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Franklin v. State

Court of Appeals of Georgia
Sep 20, 1966
151 S.E.2d 191 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966)





Involuntary manslaughter. Coweta Superior Court. Before Judge Knight.

Sanders, Mottola Haugen, Willis G. Haugen, for appellant.

Wright Lipford, Solicitor General, for appellee.

1. Where in investigating the cause of an automobile collision in which a death has resulted, evidence obtained from an examination of the death weapon, the automobile, by police officers at the scene of the collision without a search warrant is not inadmissible as having been obtained in violation of the defendant's constitutional rights under the decisions exemplified by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 ( 81 SC 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081), Raif v. State, 109 Ga. App. 354 ( 136 S.E.2d 169), and similar cases, as contended by the defendant.

2. Where the sole admission by the defendant is no more than an incriminating admission not amounting to a confession, it is not error to refuse to charge on confessions. See Pressley v. State, 201 Ga. 267, 270 ( 39 S.E.2d 478), and citations.

3. The requirement that a prima facie showing as to voluntariness be made before an incriminating admission is admissible in evidence (see Bryant v. State, 191 Ga. 686 (1), 13 S.E.2d 820), is met where the evidence discloses that such admission is made before arrest in a public building not under the control of the police to whom such admission is made.

4. Under the decision in Sims v. State, 221 Ga. 190 ( 144 S.E.2d 103), the trial court did not err in overruling the defendant's motion for a separate hearing on the question of the voluntariness of the incriminating admission that she had had "one drink," nor was the defendant denied any constitutional right to counsel under the decision in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 ( 84 SC 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977), where no arrest had taken place at the time the defendant made the alleged incriminating admission and under all the evidence in the case the defendant was not under custodial interrogation and persons (nurses and doctors) only concerned with the defendant's physical welfare and well-being were present in the room during the period when such admission was made. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 ( 86 SC 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694).

5. The fourth enumeration of error complains of the following excerpt from the court's charge: "The burden rests upon the State to prove all of the material allegations in the indictment to your satisfaction, beyond a reasonable doubt, and, if the State does this, then you would be authorized to find the defendant guilty of the offense charged." Under the decision of the Supreme Court in Salisbury v. State, 221 Ga. 718 (2) ( 146 S.E.2d 776), such charge limited the jury to a consideration of the State's evidence only and requires that a new trial be granted.

Case remanded for new trial. Hall and Deen, JJ., concur.


The defendant was indicted, tried and on September 15, 1965, convicted on three indictments in which she was charged with involuntary manslaughter in the commission of an unlawful act. She was charged with driving while under the influence of intoxicants and crossing over the center line of the highway and colliding with another automobile being driven in the opposite direction. The driver and two passengers in the other car died as a result of the injuries sustained in the collision. On appeal the defendant enumerates several alleged errors dealing with the admission of evidence and the court's charge; however, there is no contention that the verdicts were not authorized by the evidence.

Summaries of

Franklin v. State

Court of Appeals of Georgia
Sep 20, 1966
151 S.E.2d 191 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966)
Case details for

Franklin v. State

Case Details


Court:Court of Appeals of Georgia

Date published: Sep 20, 1966


151 S.E.2d 191 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966)
151 S.E.2d 191

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