Nor may the police seek to verify their suspicions by means that approach the conditions of arrest." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 499, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983). The protections of the Fourth Amendment are not diluted when legitimate law enforcement interests justify a warrantless search; the search must still be limited in scope to whatever is justified by the exception to the constitutional requirement of a warrant.
” Commonwealth v. Barros, 435 Mass. 171, 173-174, 755 N.E.2d 740 (2001), quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S. Ct. 1870, 64 L. Ed. 2d 497 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.). See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 502, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983). See also Commonwealth v. Borges, 395 Mass. 788, 791, 482 N.E.2d 314 (1985).
If an officer, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, approaches an individual, the individual has a right to ignore the police and go about his business. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983). And any “refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective justification needed for a detention or seizure.”
Evaluating whether an officer’s suspicions are (or are not) reasonable is a fact-sensitive task, bound up in the warp and woof of the surrounding circumstances.” Chhien, 266 F.3d at 8 (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983)). As we examine those suspicions, we give deference to Blake’s perceptions.
The Government points to the “dynamic situation” confronting the officers, ECF No. 22 at 9, but fails to explain how moving Flores and positioning him directly outside Room 131 facilitated the investigatory purpose of the detention, in light of the fact that the officers were concerned about interference from other members of Flores’ group, whom they suspected to be inside Room 131. While reasons of safety and security may justify moving a suspect during an investigatory stop, see Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 504-05, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983), the Government has not shown how moving Flores to the room thought to contain his fellow drug traffickers was reasonably necessary to safely conduct the investigation.Considering the totality of the circumstances, including the officers’ use of handcuffs, the seizure of the room key, and the relocation of Flores to the hotel hallway, a reasonable person in Flores’ position would have understood his situation to be tantamount to an arrest. See Jones, 700 F.3d at 624.
Vance, 790 N.W.2d at 783 n.1. The court cited Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983), for the proposition that “the scope of an investigatory stop must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification and last no longer than necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.” Id.
As long as the sniff search is conducted during the course of a lawful traffic stop, including any lawful extensions of the traffic stop, the search is proper and does not violate the Fourth Amendment. Johnson v. Commonwealth, 179 S.W.3d 882, 884 (Ky. App. 2005) (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229 (1983) (“Investigative detention [in relation to a narcotics canine sniff search] must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.”).
But those allegations are contradicted by testimony from the deputy present in the examination room that, on more than one occasion, Jacobs was reminded that he was not under arrest and did not have to ask permission to go about his business.[6] Taking the officers’ version of events as true, as we must, we agree with the trial court that a reasonable person in Jacobs’ position would have believed that he or she was free to leave the hospital at any time.[7]State v. Luebeck, 2006 WI App 87, 292 Wis. 2d 748, 715 N.W.2d 639 (police retention of ID after passing FST established seizure), and Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) (Royer seized when police moved him to private room and retained his DL), distinguished.Ineffective Assistance – Evidence of Victim’s Character Testimony, in a vehicular homicide trial, as to the victim’s character was irrelevant:¶26 We begin by pointing out that the mother’s testimony was not admissible because it was not relevant.
Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), an investigation detention is constitutionally permissible if it is justified at its inception and if “the continued stop was ‘sufficiently limited in scope and duration to satisfy the conditions of an investigative seizure.’” Guijon-Ortiz, No. 10-4518, slip op. at 13 (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983)).A stop is limited in scope and duration if “‘the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant.’” Guijon-Ortiz, No. 10-4518, slip op. at 13 (quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985)).
And whether the person who knocks on the door and requests the opportunity to speak is a police officer or a private citizen, the occupant has no obligation to open the door or to speak. Cf. Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491, 497–498 (1983) . (“[H]e may decline to listen to the questions at all and may go on his way”). When the police knock on a door but the occupants choose not to respond or to speak, “the investigation will have reached a conspicuously low point,” and the occupants “will have the kind of warning that even the most elaborate security system cannot provide.”