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Gold v. Carus

United States District Court, E.D. New York
Jul 26, 2003
01-CV-7568(ADS)(MLO) (E.D.N.Y. Jul. 26, 2003)

Summary

holding plaintiff's FMLA claim asserted in amended petition arose from same set of facts as his original claim for discriminatory discharge, and therefore the FMLA claim related back to the original complaint and was not time-barred under FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)

Summary of this case from Pena v. Cnty. of Starr

Opinion

01-CV-7568(ADS)(MLO)

July 26, 2003

PAUL GOLD, West Hempstead, New York, for Plaintiff

Leonard M. Rosenberg, Esq., Elizabeth A. Dore, Esq., GARFUNKEL, WILD TRAVIS, P.C., New York, for Defendant


ORDER


Presently before the Court is the pro se plaintiff's motion for leave to file an amended complaint pursuant to Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rule 15(a)"). Rule 15(a) provides that leave to amend a pleading "shall be freely given when justice so requires." Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). Leave to amend should be given "absent evidence of undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, undue prejudice to the opposing party, or futility." Monahan v. New York City Dep't of Corrs., 214 F.3d 275, 283 (2d Cir. 2000). "This relaxed standard applies with particular force to pro se litigants." Pangburn v. Culbertson, 200 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 1999).

The plaintiff wishes to add a claim against the defendants under the Family and Medical Leave Act (the "FMLA" or the "Act"). To establish a claim under the FMLA, a plaintiff must allege that (1) he is an eligible employee under the Act; (2) the defendant is an employer under the Act; (3) he was entitled to take leave under the Act; (4) he gave notice to the defendant of his intention to take leave; and (5) the defendant denied him certain benefits to which he was entitled under the Act. See Belgrave v. City of New York, No. 95-1507, 1999 WL 692034, at *43 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 1999).

The plaintiff claims that he was employed as a court messenger by the defendants from September 1996 to April 1999; that the defendants employed 50 or more employees, thereby qualifying them as employers under the FMLA, see 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4); that he was injured in a car accident and informed the defendants that he would be out on disability; and that as a result, he was terminated from his employment and taken off the company health plan. These allegations make out a prima facie claim under the FMLA.

The defendants argue that the FMLA claim is barred by the statute of limitations. In addressing this contention, the Court must first determine whether the defendants' alleged conduct is "willful." See Lambert v. New York State Office of Mental Health, No. 97-1347, 2000 WL 863461, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. June 9, 2000). Where the conduct underlying an FMLA claim is "willful", the statute of limitations is three years from the date of the last event constituting the violation. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(c)(2). Any other violation is subject to a two year statute of limitations. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(c)(1).

Where, as here, the plaintiff has adequately alleged facts in support of an FMLA claim, she need only make a general averment as to willfulness to invoke the three year statute of limitations. See Lambert, 2000 WL 863461, at *2, (quoting Settle v. S.W. Rodgers Co., 998 F. Supp. 657, 664 (E.D. Va. 1998)). In this case, the plaintiff has adequately alleged facts in support of his FMLA claim and he has made a general averment as to willfulness. As such, the three year statute of limitations applies.

The statute of limitations commenced on April 6, 1999, the date of the plaintiff's termination of employment. See id. at *2 (stating that the statute of limitations commences upon the date of termination). Thus, the three year period would have run on April 6, 2002. Because the complaint was filed on November 14, 2001, the FMLA claim is timely if it "relates back" to the complaint.

A claim relates back to the complaint if "the claim . . . asserted in the amended [complaint] arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the [complaint]." Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(c)(2). As to relation back, the central question is adequacy of notice, namely whether the facts set forth in the complaint constitute sufficient notice of the new claim. See Rosenberg v. Martin, 478 F.2d 520, 526 (2d Cir. 1973); Asset Value Fund Ltd. P'ship v. The Care Group, Inc., 179 F.R.D. 117, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (denying leave to amend where the proposed amendment was devoid of any "factual allegations from which the proposed claims could legitimately arise, or through which [the defendant] could reasonably be put on notice."). Courts also analyze whether the amended complaint presents an "unfair surprise." See Benfield v. Mocatta Metals Corp., 26 F.3d 19, 23 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that where the allegations in the complaint place the defendant on notice of the claims in the proposed amendment and both causes of action require evidence of similar wrongful acts, the defendant cannot claim unfair surprise); Rosenberg, 478 F.2d at 526 (holding that the proposed assault claim did not relate back to the complaint because "[o]n the most liberal reading, not a word in the complaint even suggested a claim of physical assault.").

The plaintiff's FMLA claim arises from the same set of facts as his original claim for discriminatory discharge. See Kamtaprassad v. Chase Manhattan Corp., No. 00-8834, 2001 WL 1662071, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28, 2001) ("Both the First and Second Amended Complaints filed by plaintiff in this action contain a common core of operative facts. While the First did not contain a claim under the FMLA, it did contain, by direct reference and through attached documents, the same factual allegations contained in her Second. . . . The `gist' of [both complaints] is . . . allegedly discriminatory actions in response to plaintiff's absences and disability leave."). Accordingly, the Court finds that the FMLA claim relates back to the complaint.

Based upon the foregoing, the Court grants the plaintiff's motion for leave to file an amended complaint. The plaintiff must file his amended complaint within 20 days of the date of this order. The parties are directed to contact United States Magistrate Judge Michael L. Orenstein forthwith to schedule the completion of discovery.

SO ORDERED.


Summaries of

Gold v. Carus

United States District Court, E.D. New York
Jul 26, 2003
01-CV-7568(ADS)(MLO) (E.D.N.Y. Jul. 26, 2003)

holding plaintiff's FMLA claim asserted in amended petition arose from same set of facts as his original claim for discriminatory discharge, and therefore the FMLA claim related back to the original complaint and was not time-barred under FED. R. CIV. P. 15(c)

Summary of this case from Pena v. Cnty. of Starr
Case details for

Gold v. Carus

Case Details

Full title:PAUL GOLD, Plaintiff, -v.- BARRY R. CARUS, P.C., CARUS MANNIELLO, P.C.…

Court:United States District Court, E.D. New York

Date published: Jul 26, 2003

Citations

01-CV-7568(ADS)(MLO) (E.D.N.Y. Jul. 26, 2003)

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