Gray v. Mississippi

10 Analyses of this case by attorneys

  1. Capital Defense Weekly, November 10, 2003

    Capital Defense NewsletterNovember 9, 2003

    The relevant inquiry in deciding whether prospective jurors may be excluded for cause based on their views on capital punishment is "whether the juror's views would 'prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with [the court's] instructions and [the juror's] oath.'" Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 658, 95 L. Ed. 2d 622, 107 S. Ct. 2045 (1987) (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 83 L. Ed. 2d 841, 105 S. Ct. 844 (1985)).While we give deference to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror and often has to make credibility findings based on information that cannot be easily discerned from an appellate record, Witt, 469 U.S. at 429, the record in the instant case directly contradicts the judge's ruling.

  2. Capital Defense Weekly, July 17, 2006

    Capital Defense NewsletterJuly 16, 2006

    Failure to strike a juror [*25] that is unfit to serve because of such an improper predisposition is structural error. See Knese v. State, 85 S.W.3d 628, 633 (Mo. banc 2002) (citing Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 668, 107 S. Ct. 2045, 95 L. Ed. 2d 622 (1997)). A death sentence imposed by a jury tainted with structural error must be vacated.

  3. Capital Defense Weekly, July 10, 2006

    Capital Defense NewsletterJuly 9, 2006

    In the absence of any evidence in the record to support the state courts' finding, it must be true that Stevens has established, by the requisite clear and convincing evidence, that Hartling was removed for cause on a "broader basis than inability to follow the law or abide by [her] oath [as a juror]." Adams v. Tex., 448 U.S. 38, 48, 100 S. Ct. 2521, 65 L. Ed. 2d 581 (1980); see also Gray v. Miss., 481 U.S. 648, 652 n.3, 107 S. Ct. 2045, 95 L. Ed. 2d 622 (1987) ("[a] motion to excuse a venire member for cause of course must be supported by specified causes or reasons that demonstrate, as a matter of law, the venire member is not qualified to serve"). Indeed, the record supports but a single conclusion--that Hartling was removed merely because she expressed opposition to the death penalty.

  4. Capital Defense Weekly, December 12, 2005

    Capital Defense NewsletterDecember 12, 2005

    In 1985, and again in 1987, the Supreme Court explained that the "standard for determining whether prospective jurors may be excluded for cause based on their views on capital punishment . . . is 'whether the juror's views would "prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance [*10] with his instructions and his oath."'" Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 658, 107 S. Ct. 2045, 95 L. Ed. 2d 622 (1987) (quoting Witt, 469 U.S. at 424 (quoting Adams, 448 U.S. at 45)). The Supreme Court insisted that capital jurors not be struck for cause unless they are unable to follow the court's instructions.

  5. Capital Defense Weekly, August 26, 2002

    Capital Defense NewsletterAugust 26, 2002

    At its core, this case raises a serious question as to the "impartiality of the adjudicator" because of the environment in which the trial was held. See Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 668, 95 L. Ed. 2d 622, 107 S. Ct. 2045 (1987). The jurors were aware that the courtroom in which they sat was the same as the crime scene n6 and that the building in which they entered every day of trial was the scene of the terrifying events.

  6. Reversible error to remove a prospective juror based on the belief that the criminal justice system is biased against black men

    Public Defender ServiceOctober 23, 2017

    The Court has reserved the question of whether, as in the death penalty context, exclusion of a juror based upon his or her views about the fairness of the criminal justice system constitutes structural error, not subject to harmless error review. See Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648 (1986). WCRead the full opinion here.

  7. Reversible error to remove a prospective juror based on the belief that the criminal justice system is biased against black men

    The Public Defender Service for the District of ColumbiaOctober 17, 2017

    Here, the Court extends the logic of Hinton v. United States, 979 A.2d 663 (D.C. 2009) (en banc) (reversing disqualification of a juror based on pro-defense views), and looks to Supreme Court capital cases regarding disqualification based on views on the death penalty to hold that appellant need not show prejudice. The Court has reserved the question of whether, as in the death penalty context, exclusion of a juror based upon his or her views about the fairness of the criminal justice system constitutes structural error, not subject to harmless error review. See Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648 (1986). WCRead the full opinion here.

  8. Jury Selection - Voir Dire– Excusals For Cause – Death Penalty Cases

    Garland, Samuel & Loeb, P.C.Don SamuelSeptember 1, 2015

    Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992)A defendant has a right to voir dire a juror about whether the juror would automatically impose the death penalty in certain circumstances, regardless of the presence of any mitigating circumstances. This type of reverse-Witherspoon inquiry must be permitted and a juror who says that he would automatically vote for death, regardless of any mitigating circumstance, should be excused.Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648 (1987)The United States Supreme Court holds that the improper exclusion of a juror on the basis that she equivocated about her ability to impose a death sentence is per se reversible error. No harm need be shown.Wheeler v. Simpson, 779 F.3d 366 (6th Cir. 2015)Improperly excusing a juror for cause in a death penalty case is structural error and requires setting aside the death penalty.White v. Mitchell, 431 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 2005)Reviewing the voir dire at length, the Sixth Circuit concluded that one juror should have been excused because she held a fixed opinion that the death penalty was the appropriate sentence.

  9. Juror Bias Under Tennessee Law, and What to Expect in the Vanderbilt Rape Case

    Daniel HorwitzDaniel A. HorwitzJune 16, 2015

    [30]State v. Odom, 336 S.W.3d 541, 556 (Tenn. 2011) (quotations omitted).[31]Dyer v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 1998). See also Thompson v. Altheimer & Gray, 248 F.3d 621, 622 (7th Cir. 2001) (“Denial of the right to an unbiased tribunal is one of those trial errors that is not excused by being shown to have been harmless.”); Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 668 (1987) (“because the impartiality of the adjudicator goes to the very integrity of the legal system, . . . harmless-error analysis cannot apply.”).[32]Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 578 (1986).

  10. Capital Defense Weekly, July 19, 2004

    Capital Defense NewsletterJuly 19, 2004

    For the reasons set forth above, we conclude that the record does not support the trial court’s excusals for cause under the governing legal standard (Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412, 424), and that under the compulsion of United States Supreme Court cases this error requires reversal of defendant’s death sentence, without inquiry into prejudice. (See Davis v. Georgia, supra, 429 U.S. 122, 123; Gray v. Mississippi, supra, 481 U.S. 648, 659-667 (opn. of the court); id., at pp. 667-668 (plur.