granting motion to compel and for sanctions for failure to provide complete initial disclosures, and recommending dismissalSummary of this case from Sanders v. Matthew
Nos. 08-17368, 08-17694.
The panel unanimously concludes these appeals are suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed.R.App.P. 34(a)(2).
Filed November 22, 2010.
Laurie Ellen Flanagan, Stockton, CA, pro se.
James Thomas Gotch, Kathleen Darmagnac, Louis A. Leone, Esquire, Stubbs Leone, Walnut Creek, CA, for Defendants-Appellees.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, Lawrence K. Karlton, District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. 2:07-cv-00333-LKK-GGH.
Before: TASHIMA, BERZON, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
In Appeal No. 08-17368, Laurie Ellen Flanagan appeals pro se from the district court's judgment dismissing her action as a sanction for failing to comply with her discovery obligations, and from the order denying her motion for reconsideration. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion both the dismissal of an action under the district court's inherent powers and the denial of a motion for reconsideration. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Natural Beverage Distribs., 69 F.3d 337, 348 (9th Cir. 1995); Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or. v. ACandS, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1262 (9th Cir. 1993). We affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Flanagan's action for failing to comply with her discovery obligations, where the court previously imposed monetary sanctions on Flanagan's attorney for failing to provide timely and proper initial disclosures, Flanagan never provided complete initial disclosures, Flanagan refused for many months to respond substantively to legitimate discovery requests, and the court found that defendants were prejudiced. See Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 69 F.3d at 348 (listing factors to be considered before imposing the sanction of dismissal).
The district court also did not abuse its discretion by denying Flanagan's motion for reconsideration under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) because Flanagan did not present newly discovered evidence, demonstrate clear error or manifest injustice, or show an intervening change in the controlling law. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah County, Or., 5 F.3d at 1263.
We lack jurisdiction to review Flanagan's challenge to the district court's order imposing monetary sanctions against her former attorney. See Cabrera v. City of Huntington Park, 159 F.3d 374, 382 (9th Cir. 1998) (party lacks standing to appeal an order imposing sanctions against his or her attorney).
Flanagan's remaining contentions are not persuasive.
In Appeal No. 08-17694, appellants have abandoned their challenge to the district court's order denying their request for costs because they do not raise it in their brief. See Miller v. Fairchild Indus., Inc., 797 F.2d 727, 738 (9th Cir. 1986).