Filed July 27, 2012
The court there went on to explain: The Supreme Court has consistently rejected claims that the press is shielded by the Constitution against laws of general applicability of the kind involved here. . . . Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 92 S.Ct. 2646, 33 L.Ed.2d 244 (1972) (reporters asked relevant questions in a grand jury probe are not privileged to conceal their sources and information conveyed to them under promise of confidentiality); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 99 S.Ct. 1635, 60 L.Ed.2d 115 (1979) (no special exemption for the media from the general rules of pretrial discovery). Id.
Filed June 11, 2018
They are, and the fact that Al Jazeera has produced them establishes as much. C.f. Herbert v. Lando, 73 F.R.D. 387, 396–97 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (ruling post-publication activities, writings, and statements relevant and discoverable), aff’d, 441 U.S. 153 (1979). 1 Al Jazeera cites Secord v. Cockburn, 747 F. Supp. 779, 792 (D.D.C. 1990) to support its argument that these investigations are irrelevant for purposes of discovery.
Filed September 12, 2012
No Privilege or Constitutional Right Shields EFF from This Routine Discovery In commencing Paxfire’s rebuttal to EFF’s assertion of “its” various privileges, Paxfire notes the following: although the Federal Rules allow restrictions on the disclosure of arguably relevant information, i.e. Rules 45, 26(b)(3), 26(b)(4)(A), 26(b)(4)(C), the burden is on the person objecting to discovery to demonstrate each element justifying secrecy. The Supreme Court has expressly rejected EFF’s First Amendment “defense” to discovery. Herbert, 441 U.S. 153 (no “editorial process” privilege in defamation case; the heightened burden Case3:12-mc-80135-SI Document35 Filed09/12/12 Page18 of 30 - 12 - PAXFIRE’S OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR DE NOVO DETERMINATION OF DISPOSITIVE MATTER REFERRED TO MAGISTRATE JUDGE Misc. CV12-80135 SI (NC) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 of proving “actual malice,” rather than limits or ban on discovery, provides protection for First Amendment rights). “Given the required proof [actual malice], however, damages liability for defamation abridges neither freedom of speech nor freedom of the press.”
Filed January 2, 2019
The discovery rules are accorded broad and liberal treatment to achieve their purpose of adequately informing litigants in civil trials. See Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177, 99 S.Ct. 1635, 60 L.Ed.2d 115 (1979). “Control of discovery is committed to the sound discretion of the trial 3 TracFone Wireless, Inc. is a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Miami, Florida.
Filed March 16, 2017
Finally, Yelp’s arguments are completely consistent. Yelp is entitled to protect its First Amendmentright to publish speech created by others, andto assert its rights as an Internet publisher under Section 230. “The provisions of section 230(c)(1), conferring broad immunity on Internet intermediaries, are themselves a strong demonstration oflegislative commitment to the value ofmaintaining a free market for online ’ See also Herbert v. Lando (1979) 441 U.S. 153, 171-72 (to ensure protection of First Amendmentprinciples, liability is limited “to instances where somedegree of culpability is present”); Virginia Board ofPharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. (1976) 425 U.S. 748, 771 (stating in dicta that false speech generally not protected “for its own sake”; no claim advertisements at issue were false). Plaintiffs’ reliance on Beauharnais v. Illinois (1952) 343 U.S. 250, 256, is particularly misplaced.
Filed January 24, 2017
(See Bill Johnson's Rests. v. NLRB (1983) 461 U.S. 731, 743 [‘[F]alse statements are not immunized by the First Amendment.”]; Herbert v. Lando (1979) 441 U.S. 153, 171 [“Spreading false information in and ofitself carries no First Amendmentcredentials.”]; Virginia Bd. ofPharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. (1976) 425 U.S. 748, 771 [“Untruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been protected for its own sake.”]; Beauharnais v. Illinois (1952) 343 U.S. 250, 256 [‘the prevention and punishment”oflibel has “never been thoughtto raise any Constitutional problem”)).
Filed December 22, 2016
Twitter’s sweepingly broad discovery requests do not, in most cases, seek information relevant to Twitter’s actual claims, but instead, pose the type of discovery into discretionary Executive Branch classification decisions that is unnecessary to resolve the claims here. This is a circumstance in which the Court “should not hesitate to exercise appropriate control over the discovery process,” Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979), and should therefore issue a protective order under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c). II.
Filed January 27, 2016
, reh’g denied, 134 S. Ct. 1575 (2014); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775 (1986) (“[A] public-figure plaintiff must show the falsity of the statements at issue.”); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 176 (1979) (“[T]he plaintiff must focus on the editorial process and prove a false publication attended by some degree of culpability.”); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964) (“We held in New York Times that a public official might be allowed the civil remedy only if he establishes that the utterance was false.”)
Filed January 22, 2015
The declarations submitted by Public Resource do not come close to meeting this standard—they simply provide bare assertions that Public Resource’s funders desire to remain anonymous, without any attempt to explain any objective circumstances under which disclosure of their identities would affect their associational Case 1:13-cv-01215-TSC-DAR Document 70 Filed 01/22/15 Page 5 of 16 2 rights. Keeping in mind that “[e]videntiary privileges in litigation are not favored, and even those rooted in the Constitution must give way in proper circumstances,” Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 175 (1979), the Court should reject Public Resource’s unfounded privilege claim. Even if the Court were to find that Public Resource had carried the initial burden of establishing a First Amendment privilege—which it has not—all that this would establish is that the Court should engage in “careful consideration of the need for such discovery, but not necessarily to preclude it.”
Filed February 14, 2014
As a general proposition, federal courts are discouraged from recognizing new privileges, whether of the constitutional or common law variety. See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 169-70, 174-75 (1979) (refusing “to modify firmly established constitutional doctrine” to create a new, constitutionalized privilege, when justification for “modification is by no means clear and convincing”); Nixon I, 418 U.S. at 710 (new privileges “are not lightly created”); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 689, 702-04 (1972) (refusing to create new First Amendment privilege, and asserting disinclination to “embark the judiciary on a long and difficult journey . . . [that, in administering such a new, constitutionalized privilege] would present practical and conceptual difficulties of a high order”); In Re: A Witness Before the Special Grand Jury 2000-2, 288 F.3d 289, 292 (7th Cir. 2002) (federal courts are to “avoid . . . extending privileges to new, Case 1:12-cv-01332-ABJ Document 68 Filed 02/14/14 Page 32 of 63 16 unchartered waters absent compelling considerations”); In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“Even in cases where the proposed privilege is designed i