Filed February 3, 2014
To that end, it made clear that if the Eighth Amendment is meant to do anything, it’s meant to prohibit prison officials from “gratuitously allowing the beating or rape of one prisoner by another….” 511 U.S. at 833. Here, the violent beating inflicted on Addison in the direct and passive presence of the defendants was nothing if not “gratuitous”.
Filed October 5, 2017
This Court can and should infer that Defendants know the risks posed by prolonged solitary confinement. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842. The ruinous effects of long-term isolation are neither new, nor novel concepts, nor are they debatable.
Filed January 12, 2016
See Trammell v. Keane, 338 F.3d 155, 162 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[I]n prison-conditions cases the state of mind requirement is one of ‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health or safety.” (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834) (internal brackets omitted)). For these reasons, Plaintiff’s “Conditions of Confinement” claim should be dismissed.
Filed July 7, 2015
,” plaintiff has failed to allege that defendants were deliberately indifferent in failing to protect her from a substantial general risk of harm. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842-843. 3. Alleged Risk of Serious Harm Faced by Transgender Inmates Although plaintiff claims that all of the defendants were on notice of her heightened vulnerability to sexual assault as a transgender woman and points to several laws and studies to support her allegations (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 51-59, 71-72), these general statements are insufficient to state an Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim.
Filed January 17, 2014
Case 2:09-cv-03437-PBT Document 93 Filed 01/17/14 Page 18 of 20 19 excessive risk was so obvious the official must have known about it. Beers–Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 133 (3d Cir.2001) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842). Delaney argues that the record indicates that Santos was taken to Frankford Hospital the day he injured his leg, and was again taken back to the hospital after he experienced continued pain.
Filed May 31, 2016
A prison official's duty under the Eighth Amendment is to ensure reasonable safety. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 844 (emphasis added). But, here, Plaintiffs do not seek “reasonable safety;” instead, they seek complete safety, with no risk whatsoever—a goal their own expert agrees cannot be achieved.
Filed July 31, 2015
See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842.
Filed April 15, 2015
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.
Filed October 7, 2014
Most importantly, however, is that detoxification is not employed as a punishment, but rather as a tool to improve the health of an inmate. The Eighth Amendment outlaws cruel and unusual "punishments," not "conditions," See, Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994). The same applies to the continuation of prescription medications.
Filed May 6, 2013
Additionally, the Supreme Court held in Farmer that deliberate indifference “entails something more than mere negligence” but “is satisfied by something less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm will result.” 511 U.S. at 835. In the Rosario case that Defendant Neisler cited at the Second Final Pretrial Conference, the Seventh Circuit indicated that intent is not required to prove deliberate indifference by recognizing that “‘[t]he deliberate indifference standard requires more than a finding of negligence but less than a showing of intentional harm.