Filed June 22, 2015
Indeed, a “law must be upheld under rational basis review ‘if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify’ the classifications imposed by the law.” SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 481 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961)). Those “attacking the rationality of the legislative classification have the burden to negative every conceivable basis which might support it[.]”
Filed January 7, 2015
See, e.g., Berndt Decl. (App. 0123-25); Neverman Decl. (App. 0849-51). Case 1:14-cv-00254 Document 64 Filed in TXSD on 01/07/15 Page 62 of 88 45 369 U.S. 186 (1962), McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), and Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966))). b. The States’ injuries are not “self-inflicted” Defendants cannot dismiss those injuries as “self-inflicted.”
Filed March 18, 2014
A law must be upheld under rational basis review “if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify” the classifications imposed by the law. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961). A law fails to satisfy rational basis review if there is no possible basis for the differential treatment that is “narrow enough in scope and grounded in a sufficient factual context” to demonstrate the rational basis for the discrimination.
Filed August 26, 2011
Likewise, cases that simply do not bear on the exercise of fundamental rights do not support the State’s argument. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), upheld a Sunday- closing law that applied only in certain counties, but there is no constitutional right to buy things on Sunday, and the Court applied rational basis review. See id.
Filed July 28, 2011
.Territorial uniformity is not a constitutional prerequisite") citing Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, 31 (1879); McGowan v. Maryland. 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961); Ocampo v. U.S., 234 U.S. 91, 98-99 (1914); Los Angeles Cnty. Bar Ass'n v. Eu, 979 F.2d 697, 708 (9th Cir.1992) ("[T]he equal protection clause does not require that states treat all persons within their borders identically.")
Filed July 10, 2007
Anderson does not cite Lemon because Lemon was decided 20 days after Anderson’s oral argument. However, Anderson’s analysis follows Lemon’s, as seen in the opinions by both Judges Bazelon and Leventhal, including discussion and application of the “purpose and effect test” developed in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 453 (1961); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 489-90 (1961); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962), and others, Anderson, 461 F.2d at 291-93, and replicated in Lemon’s first two tests. Anderson recognized that religious issues did “not involve programs vital to our immediate national security, or even to military operations or disciplinary procedures” and held “it is for this Court to assess that decision [to require mandatory chapel participation] in constitutional terms.”
Filed December 5, 2016
The extent of the injury is irrelevant, as even an “identifiable trifle” is sufficient: “Injury in fact” reflects the statutory requirement that a person be “adversely affected” or “aggrieved,” and it serves to distinguish a person with a direct stake in the outcome of a litigation -- even though small -- from a person with a mere interest in the problem. We have allowed important interests to be vindicated by plaintiffs with no more at stake in the outcome of an action than a fraction of a vote, see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186; a $5 fine and costs, see McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420; and a $ 1.50 poll tax, Harper v. Virginia Bd.
Filed July 11, 2016
As the Supreme Court explains: “Injury in fact” reflects the statutory requirement that a person be “adversely affected” or “aggrieved,” and it serves to distinguish a person with a direct stake in the outcome of a litigation -- even though small -- from a person with a mere interest in the problem. We have allowed important interests to be vindicated by plaintiffs with no more at stake in the outcome of an action than a fraction of a vote, see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186; a $ 5 fine and costs, see McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420; and a $ 1.50 poll tax, Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663. …. As Professor Davis has put it: “The basic idea that comes out in numerous cases is that an identifiable trifle is enough for standing to fight out a question of principle; the trifle is the basis for standing and the principle supplies the motivation.” Students Challenging Reg. Agency Procs., 412 U.S. at 689, n.14 (citations omitted); and, e.g., Palm Beach Golf Ctr.-Boca v. John G. Sarris, 781 F.3d 1245, 1251 (11th Cir. 2015) (concrete injury exists when the plaintiff’s fax line is tied up for “one minute.”).
Filed August 25, 2014
See Zhen Zhou Wu, 711 F.3d at 14 (“It is not too much to ask these businessmen and businesswomen to comply with export control regulations, even if the meaning of those regulations might not be immediately obvious to someone lacking the same sophistication.”); see also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 428 (1961) (“We believe that business people of ordinary intelligence…would be able to know what exceptions are encompassed by the statute either as a matter of ordinary commercial knowledge or by simply making a reasonable investigation….”)
Filed August 12, 2014
This standard for considering equal protection challenges affords “the States a wide scope of discretion in enacting laws which affect some groups of citizens differently than others.” McGowan v. State of Md., 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961). As further explained by the Supreme Court: The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s objective.