Herrera v. Collins

15 Analyses of this case by attorneys

  1. Justice Scalia: Executing the Innocent

    Kansas Federal Public DefenderMelody BrannonFebruary 20, 2016

    But let’s recognize his work for what it was:This Court has never held that the Constitution forbids the execution of a convicted defendant who has had a full and fair trial but is later able to convince a habeas court that he is “actually” innocent. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993). Herrera was sentenced to death in Texas for the murder of two law enforcement officers based on eyewitness testimony and other circumstantial evidence.

  2. What Were These Attorneys Thinking?

    Vicki WernekeNovember 23, 2015

    By granting death-eligible defendants an attorney, “Congress ensured that no prisoner would be put to death without meaningful access to th[is] ‘“fail safe”’ of our justice system.” Harbison, 556 U. S., at 194 (quoting Herrera v. Collins, 506 U. S. 390, 415 (1993)). So long as clemency proceedings were available” to Holiday, §3599(e), the interests of justice required the appointment of attorneys who would represent him in that process.

  3. Habeas Corpus - 55% Innocent

    Habeas Corpus BlogOctober 5, 2009

    But that's obviously important here. She points out that it would necessarily have to be a very high standard -- the Supreme Court indicated as much in Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993). This would also have to be higher than the standard for a "gateway" innocence claim in order to overcome a procedural default , a standard set out in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995).


    John T. Floyd Law FirmJohn T. FloydSeptember 17, 2009

    tions of that philosophy by both the Texas Legislature and the U.S. Supreme Court.SOURCES:1/http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/metropolitan/6617198.html2/ http://www.johntfloyd.com/comments/august09/sixth-innocent-harris-county-man-freed.htm3/http://www.johntfloyd.com/comments/july09/17a.htm4//http://www.johntfloyd.com/comments/july09/06a.htm5/ http://www.johntfloyd.com/comments/june09/30a.htm6/ http://www.johntfloyd.com/comments/june09/11a.htm7/ http://www.johntfloyd.com/comments/may09/01a.htm8/ http://www.johntfloyd.com/comments/april09/16a.htm9/ http://www.johntfloyd.com/comments/march09/22a.htm10/ http://www.johntfloyd.com/comments/march09/16a.htm11/http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2009/08/court-order-Davis.pdf [Troy Davis Opinion]12/ Ex parte Franklin, 72 S.W.3d 671 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002) {actual innocence standards]13/ Herrera v. Collins, 954 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1992) [“actual innocence” claim not ground for federal habeas relief], affirmed by U.S. Supreme Court in Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993) [left open possibility that in a capital case “a truly persuasive demonstration of ‘actual innocence’ made after trial would render the execution of the defendant unconstitutional” and thereby making actual innocence issue subject to federal habeas review]14/http://www.tcdla.com/15/ Kristin Etter, Gonzalez and Place, http://www.tcdla.com/voiceforthedefense/voiceforthedefense.

  5. Habeas Corpus - The Case for Actual Innocence

    Habeas Corpus BlogAugust 26, 2009

    But, let me play devil's advocate with myself and, below the fold, I'll make the case for actual innocence as its own substantive constitutional claim. Any discussion of actual innocence claims must start with the 1993 case of Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993).In that case, the habeas petitioner attempted to advance in his petition an independent constitutional claim based on actual innocence.

  6. Capital Defense Weekly, August 18, 2003

    Capital Defense NewsletterAugust 17, 2003

    More specifically, in 1993, a majority of the Justices of the Supreme Court stated that the execution of an innocent person would violate the Constitution. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993). This court agrees.

  7. Capital Defense Weekly, May 12, 2003

    Capital Defense NewsletterMay 12, 2003

    Freestanding Claims of Actual Innocence As Manifest InjusticeHere, however, Mr. Amrine does not assert actual innocence merely as a gateway to allow consideration of an underlying constitutional claim. Rather, he makes what has been termed a "freestanding" claim of actual [*10] innocence.In Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 122 L. Ed. 2d 203, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993), the United States Supreme Court discussed the viability of a freestanding claim of actual innocence as a basis for habeas relief in the federal courts. Although the Court determined that federalism concerns militated against recognizing actual innocence as a basis for federal habeas relief, the Court assumed for the sake of argument that: in a capital case a truly persuasive demonstration of actual innocence made after trial would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional and warrant federal habeas relief if there were no state avenue open to process such a claim.Herrera, 506 U.S. at 417.

  8. Capital Defense Weekly, January 13, 2003

    Capital Defense NewsletterJanuary 13, 2003

    In particular, equitable tolling raises none of the concerns related to constitutional interpretation that are sometimes invoked in opposition to a "'death-is-different' jurisprudence," Shafer v. South Carolina, 532 U.S. 36, 55, 149 L. Ed. 2d 178, 121 S. Ct. 1263 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 178-79, 129 L. Ed. 2d 133, 114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994) (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, [*28] J., dissenting), and it does not in any way affect the "'standard of review on federal habeas corpus,'" because AEDPA's stringent standards of review of course still apply. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 405, 122 L. Ed. 2d 203, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993) (quoting Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 9, 106 L. Ed. 2d 1, 109 S. Ct. 2765 (1989) (plurality opinion)); see 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(d), (e) (West Supp. 2002). Similarly, equitable tolling of this federal deadline poses no threat of intrusion on a state's enforcement of its own procedural rules, cf. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 115 L. Ed. 2d 640, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991), on a state's legislative choices, cf. Murray, 492 U.S. at 13-15 (O'Connor, J., concurring, and Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment), or on the prerogatives of the executive branch.

  9. Capital Defense Weekly, April 29, 2002

    Capital Defense NewsletterApril 28, 2002

    But despite the important goals, and undoubted popularity, of this federal act and similar state statutes, legislatures and courts have always been queasy about the possibility that an innocent person, mistakenly convicted and sentenced to death under such a statute, might be executed before he could vindicate his innocence--an event difficult to square with basic constitutional guarantees, let alone simple justice. As Justice O'Connor, concurring along with Justice Kennedy in Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993) , stated: "I cannot disagree with the fundamental legal principle that executing the innocent is inconsistent with the Constitution. Regardless of the verbal formula employed--'contrary to contemporary standards of decency,' 'shocking to the conscience,' or offensive to a 'principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental'--the execution of a legally and factually innocent person would be a constitutionally intolerable event."

  10. Capital Defense Weekly, March 26 , 2001

    Capital Defense NewsletterMarch 25, 2001

    Workman [*3] seized upon language in an order that this court entered in 1999, denying the first petition for rehearing en banc, when we stated:"The traditional remedy for claims of innocence based on new evidence, discovered too late in the day to file a new trial motion, has been executive clemency." Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417, 122 L. Ed. 2d 203, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993).Under Tennessee law, the governor may grant clemency, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-27-101, so Workman may produce evidence to the governor that the fatal shot must have come from someone else's gun.In support of his claim of fraud, Workman makes the following allegations: (1) the Tennessee Attorney General and others from his office, persons associated with the TBPP, representatives of the Shelby County District Attorney's Office and the governor's staff held meetings about the clemency proceedings that were designed to secure his execution; (2) the TBPP was hostile to the witnesses Workman presented during the clemency proceedings; (3) the State presented fabricated expert testimony during the clemency proceedings; and (4) a retired police officer, Clyde Keenan, falsely [*4] testified during the clemency proceedings.In our equally divided opinion denying further relief for the petitioner in Workman, 227 F.3d 331, all of the judges agreed that the court can reconsider the petition if ther