Filed January 17, 2017
The Amendment’s interpretation violates “the familiar maxim of statutory construction: expressio unius est exclusio alterius, meaning, ‘mention of one thing implies exclusion of another thing.’” Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 51 F.3d 1053, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting Am. Methyl Corp. v. EPA, 749 F.2d 826, 835-36 (D.C. Cir. 1984)); see also Halverson v. Slater, 129 F.3d 180, 186 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (same). The statute’s plain language defines bycatch as “fish which are harvested in a fishery, but which are not sold or kept for personal use.”
Filed December 23, 2016
This data point, however applies to all Canadian pilotage on the St. Lawrence River, the Seaway, and the Great Lakes, including large pilotage vessel volumes that occur only in the Canadian jurisdiction and include a substantial category of oceangoing vessels that do not enter the Great Lakes. 3 See Halverson v. Slater, 129 F.3d 180 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Lake Pilots Ass’n v. U.S. Coast Guard, 257 F. Supp. 2d 148 (D.D.C. 2003) (granting pilots motion in part); Lake Pilots Ass’n v. U.S. Coast Guard, 359 F.3d 624 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (unsuccessfully appealing the 2003 challenge to the extent it was unfavorable to pilots interests—the underling decision granted the Pilot Associations’ summary judgment in part); St. Lawrence Seaway Pilots’ Ass’n v. Collins, 362 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2005) (denying motion for summary judgment on issue of whether Coast Guard delay was reasonable but maintaining jurisdiction while Coast Guard completed rulemaking); St. Lawrence Seaway Pilots’ Ass’n v. Collins, No. Civ. A. 03- 1204 (RBW), 2005 WL 1138916 (D.D.C May 13, 2005) (vacating prior decision because Coast Guard had completed rulemaking effort); St. Lawrence Seaway Pilots’ Ass’n v. U.S. Coast Guard, 85 F. Supp. 3d 197 (D.D.C. 2015) (successful pilot challenge to 2014 ratemaking).
Filed August 19, 2016
The Executive Director will still be able to manage the daily functions of the agency consistent with federal statute, regulation and the EAC policies, answer questions from stakeholders regarding the application of [National Voter Registration Act] and [Help America Vote Act] consistent with EAC policies and guidelines and advisory and policies as set by the Commissioners. 7Although the 2015 Policy Statement is not a statute, “the statutory construction principle, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, that is, the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another thing” Halverson v. Slater, 129 F.3d 180, 185 (D.C. Cir. 1997), applies equally here. Case 1:16-cv-00236-RJL Document 105 Filed 08/19/16 Page 31 of 48 23 (AR0860) (emphasis added.)
Filed October 31, 2014
That amendment confirmed that Congress did not intend the other adjustments clause to permit “offset” adjustments, or else providing such authority only for the Secretary “[i]n making adjustments under clause (i) for transfer cases,” 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(I)(ii), would have been futile. See Halverson v. Slater, 129 F.3d 180, 185 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that to read a specific authority as “merely confirm[ing]” the agency’s general authority “violates the familiar doctrine that the Congress cannot be presumed to do a futile thing”). The Secretary insists that section 1395ww(d)(5)(I)(i) and (ii) merely represent “redundancies” and therefore this Court must give effect to both, relying upon Connecticut National Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992).
Filed January 30, 2008
Although this analysis should begin with the text of the statute, a court is also permitted to consider legislative history and apply canons of statutory construction. See, e.g., Halverson v. Slater, 129 F.3d 180, 184 ( D.C. Cir. 1997). 5 Although plaintiffs dispute that the Underwoods previously argued that IDEA’s definition of “related services” was ambiguous, this dispute does not preclude summary judgment because whether an argument was presented in a previous case is not relevant to deciding this case.
Filed November 17, 2016
Case 1:16-cv-01019-RC Document 21 Filed 11/17/16 Page 24 of 31 23 is a consideration consistent with the Coast Guard’s statutory mandate to consider the public interest in setting rates. See Halverson v. Slater, 129 F.3d 180, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting that both the language and the legislative history of the governing statute "manifest the Congress's intent to limit the individuals to whom [Pilotage Act] powers and duties--which involve primarily maritime safety and commerce--may be delegated. ").
Filed August 22, 2008
8 The D.C. Circuit has repeatedly emphasized that the Railway Labor rule is the law of this Circuit. See, e.g., Aid Ass’n for Lutherans v. U.S.P.S., 321 F.3d 1166, 1174-75 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (rejecting Postal Service’s position that regulations were permissible because statute did not expressly foreclose them); Halverson v. Slater, 129 F.3d 180, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (silence did not authorize regulation); Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int’l Union v. NLRB, 46 F.3d 82, 90 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (same); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 51 F.3d 1053, 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“We refuse to presume a delegation of power merely because Congress has not express withheld such power.”)