Freedman v. Maryland

19 Citing briefs

  1. Philip Morris USA Inc. et al v. United States Food and Drug Administration et al

    MOTION for Summary Judgment and Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment

    Filed October 30, 2015

    Although FDA suggests that it will make a decision regarding proposed label changes within the timeframes established by certain voluntarily adopted “performance measures,” Second SE Directive at 12 (AR014), those aspirational goals—which the agency can violate at will—fall well short of the rigorous “shortest fixed period” requirement mandated by the First Amendment. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58. Third, there is no guarantee that a “prompt final judicial determination” will be available to manufacturers seeking to make label changes, Se.

  2. Green et al v. U.S. Department of Justice, et al

    Memorandum in opposition to re MOTION to Dismiss

    Filed October 18, 2016

    Any one of these many failings would render the regime unconstitutional, and even speech that is ultimately exempted through the rulemaking process is impermissibly burdened. Freed- man, 380 U.S. at 58-59. 3.

  3. Vivid Entertainment LLC et al v. Jonathan Fielding et al

    MEMORANDUM in Opposition to MOTION for Preliminary Injunction [

    Filed May 13, 2013

    Travel, 436 F.3d at 1084; see also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 794 (1989) (although the criteria in challenged regulation was somewhat elastic and 8Where a court determines that a permitting scheme is a prior restraint and is not content-neutral, that permitting scheme must typically include certain procedural safeguards, such as a process for swift judicial appeal. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58. Case 2:13-cv-00190-DDP-AGR Document 51 Filed 05/13/13 Page 24 of 33 Page ID #:533 17 INTERVENORS’ OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 required reasonable discretion to be exercised by the permitting authority, that alone did not make the regulation an unconstitutional prior restraint). (b) Measure B’s Permitting Fees Are Not An Unlawful Prior Restraint Measure B itself provides that permit fees “shall be set by the Department in an amount sufficient to provide for the cost of any necessary enforcement.”

  4. American Civil Liberties Union et al v. National Security Agency/Central Security Service et al

    MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment

    Filed March 9, 2006

    Because “only a judicial determination in an adversary proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression,” the First Amendment demands that a judge, not an executive official, decide whether the executive branch may compel the disclosure of protected speech. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58; see also FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 223-24 (1990) (plurality opinion). In Marcus, the Supreme Court held that a warrant for seizing allegedly obscene material could not issue on the mere conclusory allegations of an executive officer.

  5. HASSELL v. BIRD

    Respondents’ Response to Amicus Curiae Brief

    Filed July 19, 2017

    In the view of some amici, the default judgment here is worthless because there was no “adversary proceeding,” apparently because the adversary did not appear. 19 A R , a B e t m e (See Airbnb, 22-23, quoting Freedman v. Maryland (1965) 380 U.S. 51, 58 {emphasis added]; Br. of Internet Assoc. and Consumer Technology Assoc. (“IA/CTA”), 20.) But due process in an adversary proceeding only requires notice and an opportunity to defend;it does not require that the adversary actually opt in to the action and choose to defend.

  6. Green et al v. U.S. Department of Justice, et al

    REPLY to opposition to motion re MOTION to Dismiss

    Filed October 28, 2016

    Mem. at 31; see also Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 52 (1965) (state censorship statute required each film to be submitted to censorship board before public exhibition for individual approval); FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 224-27 (1990) (city ordinance required each sexually oriented business to obtain individual approval through inspection and license); Bernstein v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 974 F. Supp. 1288, 1295-96 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (regulation required those wishing to export encryption software to obtain export license for specific software); Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 149 (1969) (city ordinance required a permit before conducting a parade or demonstration); City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 759 (city ordinance required newspapers to obtain individual permits in order to place their newsracks on city property). Case 1:16-cv-01492-EGS Document 19 Filed 10/28/16 Page 21 of 31 17 discussed above, the overarching prohibition in § 1201(a)(1)(A) on circumvention of access controls does not by its terms regulate

  7. Liu et al v. the New York City Campaign Finance Board et al

    MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Opposition re: 53 MOTION for Judgment on the Pleadings . . Document

    Filed November 3, 2015

    “In the area of freedom of expression it is well established that one has standing to challenge a statute on the ground that it delegates overly broad licensing discretion to an administrative office, whether or not his conduct could be proscribed by a properly drawn statute, and whether or not he applied for a license.” Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 56 (1965) (emphasis added); Liu, 2015 WL 1514904 at *10 (quoting Freedman). Though Defendants do not mention it, Freedman forecloses their argument.

  8. Morris et al v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers et al

    MEMORANDUM in Opposition re MOTION to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

    Filed November 25, 2013

    As demonstrated by the facts of this case, the regulation unconstitutionally delegates overly broad discretion to a government official. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965) (exhibition license must issue “within a specified brief period” and “the procedure must also assure a prompt final judicial decision . . . .”). Accordingly, 36 C.F.R. § 327.

  9. Morris et al v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers et al

    REPLY to Response to Motion re MOTION for Preliminary Injunction

    Filed September 23, 2013

    The regulation unconstitutionally delegates overly broad discretion to a government official. See Freedman v. Case 3:13-cv-00336-BLW Document 21 Filed 09/23/13 Page 25 of 31 18 Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59 (1965) (exhibition license must issue “within a specified brief period” and “the procedure must also assure a prompt final judicial decision . . . .”). Accordingly, 36 C.F.R. § 327.

  10. Greater Los Angeles Agency on Deafness, Inc. et al v. Time Warner, Inc.

    MOTION to Strike

    Filed September 12, 2011

    at 609 (Brennan, J., concurring). See also Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 57, 59 (1965) (determination of validity of prior restraint “must [ ] be limited to … the shortest fixed period compatible with sound judicial resolution”); CBS v. District Court, 729 F.2d 1174, 1177 (9th Cir. 1983) (“The first amendment informs us that the damage resulting from a prior restraint – even a prior restraint of the shortest duration – is extraordinarily grave.”).