Indeed, to qualify for relief, Mr. Miller must convince the district court that “there is no possibility fairminded jurists could disagree that the state court’s decision conflicts with [the Supreme] Court’s precedents.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 102 (2011). The district court properly determined that the OCCA did not unreasonably apply the Supreme Court’s abandonment precedent to the circumstances of this case.
The state post-conviction court already denied this ineffective assistance claim, and this decision was supported because counsel testified at the state evidentiary hearing that he pursued stronger arguments on appeal, the DNA results and their late admission, and counsel was not deficient for presenting better arguments. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101, 131 S. Ct. 770, 178 L. Ed. 2d 624 (2011) (holding that this Court’s review of an ineffective assistance claim under § 2254(d) is ‘doubly’ deferential to counsel’s performance). The district court correctly denied this claim, and no COA will issue.”
Additionally, in the September offer, the possession of a firearm by a felon charge was dismissed; that charge, which would not have been dismissed under the August offer, increased Kyles’ prison exposure by five yearsThe court of appeals also rejected Kyles’s argument that, if he had accepted the lapsed offer, defense counsel could have vigorously argued various mitigating factors could have resulted in a sentence lower than the sentence he actually received based on a joint recommendation. This was only a “theoretical possibility,” which is not sufficient to establish prejudice. Opinion ¶22 (citing Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112 (2011)). ¶
First, as the Supreme Court has stated, “After an adverse verdict at trial even the most experienced counsel may find it difficult to resist asking whether a different strategy might have been better, and, in the course of that reflection, to magnify their own responsibility for an unfavorable outcome.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 109 (2011). Second, a counsel’s subjective evaluation is of only marginal relevance in resolving an objective inquiry. Strickland requires an objective inquiry. 466 U.S. at 688.
However, [t]he likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112 (2011).”It’s true that Harrington includes the sentence above, but the court of appeals omits what Harrington said before that sentence:Instead, Strickland asks whether it is “reasonably likely” the result would have been different.
Question presented:Did the Supreme Court’s decision in Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011), silently abrogate the presumption set forth in Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797 (1991)—that a federal court sitting in habeas proceedings should “look through” a summary state court ruling to review the last reasoned decision—as a slim majority of the en banc Eleventh Circuit held in this case, despite the agreement of both parties that the Ylst presumption should continue to apply?Lower court opinion: Wilson v. Warden, 834 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2016); USSC Docket; Scotusblog pageThe decision in this case will matter for anyone doing federal habeas litigation involving state court convictions. For those unfamiliar with this issue, here’s the background:In Ylst the Court held that when a state court issues a summary denial of a state prisoner’s legal challenges to his conviction, the federal habeas court will presume the “silent” summary decision rests on the same grounds as the last state court decision that set out its reasoning for denying the challenge.
The Court also has declined to adopt a “categorical rule excluding … from the Sixth Amendment’s reach” statements made to individuals who are not law enforcement officers, see Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 2173, 2180—81 (2015), citing Davis, 547 U.S. at 823 n.2, so that question remains open in Supreme Court jurisprudence.Our inquiry under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) is whether the state court’s rejection of Lisle’s Confrontation Clause claim was an “unreasonable application” of controlling Supreme Court precedent in 2007, meaning that it was “so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fair-minded disagreement.” See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). Lisle cannot satisfy this demanding standard.
On habeas review the Sixth Circuit held that allowing the exclusion of the juror was an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent, citing Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985), and their progeny.Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), state court rulings excluding a death penalty juror must be given “double deference”: The state prisoner must show the state supreme court’s ruling “‘was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement,’” White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. ___, (2014) (slip op., at 4) (quotingHarrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011)); and the trial court’s conclusions about the juror’s attitude are likewise entitled to deference, even in the absence of explicit analysis by the judge or clear statements by the juror, Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1, 7, 10 (2007). (Slip op. at 4-5).
The question arises because if a state court rejects a claim without any explanation, the petitioner has to show there’s no reasonable basis for the state court’s decision. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 98 (2011). If the state court gives reasons that are incomplete—which is one way to characterize the state court’s decision in this case—the habeas court can fill in the gaps by asking what reasons could have supported the state court’s conclusion.
The United States Supreme Court focused on the need to investigate and hire a defense expert where the case warrants it. Citing a passage in Harrington v Richter, 562 US __, 131 S Ct 770, 788 (2011), the Court reiterated that “[c]riminal cases will arise where the only reasonable and available defense strategy requires consultation with experts or introduction of expert evidence.” And while noting that invalid forensic testimony can contribute to wrongful convictions, the Hinton Court stated that “this threat is minimized when the defense retains a competent expert to counter the testimony of the prosecution’s expert witnesses.”