Florida v. Royer

14 Analyses of this case by attorneys

  1. Search exceeded scope of stop

    Kansas DefendersRandall HodgkinsonDecember 7, 2012

    Nor may the police seek to verify their suspicions by means that approach the conditions of arrest." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983). The protections of the Fourth Amendment are not diluted when legitimate law enforcement interests justify a warrantless search; the search must still be limited in scope to whatever is justified by the exception to the constitutional requirement of a warrant.

  2. MA well explains the totality of circumstances test applied to police-citizen contacts

    Law Offices of John Wesley HallOctober 22, 2019

    ” Commonwealth v. Barros, 435 Mass. 171, 173-174, 755 N.E.2d 740 (2001), quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.). See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983). See also Commonwealth v. Borges, 395 Mass. 788, 791, 482 N.E.2d 314 (1985).

  3. W.D.Ky.: Mere refusal to cooperate is not RS, but headlong flight pretty much is

    Law Offices of John Wesley HallJohn Wesley HallJune 16, 2017

    If an officer, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, approaches an individual, the individual has a right to ignore the police and go about his business. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983). And any “refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure.”

  4. CA1: 25 year old prior could be considered by officer in RS totality

    Law Offices of John Wesley HallJohn Wesley HallJune 13, 2017

    Evaluating whether an officer’s suspicions are (or are not) reasonable is a fact-sensitive task, bound up in the warp and woof of the surrounding circumstances.” Chhien, 266 F.3d at 8 (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983)). As we examine those suspicions, we give deference to Blake’s perceptions.

  5. D.Me.: Detaining def, taking his hotel room key, and moving him from outside the hotel to just outside his hotel room was an arrest; but here with PC

    Law Offices of John Wesley HallJohn Wesley HallDecember 31, 2016

    The Government points to the “dynamic situation” confronting the officers, ECF No. 22 at 9, but fails to explain how moving Flores and positioning him directly outside Room 131 facilitated the investigatory purpose of the detention, in light of the fact that the officers were concerned about interference from other members of Flores’ group, whom they suspected to be inside Room 131. While reasons of safety and security may justify moving a suspect during an investigatory stop, see Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 504-05, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983), the Government has not shown how moving Flores to the room thought to contain his fellow drug traffickers was reasonably necessary to safely conduct the investigation.Considering the totality of the circumstances, including the officers’ use of handcuffs, the seizure of the room key, and the relocation of Flores to the hotel hallway, a reasonable person in Flores’ position would have understood his situation to be tantamount to an arrest. See Jones, 700 F.3d at 624.

  6. IA: Once it was discovered that owner with suspended DL wasn’t driving car, officer could still ask for DL (noting conflicting authorities)

    Law Offices of John Wesley HallJohn Wesley HallMay 3, 2016

    Vance, 790 N.W.2d at 783 n.1. The court cited Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983), for the proposition that “the scope of an investigatory stop must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification and last no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.” Id.

  7. KY: Use of drug dog during stop unjustified and suppressed

    Law Offices of John Wesley HallJohn Wesley HallMarch 23, 2016

    As long as the sniff search is conducted during the course of a lawful traffic stop, including any lawful extensions of the traffic stop, the search is proper and does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 179 S.W.3d 882, 884 (Ky. App. 2005) (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983) (“Investigative detention [in relation to a narcotics canine sniff search] must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.”).

  8. Search & Seizure: Consent to Blood Draw – Test for Seizure of Person; Ineffective Assistance: Unobjected-to Evidence of Victim’s Character – No Prejduice

    Wisconsin State Public DefenderAugust 1, 2012

    But those allegations are contradicted by testimony from the deputy present in the examination room that, on more than one occasion, Jacobs was reminded that he was not under arrest and did not have to ask permission to go about his business.[6] Taking the officers’ version of events as true, as we must, we agree with the trial court that a reasonable person in Jacobs’ position would have believed that he or she was free to leave the hospital at any time.[7]State v. Luebeck, 2006 WI App 87, 292 Wis. 2d 748, 715 N.W.2d 639 (police retention of ID after passing FST established seizure), and Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) (Royer seized when police moved him to private room and retained his DL), distinguished.Ineffective Assistance – Evidence of Victim’s Character Testimony, in a vehicular homicide trial, as to the victim’s character was irrelevant:¶26 We begin by pointing out that the mother’s testimony was not admissible because it was not relevant.

  9. 4 Cir: Calling ICE during routine traffic stop doesn’t violate 4th Amendment

    University of Denver Sturm College of LawApril 12, 2012

    Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), an investigation detention is constitutionally permissible if it is justified at its inception and if “the continued stop was ‘sufficiently limited in scope and duration to satisfy the conditions of an investigative seizure.’” Guijon-Ortiz, No. 10-4518, slip op. at 13 (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)).A stop is limited in scope and duration if “‘the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant.’” Guijon-Ortiz, No. 10-4518, slip op. at 13 (quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985)).

  10. Warrantless Entry – Exigent Circumstances Exception not Circumscribed by Whether “Police-Created”

    Wisconsin State Public DefenderMay 16, 2011

    And whether the person who knocks on the door and requests the opportunity to speak is a police officer or a private citizen, the occupant has no obligation to open the door or to speak. Cf. Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491, 497–498 (1983) . (“[H]e may decline to listen to the questions at all and may go on his way”). When the police knock on a door but the occupants choose not to respond or to speak, “the investigation will have reached a conspicuously low point,” and the occupants “will have the kind of warning that even the most elaborate security system cannot provide.”