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Guernseytown Farms, LLC v. Sitsis

Connecticut Superior Court Judicial District of Waterbury at Waterbury
Dec 23, 2008
2008 Ct. Sup. 20226 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2008)

Opinion

No. CV07-5005755S

December 23, 2008


MEMORANDUM OF DECISION


This is an action and countersuit between neighbors over the boundary line and ownership of a parcel of land in the northwesterly section of Watertown, near the town boundary of Morris, Bethlehem and Watertown. The plaintiff is Guernseytown Farms, LLC, owned and operated by Joseph Calabrese. The defendants are Bonnie Sitsis, who is the record holder of the land, and Konstantino Sitsis, her husband. The defendants' land is to the north of the plaintiff's land and the disputed parcel is located along their shared border. By way of a verified complaint filed on September 28, 2007, and amended on February 21, 2008, the plaintiff is seeking to quiet title to its parcel pursuant to General Statutes § 47-31. The plaintiff is also seeking a permanent injunction prohibiting the defendants from further trespass on its land.

In their answer, filed on May 1, 2008, the defendants deny both the plaintiff's quiet title action and allegation of trespass. Through their pleadings, the defendants offer one of the following alternative special defenses: 1) that they are the owners of the property and are entitled a quiet title judgment; 2) that they have obtained ownership of the property by statutory and common-law adverse possession; 3) that they have a statutory and common-law prescriptive easement; 4) that they have an easement by necessity; or 5) that the plaintiff is barred from claiming title by the equitable doctrine of laches. A court trial was held on September 30, October 3, 4, 8, 9 and 10, 2008.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The court heard eight witnesses, admitted 128 exhibits (forty-two exhibits from the plaintiff and eighty-six exhibits from the defendants) and read more than 150 pages of trial and post-trial briefs. Based on this and the other evidence in the record, the court finds the following facts. This case involves two abutting properties in the northwesterly section of Watertown owned by the parties in this case. The southern property at issue was purchased by Joseph Calabrese in 1968, as part of a larger tract of land, and was deeded to the plaintiff, Guernseytown Farms, LLC, by Calabrese in 2002. The northern property at issue was owned by Joseph DiBlasi, who then deeded most of it to his business interest, White Birch, Inc., in 1972.

Guernseytown Farms, LLC is a business interest of Calabrese.

In the summer of 1994, Bonnie Sitsis and her husband (the defendants) saw an advertisement listing a large tract of land for sale in the northwesterly section of Watertown. The owner, seller and real estate agent for the property was Joseph DiBlasi, d/b/a White Birch, Inc. The defendants met with DiBlasi and viewed the property in 1994. During their meeting DiBlasi showed the defendants three maps: the June 1941 "Van Riper Map" (Plaintiff's Exhibit 3), the 1985 Orsine, Cotter "Tiburon Map" (Defendants' Exhibit 5) and the April 1970 DiBlasi Map (Plaintiff's Exhibit 9). At this time the defendants also walked the entire property line with DiBlasi. During this meeting and walk through, DiBlasi clearly laid out his property lines and what his property contained. This tour of the property was based upon the survey map, which DiBlasi had both completed and filed with the Watertown Records Department in 1970. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 9.) The property was thickly wooded, with logging trails, stones, boulders and large tree stumps scattered throughout. DiBlasi indicated to the defendants that he, through his business, White Birch, Inc., had an extensive commercial logging operation on the property, especially in what later turned out to be the disputed adverse possession area. (Defendants' Exhibit XXX.) The evidence established that on a consistent and regular basis DiBlasi and White Birch, Inc. extensively logged the disputed parcel and permitted a horse-and-hunt club to utilize the same. This use began at least fifteen years prior to the defendants taking possession of the property, including the disputed property, based on the DiBlasi map. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 9.)

The defendants purchased the property on January 27, 1995. At the closing, DiBlasi was represented by Attorney Franklin Pilicy. Pilicy prepared the six deeds for the parcel, four by way of warranty deeds that included five pieces, and two by quitclaim deeds. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 33-38.) One of the quitclaim deeds conveyed "any land owned by White Birch, Inc. as of January 27, 1995 located in the Town of Watertown, County of Litchfield and State of Connecticut, contiguous to any other land conveyed by White Birch, Inc." (Plaintiff's Exhibit 38.) The other quitclaim deed (Plaintiff's Exhibit 35) had come to be known as the "Adverse Possession Parcel," and it constituted approximately ten acres of land. Pilicy told Bonnie Sitsis that there was uncertainty as to whether the deeds accounted for all sixty-four acres that were stated on the "Tiburon Map." (Defendants' Exhibit 5.) Bonnie Sitsis accepted this concern that she may not be receiving all the acreage, but she did believe she was purchasing all of the property that she had been shown the day she visited and walked the property line with DiBlasi, based on the survey map created for DiBlasi, and on DiBlasi's direction as to the property lines. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 9.)

The "Tiburon Map" had originally been prepared for Tiburon Associates, another one of Pilicy's client.

Shortly after their purchase of the property, the defendants hired a land surveyor, David Hintz, to perform an A-2 survey of the property. Hintz was chosen by the defendants because he had previously surveyed the "Van Riper" property directly to the east of their property. (Defendant's Exhibit J.) Hintz completed the survey (Defendant's Exhibit C) in June of 1995 and filed it with the Watertown Land Records in July of 1995. This survey was almost identical to the survey produced and filed for DiBlasi by land surveyor Vincent Petroccia in 1970. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 9.)

An A-2 survey is a type of survey certification, with error of no more than one foot in five thousand feet surveyed.

After extensive research Hintz provided an updated and final survey of the land illustrated through defendants' Exhibit I.

On multiple occasions after purchasing the property in 1995, the defendants encountered fox-hunters in full traditional fox-hunting outfits, hunting on the now disputed parcel. (Defendants' Exhibit 55.) When confronted, the fox-hunters informed the defendants that they had previously received permission from DiBlasi to hunt on his property and had hunted there on a consistent basis for a long period of time. The defendants revoked this permission to hunt the land later in 1995.

The defendants then contracted with Land Data Engineering for testing of the property for potential home sites, and two were presented (Defendant's Exhibit M). The Town of Watertown Zoning Approval (Defendant's Exhibits YY and AAA) was obtained, followed by Torrington Area Health District approval (Defendants Exhibit ZZ) in June of 1996. In 1997-99, the defendants installed a 1,600-foot driveway on the property connecting their house to the Townline Highway. The necessary inspections (Defendant's Exhibit WW) were received, the defendants' home was completed, and the family moved in, in May of 1999.

The Townline Highway is a paved road on the Watertown-Bethlehem town line. It was extended jointly by both towns to meet the start of the defendants' driveway on the disputed parcel at the request of the defendants.

In the fall of 1999, Calabrese came to the defendants' house and told the defendants that he owned twenty acres of land in the area, including much of the land on which they had built their 1,600-foot driveway. On December 17, 1999, there was a meeting between Calabrese, Jim Jones, Hintz and the defendants. At the meeting it was established that there were four agreed-upon conditions with which the defendants would allow Calabrese to survey the property. Two of the four conditions were that: 1) Calabrese had to make an appointment and be accompanied on the property; and 2) he was to share the results of any survey in a timely fashion. On July 25, 2000, Jones completed the survey and filed it with Watertown. (Defendant's Exhibit K.) Calabrese did not make an appointment, the surveyor was not accompanied on the property and the map was not shared with the defendants, in derogation of the parties' prior agreement.

Jones was a surveyor for Krazert and Jones, who had been hired by Calabrese.

Bonnie Sitsis discovered the filed survey months later, in September 2000, through her prior lawyer.

In December of 2004, Calabrese was again discovered on the property, north of the disputed parcel. When his presence was questioned, he explained that in 2002 he had filed another map claiming "additional acreage." This map was filed on April 29, 2002, and was produced by Krazert and Jones, Inc. (Defendants' Exhibit L.) Through this map, Calabrese claimed ownership to an additional 167-foot-wide strip of the defendants' property on the western border and additionally claimed ownership to other land located north of the defendants' northern property line. Shortly after the defendants questioned Calabrese's presence on the property in 2004, they were served with a "Notice of Intention to Dispute Right of Way," which right of way was erroneously described as from Connecticut Route sixty-three, as opposed to Townline Highway, and was dated two years prior, May 20, 2002.

This land was owned by the "Johnson's" and was not subject of this suit.

The defendants' driveway accesses Townline Highway and not to Connecticut Route 63. Also, the defendants claim never to have been served with the May 20, 2002 notice. The Marshal's Affidavit of Abode Service was dated June 13, 2002. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 30.)

In August 2005, there was a meeting scheduled at Pilicy's office for the purpose of constructive discussions between the surveyors. This meeting was uneventful as Calabrese failed to bring his surveyor as opposed to the defendants who had brought along Hintz. In October of 2006, another meeting was held at Pilicy's offices. This time Calabrese brought Samuel Bertaccini, who was introduced as the author of the October 1994 "Hunt Survey" (Plaintiff's Exhibit 12), covering the land to the south. Bertaccini was later hired by Calabrese to survey the land in dispute. Shortly after this meeting, Calabrese nailed "Private Property" signs into all of the trees along the defendants' 1,600-foot driveway. (Defendant's Exhibit PP.)

In April of 2007, Bertaccini produced a map of the disputed property. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 16.) This map claims that the plaintiff owns approximately 8.298 acres north of French Mountain Road. This area encompasses many acres north of the stonewall, referenced by Hintz as the defendants' boundary line. This was offered as the most accurate map of the plaintiff's land and boundary line by the plaintiff. The plaintiff also offered aerial photos of the land in dispute. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 18 and 19.) The defendants offered a map produced by Hintz on June 26, 2006, as the most accurate map of the defendants' land, boundary line and the plaintiff's land. (Defendants' Exhibit I.)

QUIET TITLE ACTION

As noted, both the plaintiff and defendants claim record ownership of the disputed property and have asked the court to settle the title issue, pursuant to General Statutes § 47-31. Section 47-31(a) provides in relevant part: "An action may be brought by any person claiming title to, or any interest in, real . . . property . . . against any person who may claim to own the property . . . in fee . . . adverse to the plaintiff . . . for the purpose of determining such adverse estate, interest or claim, and to clear up all doubts and disputes and to quiet and settle the title to the property . . ." Subparagraph (f) of said statute defines the court's duty and provides that, "[t]he court shall hear the several claims and determine the rights of the parties, whether derived from deeds, wills or other instruments or sources of title, and may determine the construction of the same, and render judgment determining the questions and disputes and quieting and settling title to the property."

"Under this statute, each party, who claims record title to the property in dispute, `must prevail on the strength of his own title, and not upon the weakness of his adversary.' Devita v. Esposito, 13 Conn.App. 101, 110, [ 535 A.2d 364] (1987), cert. denied, 207 Conn. 807, [540 A.2d 375] (1988). Based upon the evidence that each of the parties is obligated to provide as to the source through which each is claiming title, it is then the court's obligation, per the statute, to determine, `the exact status of the land,' that is subject of the dispute. The court's judgment then, `must set forth the rights of the parties in it.' Spelke v. Shaw, 114 Conn. 272, 283 [158 A. 809] (1932)." Porter v. Morrill, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV 04 4000612 (May 24, 2006, Trombley, J.), aff'd, 108 Conn.App. 652, 949 A.2d 526, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 921, 958 A.2d 152 (2008).

"Where a party, pursuant, to . . . § 47-31 seeks to quiet title, the trial court should first determine in which party record title lies and then determine whether adverse possession has divested the record owner of title." Har v. Boreiko, Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia-Milford, Docket No. CV 06 4005573 (February 11, 2008, Robinson, J.).

"In determining a boundary line in a deed, the law is clear that the description in the deed, if clear and unambiguous, must be given effect. In such a case, there is no room for construction. The inquiry is not the intent of the parties but the intent which is expressed in the deed. Lake Garda Improvement Ass'n. v. Battistoni, 160 Conn. 503, 511, 280 A.2d 877; Faiola v. Faiola, 156 Conn. 12, 17, 238 A.2d 405; Katsoff v. Lucertini, 141 Conn. 74, 77, 103 A.2d 812; Patzloff v. Kasperovich, 116 Conn. 440, 441-42, 165 A. 349; Rotsford v. Wallace, 69 Conn. 263, 271, 37 A. 902. Where the deed is ambiguous, however, the intention of the parties is a decisive question of fact. Lake Garcia Improvement Ass'n. v. Battistoni, supra; Staff v. Hawkins, 135 Conn. 316, 319, 64 A.2d 176; Gioia v. Annunziata, 102 Conn. 52, 56, 127A. 921 [1925]; Raymond v. Nash, 57 Conn. 447, 452, 18 A. 714." F. AK, Inc. v. Sleeper, 161 Conn. 505, 510, 289 A.2d 905 (1971).

"Where the testimony of the witnesses as to the location of the land described in deeds is in conflict, it becomes a question of fact for the determination of the court which may rely on the opinions of experts to resolve the problem and it is the court's duty to accept that testimony or evidence which appears more credible." (Emphasis added.) Stohlts v. Gilkinson, 87 Conn.App. 634, 640, 867 A.2d 860, cert. denied, 273 Conn. 930, 954, 873 A.2d 1000 (2005).

Having considered the testimony of the parties and witnesses, evaluated their credibility, reviewed the exhibits and considered the relevant statutory and case law, the court finds that the plaintiff has failed to present adequate proof of its claim. The plaintiff's experts and other witnesses were not credible and the strength of their title did not satisfy the burden required to quiet title. The title searchers for both parties, Judy Pilicy and Nicholas Polletta, agree that the chains of title for both properties are separate and distinct from each other. There is no overlapping of evidence that would show that title to the disputed parcel derives from both chains. The court finds the plaintiff does not have title to the property as described in Plaintiff's Exhibit 14 and displayed in Plaintiff's Exhibit 16. Rather the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendants have satisfied their burden of their first special defense and proved the claimed boundary as described in Defendants' Exhibit XXX and set forth in Defendants' Exhibit I. The most credible and persuasive evidence in support of the northern boundary of the plaintiff's land (southern boundary of the defendants' land) were the deeds, title and other evidence provided by the defendants. The clear, credible and persuasive testimony of David Hintz and the unquestionably exhaustive investigation he related in his effort to create a survey clearly and accurately laid out the boundary lines between the plaintiff's and defendants' properties. When considered and compared to the testimony of the defendants' witnesses, the plaintiff's evidence simply does not measure up.

The court holds that the defendants have record title to the disputed area as described and set forth in Defendants' Exhibit XXX and as shown in Defendants' Exhibit I (prepared in 2006 and signed in 2008), the title to which is quieted and settled in the name of the defendants. While this decision quiets title and clarifies the boundaries between the parties, this does not include the area south of the controverted existing stonewall and north of the Hunt property, as described and set forth in Defendants' Exhibit YYY and as shown in Defendants' Exhibit I.

ADVERSE POSSESSION ACTION

The defendants, through their third special defense, claim statutory adverse possession of the disputed parcel under § 52-575. Because the defendants' title has been quieted as to possession of the land described in Defendants' Exhibit XXX and as shown in Defendants' Exhibit I, the only remaining disputed parcel is that described in Defendants' Exhibit YYY and as shown in Defendants Exhibit I (described as "Formerly Patron M Blackman Estate").

"The doctrine of adverse possession is to be taken strictly." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Roche v. Fairfield, 186 Conn. 490, 499, 499 A.2d 911 (1982). Adverse possession is governed in Connecticut by § 52-575(a). "To establish title by adverse possession, the claimant must oust an owner of possession and keep such owner out without interruption for fifteen years by an open, visible and exclusive possession under a claim of right with the intent to use the property as his own and without the consent of the owner." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Allen v. Johnson, 79 Conn.App. 740, 744, 831 A.2d 282, appeal denied, 266 Conn. 929, 837 A.2d 802 (2003); See also Robinson v. Myers, 156 Conn. 510, 517, 244 A.2d 385 (1968); Devita v. Esposito, 13 Conn.App. 101, 106, 535 A.2d 356 (1987), cert. denied 207 Conn. 807, 540 A.2d 375 (1988) Occupation of the land is required, but the adverse possessor is not required to have the adverse intent. French v. Pierce, 8 Conn. 439 (1831). "[T]he claimant's possession need not be absolutely exclusive; it need only be a type of possession which would characterize an owner's use." (Emphasis in original.) Eberhart v. Meadow Haven, Inc., 111 Conn.App. 636 (2008). "`It is sufficient if the acts of ownership are of such a character as to openly and publicly indicate an assumed control or use such as is consistent with the character of the premises in question' (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Roche v. Fairfield, 186 Conn. 490, 502-03, 442 A.2d 911 (1982)." Eberhart v. Meadow Haven, Inc., supra, 111 Conn.App. 642.

Eberhart v. Meadow Haven, Inc., 111 Conn.App. 636 (2008) was decided by the Appellate Court after the completion of the trial.

"A finding of adverse possession is to be made out by clear and positive proof. Clear and convincing proof denotes a degree of belief that lies between the belief that is required to find the truth or existence of the fact in issue in an ordinary civil action and the belief that is required to find guilt in a criminal prosecution. The burden is sustained if evidence induces in the mind of the trier a reasonable belief that the facts asserted are highly probably true, that the probability that they are true or exist is substantially greater than the probability that they are false or do not exist. The burden of proof is on the party claiming adverse possession." Allen v. Johnson, supra, 79 Conn.App. 745. See also Eberhart v. Meadow Haven, Inc., supra, 111 Conn.App. 640.

"[A]n exclusive possession, if it is without the consent or license of the owner, will result in the acquisition of title by adverse possession when it extends over a marked and readily visible area . . . if the other requisites of acquisition of title by adverse possession are established." Loewenberg v. Wallace, 151 Conn. 355, 357, 197 A.2d 634 (1964). In considering a claim of adverse possession, "[i]t is sufficient if there is an adverse possession continued uninterruptedly for [fifteen] years, whether by one or more persons." Id. The possessions must be connected and continuous. Smith v. Chapin, 31 Conn. 530, 531 (1863).

The court notes that the defendants in this matter did not own their real property for a period of fifteen years yet they assert they own the disputed property by adverse possession. The defendants' theory that they are entitled to the property despite the fact that they did not personally own the property involves the concept of "tacking." Tacking requires the continuous possession by two or more persons. Matto v. Dan Beard, Inc., 15 Conn.App. 458, 479-81, 546 A.2d 854, appeal denied, 209 Conn. 812, 550 A.2d 1082 (1988). Privity of estate is not necessary, but rather, privity of possession. Id. It is sufficient if there is an adverse possession continued uninterruptedly for fifteen years whether by one or more persons. Id. The court finds that through tacking, the defendants had possession of the properties in issue since at least 1970.

It is well settled law that sporadic trespasses, such as the entry to remove cars, random appearances on the property, the planting of shrubbery or the mowing of lawns is not enough to show that a possession was open and notorious. Robinson v. Myers, supra, 156 Conn. 517-18. "[T]he adverse possession must be notorious so as to give notice to an owner that a claim is being made contrary to his ownership or at least some act or constructive notice that such a hostile claim is being made." Waggoner v. The Benton Beach Corp., Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 960391414 (April 3, 1988, Meadow, J.T.R.). "The requirement that an adverse possession be `notorious' in the sense of `being or constituting something that is commonly known: well known' (Webster, Third New International Dictionary) is obviously to give actual notice to an owner that a claim contrary to his ownership is being asserted or to lay a foundation for finding constructive notice. Pepe v. Aceto, 119 Conn. 282, 287, 175 A. 775." Robinson v. Myers, supra, 156 Conn. 518. The Appellate Court has found that staking out a lot, digging test holes, blasting rock and removing trees may be enough to establish adverse possession, but it must occur consistently for the statutory period of fifteen years. Porter v. Morrill, supra, 108 Conn.App. 667. In a recent opinion dated December 16, 2008, the Appellate Court upheld a decision granting adverse possession, where the adverse possessor had exclusive use of the property by installing and maintaining a driveway, grass, light posts, plantings and a lawn. The court found these to be behaviors that are consistent with ownership. Eberhart v. Meadow Haven, Inc., supra, 111 Conn.App. 642.

As the Appellate Court recently stated: "The legal significance of the open and visible element is not, as the defendants contend, an inquiry as to whether a record owner subjectively possessed an understanding that a claimant was attempting to claim the owner's property as his own. Rather, the open and visible element requires a fact finder to examine the extent and visibility of the claimant's use of the record owner's property so as to determine whether a reasonable owner would believe that the claimant was using that property as his or her own. See 2 C.J.S. 482, Adverse Possession § 53 (2003) (`The purpose of the "open," "visible," and "notorious" requirements . . . is to provide the true owner with adequate notice that a trespass is occurring, and that the owner's property rights are in jeopardy. Hence, a claimant will fail to satisfy these requirements unless the possession and use were sufficiently apparent to put the true owner on notice that the claimant was making an adverse claim of ownership.'); 3 Am.Jur.2d 139, Adverse Possession § 63 (2002) (`the words "open and notorious possession" . . . mean that an adverse claim of ownership must be evidenced by such conduct as is sufficient to put a person of ordinary prudence on notice of the fact that the land in question is held by the claimant as his or her own')." Schlichting v. Cotter, 109 Conn.App. 361, 368-69, 952 A.2d 361 (2008).

In Schlichting, the plaintiff adversely used the defendant's land in a manner consistent with its residential nature. The court upheld the trial court's finding that this use was open and notorious and the decision to grant adverse possession to the plaintiff, despite the fact that the defendant gave the plaintiff permission to use the land. Schlichting v. Cotter, supra, 109 Conn.App. 369.

In this case, Calabrese purchased the disputed adverse possession property as part of a larger tract of land on December 20, 1968. Calabrese later quit claimed all interest in the land to Guernseytown Farm, LLC May 11, 2002. There was no evidence that Calabrese, the plaintiff corporation or any other party under their control made use of, or even visited the property from its conveyance in 1968 until 1999, when Calabrese first appeared at the property and informed the defendants that he was the owner of this land. Only DiBlasi and the defendants used this land during that time period, ousting all others. From 1999 forward, Calabrese and the plaintiff corporation engaged in the use of the property, having the property surveyed, walking on the property and filing this action. On June 13, 2002, the plaintiff served the defendant with a notice of intent to dispute her use of the land and filed this on the land records the same day. The plaintiff then directed that a survey be completed of his property by certified surveyor Samuel Bertaccini. Bertaccini produced an April 2007 survey (Plaintiff's Exhibit 16), an April 2007 compilation of the Blackman estate (Plaintiff's Exhibit 15) and a September 2008 compilation of all area properties (Plaintiff's Exhibit 17). The court does not find Bertaccini's surveys and testimony credible.

As previously mentioned, DiBlasi had a survey completed and filed on the land-records in 1970. (Plaintiff's Exhibit 9.) This survey, directed by DiBlasi, but completed by a certified surveyor, clearly shows DiBlasi's intent of including in his land all of the disputed parcels in this case, including the disputed adverse possession piece as described in Defendants' Exhibit YYY. From the filing of this map with the public land records in 1970, DiBlasi clearly provided notice to the world that his intention was to adversely possess the disputed adverse possession piece described in Defendants' Exhibit YYY. DiBlasi, and later the defendants put this disputed land to use.

The court finds that logging consistently occurred and logging trails were created at least fifteen years prior to Calabrese's or the plaintiff's re-entry onto the property in 1999. Further, the court finds that fox-hunting occurred on the property on a consistent basis prior to 1999. The fact that permission was given by DiBlasi, then rescinded by the defendants, to fox hunt on the disputed property further bolsters the argument that DiBlasi, then the defendants, were using the property in an open and notorious fashion, showing control. Finally, the offering of this land for sale shows control of the property by DiBlasi or the defendants for over 29 years. The court finds that the possession in this case was clearly and convincingly open, notorious, hostile and contrary to the owner from, at least, 1972 (when the property was deeded to White Birch, Inc.) through 1999 (when Calabrese first appeared on the property claiming ownership).

Exhibit GGGG was a "Town of Watertown Assessor's Map" that was offered by the defendants and admitted as a full exhibit by the court. Exhibits 31, 32 and 39 were also admitted as full exhibits as Assessor's Maps. These maps were the only evidence offered as to the paying of taxes on the land, but this evidence was unclear and neither party offered clear and convincing evidence that they paid taxes on the property.

All of the evidence presented showed that DiBlasi, and then the defendants, were consistently present on the property for a period of longer than fifteen years, satisfying the statutory requirements for adverse possession. General Statutes § 52-575(a). The open and notorious conduct in this case was not sporadic and was more substantial than the mere mowing of a lawn or landscaping. Robinson v. Meyers, supra, CT Page 20236 156 Conn. 517-18. The behavior by DiBlasi, then the defendants, was consistent with the ownership of this heavily wooded land, establishing the defendants as owners and ousting the previous owners. Eberhart v. Meadow Haven, Inc., supra, 111 Conn.App. 642.

The court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that the defendants, through the tacking of DiBlasi's ownership and control, ousted the plaintiff/owner of the disputed property, through open, notorious, unconcealed, visible and exclusive use and kept the plaintiff/owner out of the property, without interruption for at least fifteen years, satisfying the statutory requirement. The court factually finds that the defendants' predecessor in title adversely claimed and held out as his own the property in question. Further, the court finds that there was continuous, uninterrupted possession by DiBlasi, then by the defendants. The court finds that at the time the property, based on Plaintiff's Exhibit 9, was conveyed from White Birch, Inc. and DiBlasi to the defendants, DiBlasi had already satisfied the statutory requirements of adverse possession. Further, the court finds that at the time Calabrese deeded his interest to Guernseytown Farms, LLC in 2002, he no longer owned the adverse possession parcel in question.

CONCLUSION

The court orders that title be quieted for the defendants as described in Defendants' Exhibit YYY (attached) and as the defendants' land is shown in Defendants' Exhibit I. Further, the court finds that the defendants obtained title to the land as described in Plaintiff's Exhibit XXX (attached)fn_ and shown in the map admitted as Defendants' Exhibit I through adverse possession and the court orders any and all actions be taken by the parties, as needed, consistent with, and to effectuate this finding. With respect to all additional claims by both the plaintiff and the defendants, they are deemed abandoned for insufficient evidence. Punitive and other damages have been considered and are not awarded in this case.

Editor's Note: Defendant's Exhibit YYY and Plaintiff's Exhibit XXX have not been reproduced herein.


Summaries of

Guernseytown Farms, LLC v. Sitsis

Connecticut Superior Court Judicial District of Waterbury at Waterbury
Dec 23, 2008
2008 Ct. Sup. 20226 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2008)
Case details for

Guernseytown Farms, LLC v. Sitsis

Case Details

Full title:GUERNSEYTOWN FARMS, LLC v. BONNIE D. SITSIS ET AL

Court:Connecticut Superior Court Judicial District of Waterbury at Waterbury

Date published: Dec 23, 2008

Citations

2008 Ct. Sup. 20226 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2008)