Hoffa v. United States

7 Citing briefs

  1. USA v. Christian et al

    MEMORANDUM in Opposition

    Filed July 31, 2013

    denied, 520 U.S. 1109 (1997). C. Cross-Examination is a Sufficient Guarantee of Reliability Williams argues that the right to cross-examination – as described by the Supreme Court in Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 – is inadequate as a safe guard, or test, for an informant’s truthfulness. (Def.

  2. PEOPLE v. BRYANT

    Appellant, Stanley Bryant, Opening Brief

    Filed December 16, 2004

    The Wheeler house wasclearly a private residence, used regularly by appellant, and thus by definition appellant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the premises. (Ibid.; see also Hoffa v. United States, supra, 385 U.S. 293.) And, as explained below, no exigent circumstancejustified the warrantless search ofthat house.

  3. USA v. Phua et al

    RESPONSE to 229 Joint MOTION to Suppress Fruits of Warrantless Searches ;

    Filed November 10, 2014

    But the Fourth Amendment, however, does not protect wrongdoers from misplaced confidence in the fact that their activities would not be detected, or reported by Caesars’ employees. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 87 S.Ct. 408, 17 L.Ed.2d 374 (1966). Defendants retained the choice of whether—and when—to permit SAs Lopez and Kung to enter Villa 8882.

  4. ROBEY v. S.C. (PEOPLE)

    Real Party in Interest, The People, Opening Brief on the Merits

    Filed February 15, 2012

    In fact, there is no logical basis to conclude that an officer’s sense of smell provides any less basis for probable cause than his or her sight. Logically, “plain smell”is an exception to the warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendmentakin to plain view. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has expanded plain view to include “plain feel” in Minnesota v. Dickerson (1993) 508 U.S. 366 and “plain hearing” in Hoffa v. United States (1966) 385 U.S. 293. In the California Judges Benchbook Search and Seizure, 2" edition 2002 (CEB), Published by Judicial Counsel of California, “Plain Smell” is listed under the heading of plain view, Section 5.13.

  5. USA v. Muhtorov et al

    RESPONSE to Motion

    Filed May 9, 2014

    Senders of electronic communications do not retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in communications once they arrive at their destination The Supreme Court has long held that when one person voluntarily discloses information to another, the first person loses any cognizable interest under the Fourth Amendment in what the second person does with the information. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 335 (1973); White, 401 U.S. at 752 (plurality opinion); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302-03 (1966). For Fourth Amendment purposes, the same principle applies whether the recipient intentionally makes the information public or stores it in a place subject to a government search.

  6. Animal Legal Defense Fund et al v. Herbert et al

    MEMORANDUM in Opposition re MOTION to Dismiss

    Filed December 10, 2013

    8 Undercover investigations are not uncommon and serve important functions. See, e.g., United States v. Wahchumwah, 710 F.3d 862, 868 (9th Cir. 2013) (approving “undercover agent’s warrantless use of a concealed audio-video device in a home”); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966). Private party media investigations, including investigative features such as the infamous “To Catch a Predator” are a common form of politically salient speech.

  7. Bessie Caldwell et al., Appellants,v.Cablevision Systems Corporation, et al., Defendants, Communications Specialists, Inc., Respondent.

    Brief

    Filed January 8, 2013

    Rather, it chose to follow a line of criminal authority: “[C]ontrary to the plaintiffs’ contention, the exclusion of Dr. Krosser’s testimony was not the required remedy in this case. Our legal system generally ‘leave[s] the veracity of a witness to be tested by cross-examination, and the credibility of his testimony to be determined by a properly instructed jury’ (Hoffa v. United States, 385 US 293, 211). Accordingly, for example, a witness who has been promised a favorable plea bargain in exchange for his or her truthful testimony is competent to testify, even though the promise of a reduced sentence undoubtedly creates a motive to fabricate (see People v. Jackson, 74 NY2d 787, 789-90; see also United States v. Persico, 832 F2d 705, 717 [paid informant is competent to testify], cert denied 486 US 1022; United States v. Cervantes-Pacheco, 826 F2d 310, 315 [same], cert denied sub nom.