Halverson v. Slater

7 Citing briefs

  1. Oceana, Inc. v. Pritzker et al

    MOTION for Summary Judgment

    Filed January 17, 2017

    The Amendment’s interpretation violates “the familiar maxim of statutory construction: expressio unius est exclusio alterius, meaning, ‘mention of one thing implies exclusion of another thing.’” Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 51 F.3d 1053, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (quoting Am. Methyl Corp. v. EPA, 749 F.2d 826, 835-36 (D.C. Cir. 1984)); see also Halverson v. Slater, 129 F.3d 180, 186 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (same). The statute’s plain language defines bycatch as “fish which are harvested in a fishery, but which are not sold or kept for personal use.”

  2. American Great Lakes Ports Association et al v. Zukunft et al

    RESPONSE re Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment

    Filed December 23, 2016

    This data point, however applies to all Canadian pilotage on the St. Lawrence River, the Seaway, and the Great Lakes, including large pilotage vessel volumes that occur only in the Canadian jurisdiction and include a substantial category of oceangoing vessels that do not enter the Great Lakes. 3 See Halverson v. Slater, 129 F.3d 180 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Lake Pilots Ass’n v. U.S. Coast Guard, 257 F. Supp. 2d 148 (D.D.C. 2003) (granting pilots motion in part); Lake Pilots Ass’n v. U.S. Coast Guard, 359 F.3d 624 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (unsuccessfully appealing the 2003 challenge to the extent it was unfavorable to pilots interests—the underling decision granted the Pilot Associations’ summary judgment in part); St. Lawrence Seaway Pilots’ Ass’n v. Collins, 362 F. Supp. 2d 59 (D.D.C. 2005) (denying motion for summary judgment on issue of whether Coast Guard delay was reasonable but maintaining jurisdiction while Coast Guard completed rulemaking); St. Lawrence Seaway Pilots’ Ass’n v. Collins, No. Civ. A. 03- 1204 (RBW), 2005 WL 1138916 (D.D.C May 13, 2005) (vacating prior decision because Coast Guard had completed rulemaking effort); St. Lawrence Seaway Pilots’ Ass’n v. U.S. Coast Guard, 85 F. Supp. 3d 197 (D.D.C. 2015) (successful pilot challenge to 2014 ratemaking).

  3. League of Women Voters of The United States et al v. Newby et al

    Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment

    Filed August 19, 2016

    The Executive Director will still be able to manage the daily functions of the agency consistent with federal statute, regulation and the EAC policies, answer questions from stakeholders regarding the application of [National Voter Registration Act] and [Help America Vote Act] consistent with EAC policies and guidelines and advisory and policies as set by the Commissioners. 7Although the 2015 Policy Statement is not a statute, “the statutory construction principle, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, that is, the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another thing” Halverson v. Slater, 129 F.3d 180, 185 (D.C. Cir. 1997), applies equally here. Case 1:16-cv-00236-RJL Document 105 Filed 08/19/16 Page 31 of 48 23 (AR0860) (emphasis added.)

  4. Shands Jacksonville Medical Center, Inc. et al v. Sebelius

    Memorandum in opposition to re MOTION to Dismiss and MOTION for Summary Judgment

    Filed October 31, 2014

    That amendment confirmed that Congress did not intend the other adjustments clause to permit “offset” adjustments, or else providing such authority only for the Secretary “[i]n making adjustments under clause (i) for transfer cases,” 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(I)(ii), would have been futile. See Halverson v. Slater, 129 F.3d 180, 185 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (holding that to read a specific authority as “merely confirm[ing]” the agency’s general authority “violates the familiar doctrine that the Congress cannot be presumed to do a futile thing”). The Secretary insists that section 1395ww(d)(5)(I)(i) and (ii) merely represent “redundancies” and therefore this Court must give effect to both, relying upon Connecticut National Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992).

  5. Petit et al v. United States Department of Education et al

    Memorandum in opposition to re MOTION to Dismiss MOTION for Summary Judgment

    Filed January 30, 2008

    Although this analysis should begin with the text of the statute, a court is also permitted to consider legislative history and apply canons of statutory construction. See, e.g., Halverson v. Slater, 129 F.3d 180, 184 ( D.C. Cir. 1997). 5 Although plaintiffs dispute that the Underwoods previously argued that IDEA’s definition of “related services” was ambiguous, this dispute does not preclude summary judgment because whether an argument was presented in a previous case is not relevant to deciding this case.

  6. American Great Lakes Ports Association et al v. Zukunft et al

    Cross MOTION for Summary Judgment and Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment

    Filed November 17, 2016

    Case 1:16-cv-01019-RC Document 21 Filed 11/17/16 Page 24 of 31     23    is a consideration consistent with the Coast Guard’s statutory mandate to consider the public interest in setting rates. See Halverson v. Slater, 129 F.3d 180, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting that both the language and the legislative history of the governing statute "manifest the Congress's intent to limit the individuals to whom [Pilotage Act] powers and duties--which involve primarily maritime safety and commerce--may be delegated. ").

  7. ZUHAIR v. BUSH et al

    RESPONSE TO ORDER OF THE COURT Petitioner's Response to Government's Brief Regarding Preliminary and Procedural Framework Issues

    Filed August 22, 2008

    8 The D.C. Circuit has repeatedly emphasized that the Railway Labor rule is the law of this Circuit. See, e.g., Aid Ass’n for Lutherans v. U.S.P.S., 321 F.3d 1166, 1174-75 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (rejecting Postal Service’s position that regulations were permissible because statute did not expressly foreclose them); Halverson v. Slater, 129 F.3d 180, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (silence did not authorize regulation); Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int’l Union v. NLRB, 46 F.3d 82, 90 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (same); Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 51 F.3d 1053, 1060 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“We refuse to presume a delegation of power merely because Congress has not express withheld such power.”)