at 694.Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). 559 U.S. 356 (2010).
In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with a guilty plea, a petitioner must prove that his coun- sel's performance fell below the well-established standard outlined in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57-59 (1985). Strickland requires proof of both ineffec- tive representation and actual prejudice -- that is, proof that counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofes- sional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted); Strickland [v.Washington], 466 U.S. [668,] 695 [(1984)]. And, more fundamentally, the Government overlooks that the inquiry we prescribed in Hill v. Lockhart [474 U.S. 52 (1985)] focuses on a defendant’s decisionmaking, which may not turn solely on the likelihood of conviction after trial.A defendant without any viable defense will be highly likely to lose at trial. And a defendant facing such long odds will rarely be able to show prejudice from accepting a guilty plea that offers him a better resolution than would be likely after trial.
Assuming trial counsel was deficient, the court of appeals holds there was no prejudice. Under the standard in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985), and compared to the prejudice showing made in State v. Dillard, 2014 WI 123, 358 Wis. 2d 543, 859 N.W.2d 44, Clarmont hasn’t shown why he would have gone to trial had he known of the IP address evidence at the time of his plea:¶22 While Clarmont expresses confidence in the efficacy of the IP address information drastically changing the results of both trials, we are not so convinced. The IP information did not provide Clarmont with a complete defense to the felony bail jumping charge; it certainly did not provide him a complete defense for the one felony and multiple misdemeanor charges in case No. 2012CF188.
This assessment, in turn, will depend in large part on a prediction whether the evidence likely would have changed the outcome of a trial. Similarly, where the alleged error of counsel is a failure to advise the defendant of a potential affirmative defense to the crime charged, the resolution of the “prejudice” inquiry will depend largely on whether the affirmative defense likely would have succeeded at trial.Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S. Ct. 366, 370-371, 88 L. Ed. 2d 203, 210 (1985).In evaluating a case with an eye toward filing to vacate a plea, an attorney needs to start by looking at two documents: 1) the plea petition and 2) the plea transcript.
Prejudice requires showing a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the defendant wouldn’t have pleaded guilty but instead would have insisted on going to trial. Slip op., p. 12, citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). AEDPA deference is heightened in this context:Deference to the state court’s prejudice determination is all the more significant in light of the uncertainty inherent in plea negotiations described above: The stakes for defendants are high, and many elect to limit risk by forgoing the right to assert their innocence.
See Miller v. Champion, 161 F.3d 1249, 1254 (10th Cir. 1998) (applying AEDPA). "To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must prove that counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient and that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defense . . . ." Boyd, 179 F.3d at 913 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687); see also Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985) (holding this two-part test applies to challenges to guilty pleas based upon ineffectiveness of counsel). To prove deficient performance, petitioner must overcome the presumption that counsel's conduct was not constitutionally defective.
That does not match Lafler.Furthermore, the second lawyer’s advice caused Mbugua to accept a bad deal a.k.a. “plea offer 2.” Isn’t that more of a Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) scenario not a Lafler scenario? Hill holds that when counsel’s bad advice causes a defendant to accept a plea offer, then the defendant must prove that but for his lawyer’s unprofessional error he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.
In Hill v. Lockhart, the high court held that the two part test in Strickland also applies to the plea stage. 474 U.S. 52, 57 (1985). Here, the high court concluded that under Strickland and supporting cases, Lee was prejudiced by ineffective assistance of counsel.
If the defendant has pleaded guilty, “in order to satisfy the ‘prejudice’ requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).We conclude that trial counsel should have moved to suppress the firearms and ammunition.