Filed June 30, 2014
Inc. v. Long Island Lighting Co., 934 F.Supp.53, 54 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (“Although the bulk of the FCRA regulatory mechanisms monitor the conduct of credit reporting agencies, the provision invoked in the instant case is one designed to check the conduct of parties requesting credit information from credit reporting agencies.”) aff’d, 113 F.3d 1229 (2d. Cir. 1997). However, “so long as a user has a reason to believe that a permissible purpose exists, that user may obtain a consumer report without violating the FCRA.”
Filed October 9, 2013
Numerous courts have recognized the almost inevitable stigmatizing effect on those named in a civil RICO action. See Katzman v. Victoria’s Secret Catalog, 167 F.R.D., 649, 660, aff’d, 113 F. 3d 1229 (2d Cir. 1997). Indeed, courts have recognized that civil RICO is considered an unusually potent weapon, often referred to as the “litigation equivalent of a thermonuclear device.”
Filed July 14, 2011
. See Doxie v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 603 F.Supp. 624, 628 (S.D. Ga. 1984) 624, 628 (S.D. Ga. 1984); Katzman v. Victoria's Secret Catalogue, 167 F.R.D. 649, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd, 113 F.3d 1229 (2d Cir. 1997). To properly plead a claim involving fraud, including RICO, a plaintiff must specify the alleged fraudulent conduct, when and where each incident of fraudulent conduct occurred, and who participated in the fraudulent conduct, especially in the case of multiple defendants.
Filed February 9, 2010
Fezzani v. Bear, Stearns & Co., No. 99 Civ. 0793, 2005 WL 500377, at *4 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2005). Especially in light of RICO’s status as “the litigation equivalent of a thermonuclear device,” Katzman v. Victoria’s Secret Catalogue, 167 F.R.D. 649, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d, 113 F.3d 1229 (2d Cir. 1997), with powerful remedies that “warrant[] concern[s] over the consequences of an unbridled reading of the statute,” Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 412 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted) (second alteration in original), it would be improper to go beyond the criminal-conviction proviso’s plain language.
Filed August 22, 2008
Further, the objective unreasonableness of a litigant’s claims as a legal matter strongly supports a conclusion that they were filed for an improper purpose. See Knipe v. Skinner, 19 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that the lack of merit to the action supported the record that the plaintiff was “pursuing a personal agenda against the [defendants]”); Katzman v. Victoria’s Secret Catalogue, 167 F.R.D. 649, 661 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that legal baselessness of claims supported inference that action was “filed for improper purposes”), aff’d, 113 F.3d 1229 (2d Cir. 1997). The history of DCML’s conduct make its motivations obvious—DCML is maintaining this lawsuit solely as a component to the pressure campaign it is waging against Danka’s board as Danka determines its next course of action.
Filed May 13, 2016
These pleading rules apply with special force in RICO cases: “Because the ‘mere assertion of a RICO claim … has the almost inevitable stigmatizing effect on those named as defendants, … courts should strive to flush out frivolous RICO allegations at an early stage of the litigation.’” Katzman v. Victoria’s Secret Catalogue, 167 F.R.D. 649, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d, 113 F.3d 1229 (2d Cir. 1997). Claims of misrepresentation or fraud—including those made here that assert RICO claims based on allegedly false statements on LCA forms—trigger Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard.
Filed January 25, 2013
As to claims sounding in fraud, the Complaint must: “(1) specify the statements that the plaintiff[s] contend[] were fraudulent, (2) identify the speaker, (3) state where and when the statements were made, and (4) explain why the statements were fraudulent.” Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, Inc., 25 F.3d 1124, 1128 (2d Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). Fraud claims must be based on more than just “speculation and conclusory allegations.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). These requirements should be applied rigorously here because “all of the concerns that dictate that fraud be pleaded with particularity exist with even greater urgency in civil RICO actions.” Morin v. Trupin, 778 F. Supp. 711, 716 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted). A civil RICO action is “an unusually potent weapon—the litigation equivalent of a thermonuclear device.” Katzman v. Victoria’s Secret Catalogue, 167 F.R.D. 649, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff’d, 113 F.3d 1229 (2d Cir. 1997). “[C]ourts should strive to flush out frivolous RICO allegations at an early stage of the litigation” because the “mere assertion of a RICO claim … has an almost inevitable stigmatizing effect” on defendants.
Filed July 15, 2009
But a “conclusory allegation [like this] that Defendants ‘used or invested’ income received from [racketeering activity] is insufficient because it fails to allege how that use or investment” caused Plaintiffs’ any injury. Katzman v. Victoria’s Secret Catalogue, 167 F.R.D. 649, 657 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (dismissing claim under Section 1962(a)), aff’d 113 F.3d 1229 (2nd Cir. 1997); In Re Teledyine Def. Contracting Deriv.
Filed December 29, 2006
Because the ‘mere assertion of a RICO claim … has an almost inevitable stigmatizing effect on those named as defendants, … courts should strive to flush out frivolous RICO allegations at an early stage of the litigation.’ ” Katzman v. Victoria’s Secret Catalogue, 167 F.R.D. 649, 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d, 113 F.3d 1229 2d Cir. 1997) (internal citations omitted). As one court has noted, “every member of the federal bench has before him or her at least one–and possibly more–garden variety fraud or breach of contract cases that some Plaintiff has attempted to transform into a vehicle for treble damages. . . .” Goldfine v. Sichenzia, 118 F. Supp. 2d 392, 394 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).