Ferguson v. Georgia

8 Citing briefs

  1. PEOPLE v. MICKEL (ANDREW)

    Appellant’s Reply Brief

    Filed January 22, 2013

    As appellant explainedin his opening brief, exclusionofthis sort ofevidence implicates the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to present a defense andis, therefore, given stricter scrutiny. (AOB 199-202; -101- See Rock v. Arkansas, supra, 483 U.S. 44; Ferguson v. Georgia (1961) 365 U.S. 570; See Martinez v. Yist (9" Cir. 1991) 951 F.2d 1153, 1157.) Respondent nonetheless reasons that under the Watson standard, the exclusion of appellant’s testimony was harmless because the jury heard appellant’s testimonyat the penalty phase and sentenced him to death.

  2. PEOPLE v. RICES

    Appellant’s Opening Brief

    Filed November 18, 2014

    Accord Crutchfield v. Wainwright (11th Cir. 1986) 803 F.2d 1103, 1108 [holding that the Strickland harmlesserror standarddoes not “apply to situations wherethe state, the court, or the criminal justice system denies a defendant the effective assistance of counsel.”].) 3 See also Brooks v. Tennessee, supra, 406 U.S. 605 [no showingof prejudice required where impedimentto defense counsel’s representation was caused bystate law]; Ferguson v. Georgia (1961) 365 U.S. 570 [same]. 189 Pursuantto all these authorities, a harmless error analysis is inappropriate in this case.

  3. PEOPLE v. CARRASCO

    Appellant’s Reply Brief

    Filed August 25, 2010

    In that regard Mr. Beswick failed miserably, as detailed in Arguments [IX and X. Alternatively, as also present in Appellant’s case, state interference can itself violate a defendant’s right to the effective assistance of counsel by rulings which interfere with the abil- ity of counsel to respond to the state’s case or conduct a defense. (/bid; see also, Geders v. United States (1976) 425 U.S. 80; Herring New York, supra, 422 U.S. 853; Brooks v. Tennessee (1972) 406 U.S. 605, 612-613; Ferguson v. Georgia (1961) 365 U.S. 570, 593-596.) Thetrial court’s interference with the right of Appellant to effective assis- tance of counsel and fair trial was astounding.

  4. PEOPLE v. HERNANDEZ

    Respondent's Opening Brief on the Merits

    Filed May 13, 2010

    (Cronic, supra, 466 U.S.at pp. 659 & fn. 25.) As examples, the court cited Geders v. United States, supra, 425 U.S. at p. 91 (order preventing defendant from consulting with his counsel “‘about anything” during a 17-hour overnight recess), Herring v. New York (1975) 422 U.S. 853, 865 (trial judge’s order denying counsel the opportunity to make a summation at close of bench trial), Brooks v. Tennessee (1972) 406 U.S. 605, 612-613 (law requiring defendantto testify first at trial or not at all deprived accused of“the “guiding hand of counsel’in the timing of this critical elementof his defense”), Hamilton v. Alabama (1961) 368 U.S. 52, 55 (denial of counsel at arraignment), White v. Maryland (1963) 373 U.S. 59, 60 (per curiam) (denial of counsel at preliminary hearing), Ferguson v. Georgia (1961) 365 U.S. 570, 596(statute retaining common law incompetencyrulefor criminal defendants, which denied the accused the right to have his counsel question him to elicit his statements before the jury), and Williams v. Kaiser (1945) 323 U.S. 471 (failure to appoint counsel upon defendant’s request prior to entry of defendant’s guilty plea).'° '° At least two categories of error that Cronic deemedreversible without an assessmentofprejudice have since beenheld to be subject to harmless-error review. Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 682- 683, rejected the view that Davis v. Alaska (1974) 415 U.S. 308 requires automatic reversal where thetrial court erroneously limits cross- examination.

  5. PEOPLE v. HERNANDEZ

    Respondent's Petition for Review

    Filed December 18, 2009

    (/d. at p. 658, fn. omitted.) As examples, Cronic listed among others, Herring v. New York (1975) 422 U.S. 853, 863-865 [bar on defense counsel’s summation at benchtrial]; Brooks v. Tennessee (1972) 406 U.S. 605, 612-613 [requirementthat defendantbe first defense witness], and Ferguson v. Georgia (1961) 365 U.S. 570, 593-596 [bar on defense counsel’s direct examination of defendant]. Cronic and Perry deemed Geders error—the complete denial of counsel concerning all matters during an overnight recess in the trial—to be an error that “is not subject to the kind ofprejudice analysis that is appropriate in determining whetherthe quality of a lawyer’s performance itself has been constitutionally ineffective.”

  6. PEOPLE v. CARRASCO

    Appellant’s Opening Brief

    Filed December 10, 2007

    (Ibid; see also, Geders v. United States (1976) 425 U. S. 80 [defendant denied right to effective counsel where trial court pre- cluded him from consulting with counsel during an overnight recess in trial]; Herring New York, supra, 422 U.S. 853 [defendant denied right to ef- fective counsel where trial court refused to allow his counsel to make clos- ing argument in bench trial]; Brooks v. Tennessee (1972) 406 U.S. 605, 612-613 [ruling requiring that defendant be the first defense witness ("The accused is thereby deprived of the 'guiding hand of counsel' in the timing of this critical element of his defense."]; Ferguson v. Georgia (1961) 365 U.S. 570, 593-596 [state rule barring questioning of a defendant on direct examination by his attorney during an unsworn statement].) While gener- ally a defendant who represents himself at trial forfeits a claim that their own actions were deficient, even a pro se defendant cannot forfeit a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel that was the result of state interference.

  7. PEOPLE v. CLARK (WILLIAM CLINTON)

    Appellant’s Opening Brief

    Filed June 17, 2005

    J/d.; see also Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 279-80 (1989) (stating that the Supreme Court has “expressly noted that direct governmental interference with the right to counsel is a different matter” with regard to whether prejudice must be shown, and collecting representative cases where prejudice need not be proved); Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658 & n.24 (citing cases in which the Court has discussed circumstances justifying a presumption of prejudice). The cases in whichstate interference with the right to counsel has been held to violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendmentrights per se include the following circumstances: prohibiting direct examination of the defendant by his counsel, see Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961); requiring those 168 defendants who choosetotestify to do so before any other defense witnesses, see Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972); refusing to allow defense counsel closing argumentin a benchtrial, see Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975); and prohibiting any consultation between a defendant and his attorney during an overnight recess separating the direct-examination and the cross-examination of the defendant, see Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976). See also United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 201 & nn. 14-17 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 944 (1979); 2 LaFave & Israel, supra, 11.8(a).

  8. RENO ON H.C.

    Petitioner's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus

    Filed May 10, 2004

    The Supreme Court has uniformly found constitutional error without any showing of prejudice when counsel waseithertotally absent or prevented from assisting the accused during critical stage of the proceeding. See, e. g., Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976); Herring v. New York, 422 US. 853 (1975); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 612-613 (1972); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 55 (1961); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60 (1963) (per curiam), Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961); Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 475-476 (1945). 12.