 4, 2010.

Carl Edward Hoffman, Vista, CA, pro se.

Joseph P. Tabrisky, Esquire, Anderson, McPharlin Conners LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, Barry T. Moskowitz, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. 3:06-cv-00489-BTM-NLS.

Before: FERNANDEZ, GOULD, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.



MEMORANDUM

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

Carl Edward Hoffman appeals pro se from the district court's order denying his Rule 60(b) motion seeking relief from judgment against him in his trade secret misappropriation lawsuit. Hoffman contends that defendant's summary judgment motion went unopposed as a result of his attorney's negligence and misconduct by counsel for defendant. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for abuse of discretion, Casey v. Albertson's Inc., 362 F.3d 1254, 1257 (9th Cir. 2004), and we affirm.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Hoffman's motion because he did not demonstrate any viable ground for relief under Rule 60(b). See id. at 1259-60 (9th Cir. 2004) (affirming denial of Rule 60(b)(1) motion that was based on alleged attorney malpractice and explaining that Rule 60(b)(3) requires "clear and convincing evidence that the [judgment] was obtained through fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct and the conduct complained of prevented the losing party from fully and fairly presenting" its case); Latshaw v. Trainer Wortham Co., Inc., 452 F.3d 1097, 1101, 1103 (9th Cir. 2006) (explaining that mistakes resulting from attorney negligence "are more appropriately addressed through malpractice claims" than under Rule 60(b)(1) and that Rule 60(b)(6) "is used sparingly" and "only where extraordinary circumstances prevented a party from taking timely action") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Hofftnan's remaining contentions are unpersuasive.

AFFIRMED.