Rep. P18490 (E.D. Ark. 2010), In re Baycol Prods. Litig., 532 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (D. Minn. 2007); Ninth Circuit – Monroe v. Zimmer US Inc., 766 F. Supp. 2d 1012 (E.D. Cal. 2011), Henricksen v. ConocoPhillips Co., 605 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 78 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. (CBC) 857 (E.D. Wash. 2009), Lusch v. Matrixx Initiatives, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72068, 74 Fed. R. Evid. Serv.
Id. at *9-10 (quotingHenricksen v. ConocoPhillips Co., 605 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1166 (E.D. Wash. 2009); citingBaker v. Chevron USA, Inc., 680 F. Supp. 2d 865, 878 n.9 (S.D. Ohio 2010) (“The ‘one-hit’ or ‘no threshold’ theory of causation in which exposure to one molecule of a cancer-causing agent has some finite possibility of causing a genetic mutation leading to cancer is not a reliable theory for causation under Daubert standards.”)) The court also properly found that this “no-threshold” theory of causation fails every Daubert smell test there is: "The linear non-threshold model cannot be falsified, nor can it be validated.
General causation is typically shown through epidemiological studies, and plaintiffs in toxic exposure cases in Vermont generally must demonstrate specific causation by submitting evidence concerning the amount, duration, intensity, and frequency of exposure. Citing Henricksen v. ConocoPhillips Co., 605 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1157 (E.D. Wash. 2009) (citing several appellate court cases holding that experts testifying as to specific causation must pay careful attention to amount, intensity, and duration of exposure).The court recognized that in some toxic tort cases it is impossible to quantify exposure with hard proof, such as the presence of the alleged toxic substance in the plaintiff's blood or tissue and the precise amount of the toxic substance to which an individual plaintiff was exposed.
See Allen v. Pennsylvania Eng’g Corp., 102 F.3d 194, 199 (5th Cir. 1996) (“Scientific knowledge of the harmful level of exposure to a chemical, plus knowledge that the plaintiff was exposed to such quantities, are minimal facts necessary to sustain the plaintiffs’ burden in a toxic tort case.”); McClain v. Metabolife Int’l, Inc., 401 F.3d 1233, 1240 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that district court erred by not excluding plaintiff’s expert’s causation opinion because he neglected dose-response relationship); Henricksen v. ConocoPhillips Co., 605 F. Supp.2d 1142, 1162 (E.D. Wash. 2009) (excluding expert’s opinion pursuant to Daubert where “he presumed that exposure to benzene in gasoline can cause AML in any dose.”); National Bank of Commerce v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 22 F. Supp.2d 942, 961 (E.D.Ark. 1998), aff’d, 191 F.3d 858 (8th Cir. 1999); Sutera v. Perrier Group of Am., Inc., 986 F. Supp. 655, 667 (D. Mass. 1997).