Green v. Johnson

5 Analyses of this case by attorneys

  1. Capital Defense Weekly, December 10, 2001

    Capital Defense NewsletterDecember 10, 2001

    It does not speak to the quality of the process. See Green v. Johnson, 116 F.3d 1115, 1121 (5th Cir. 1997) (rejecting pre-AEDPA contention that "the resolution on the merits prerequisite is a proxy for the quality of the legal process resolving a dispute"); Murphy v. Johnson, 205 F.3d 809, 813 (5th Cir. 2000) (applying Green to "adjudication on the merits"). This mandatory and all-encompassing language combined with the meaning of "adjudication on the merits" leaves no room for judicial imposition of a full and fair hearing prerequisite.Moreover, casting aside AEDPA's standards of review in the fashion urged by Valdez has another untenable result.

  2. Capital Defense Weekly, January 10, 2000

    Capital Defense NewsletterJanuary 9, 2000

    The jury instructions at the punishment phase of a capital case must be permitted to give effect to any constitutionally relevant mitigating evidence. See Green v. Johnson, 116 F.3d 1115, 1126 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112, 102 S.Ct. 869, 875 (1982)). In Penry, the Supreme Court reversed a death sentence on the ground that, although the evidence regarding the defendant's mental retardation and childhood abuse was presented to the jury at the penalty phase of the trial, the special issues prescribed by Texas statute prevented the jury from giving mitigating effect to that evidence.

  3. Capital Defense Weekly, March 22, 1999

    Capital Defense NewsletterMarch 22, 1999

    See Wright v. Angelone, 151 F.3d 151, 156-57 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 313 (1998); accord Green v. Johnson, 116 F.3d 1115, 1121 (5th Cir. 1997); Hennon v. Cooper, 109 F.3d 330, 334-35 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 72 (1997).

  4. Capital Defense Weekly, February 26, 1999

    Capital Defense NewsletterFebruary 26, 1999

    As to issue on which the panel split, recusal:Trevino filed his habeas petition in the federal district court in June 1997; therefore, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) applies to his case. See Green v. Johnson, 116 F.3d 1115, 1119-20 (5th Cir. 1997). Under AEDPA, "[u]nless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from . . . the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court."

  5. Capital Defense Weekly, February 22, 1999

    Capital Defense NewsletterFebruary 22, 1999

    As to issue on which the panel split, recusal:Trevino filed his habeas petition in the federal district court in June 1997; therefore, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) applies to his case. See Green v. Johnson, 116 F.3d 1115, 1119-20 (5th Cir. 1997). Under AEDPA, "[u]nless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability, an appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from . . . the final order in a habeas corpus proceeding in which the detention complained of arises out of process issued by a State court."