Filed June 24, 2002
effective assistance of counsel); Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668 (counsel has duty to conduct reasonable investigation; under Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, a showing that counsel’s acts fell outside the range ofreasonable competence, coupled with showing of prejudice, compels reversal; prejudice shown if there is a reasonable probability, less than a preponderance, that counsel’s errors affected the outcome;these principles apply equally to guilt and sentencing phasesof capital trial); United States v. Cronic (1984) 466 U.S. 648, 659 (Sixth Amendmentviolated, and prejudice need not be shown, if counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial Page -336- testing); Cuyler v. Sullivan (1980) 446 U.S. 335 (prejudice from ineffective assistance presumed when counsellabors underconflict of interest); Hill v. Lockhart (1985) 414 U.S. 52 (Strickland standards apply to representation provided prior to trial, such as during plea proceedings); Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (criminal defendant has constitutionally protected right under Sixth and FourteenthAmendmentsto waive counsel and - represent himself);McKasklev. Wiggins(1984)465 U.S.168(constitutional. — — ——— — right to selfrepresentation); Dusky v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 402 (per curiam) (standard of competencyfor pleading guilty is same as competency for standingtrial); and see Godinez v. Moran (1993) 509 U.S. 389; Caldwell v. Mississippi (1985) 472 U.S. 320 (prosecutorial misconduct); Pate v. Robinson (1966) 383 U.S. 375 (failure to observe procedures designed to assure defendantwill not be tried or convicted while incompetentviolates due process and right to fair trial); Drope v. Missouri (1975) 420 U.S. 162 (defendant’s conduct after arraignment, such as conductin court orin jail, maytrigger competency proceedings); Ake v. Oklahoma (1985) 470 U.S. 68 (defendant entitled to expert assistance, including mental health expert assistance, to preparefor andtestify at trial); Mattox v. United
Filed August 30, 2012
[Citation.] 93 The threat of appellate reversal would be not merely ineffective but counterproductive. A knowledgeable defendant desiring to avoid the death penalty could make a timely request for self- representation under Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. 806, and then decline to present any mitigating evidence at the penalty phase, secure in the knowledge that any death judgment would be reversed by this court, while a defendant genuinely desiring death could circumvent the rule by presenting a bare minimum of mitigating evidence. A rule so easily evaded or misused is clearly unsound.
Filed March 22, 2012
Consequently, appellant’s right to counsel, due process of law, and a reliable penalty determination as guaranteed by the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, were all violated byJudge Riemer’s error, requiring reversal of the death judgment and a remandto the superior court for the purposes of another hearing on appellant’s section 190.4, subdivision (e), application for modification of the death verdict. (Martinez, supra, 528 U.S.at p. 154, 159-160; Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 835.) | | H 34 Il JUDGE RIEMER’S DETERMINATION THAT,IN CONDUCTING HIS INDEPENDENT REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE AT THE AUTOMATIC MOTION TO MODIFY THE JURY’S DEATH VERDICT, HE WAS PRECLUDED FROM CONSIDERING THE PREVIOUS SECTION190.4, SUBDIVISION (e) FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE JUDGE WHO PRESIDED AT THE PENALTY RETRIAL CONCERNING THE CREDIBILITY OF THE WITNESSES, WAS REVERSIBLE ERROR A. Proceedings Below Becauseofthe self-described “unfortunate procedural circumstances” in which Judge Riemer found himself when called upon to fulfill his duties undersection 190.4, subdivision(e), he directed the People to file a brief addressing several questions that were of concern to him.
Filed September 24, 2015
In every case in which a defendant opts for self- representation, he necessarily waives the right to the assistance of counsel. (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 835 [“[I]n order to represent himself, the accused must “knowingly andintelligently’ forgo those relinquished benefits [associated with the right to counsel]”; Von Moltke v. Gillies (1948) 332 U.S. 708, 724.) As noted above, in virtually every case in whichthetrial court terminated the pro se status of a misbehaving pro se defendant, that defendant had previously waived the assistance of counsel.
Filed June 23, 2015
’” (Parento, supra, 235 Cal.App.3d at p. 1381, quoting Teron, supra, 23 Cal.3d at p. 108.) “‘If the defendant chooses to defend himself by not participating in thetrial, he, unlike his attorney, is free to do so, but once this choiceis madehe cannotthereafter claim ineffective assistance of counsel as a basis for reversal on appeal.’” (Parento, supra, 235 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1381- 1382, quoting McKenzie, supra, 34 Cal.3d at pp. 628-626; accord, Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 835, fn. 46.) Parento concluded: Wesee no reasonto distinguish betweenthe situation, occurring in McKenzie, where a defendant exercises his rightof self- representation by being physically present but conducting no defense, and the situation occurring here, where the defendant chooses to exercise that right by physically absenting himself from the proceedings. The issue is not physical presence, but choice.
Filed July 18, 2012
[Citation].’ (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at p. 835.) ‘No particular form of. words is required in admonishing a defendant who seeks to 16 waive counsel andelect self-representation.’
Filed November 28, 2016
Moreover, even if the Court disagrees with a defendant’s strategic choices about how to present his case in the manner in which he chooses, that disagreement is not a basis on which to deny a defendant his constitutionally protected right to self-representation. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 (“[A]lthough [a defendant] may conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must be honored out of that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law.”); see also Silagy v. Peters, 905 F.2d 986, 1007-08 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that “we do not believe that the right which Faretta grants can or should be contingent on [the nature of the defense which the defendant wishes to present]”); United States v. Davis, No. 01-30656, 2001 WL 34712238, at *3 (5th Cir. July 17, 2001) (holding that district court erred in denying the defendant’s right to represent himself based solely on his refusal to present traditional mitigation evidence during the penalty phase).
Filed September 12, 2012
Appellant had the right under the Sixth Amendmentofthe United States Constitution to conduct his own defenseif he knowingly andintelligently waived the rightto the assistance of counsel. (Faretta v. California, supra, 422 U.S. at pp. 819, 835-836; People v. Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 708.) That right extends to the penalty phase.
Filed September 16, 2015
In addition, Justice Richardson recognizedthat the right of a self-represented defendant to make his own personal and fundamental choice to plead guilty was protected under the federal 62 Constitution and rang hollow if the criminal defendant could not plead as he chose. (/d. at pp. 759-763; See Faretta, 422 U.S. at p. 834.) Morerecently, in Alfaro, the defendant’s counsel refused to consent to the defendant’s guilty plea in a capital case because he believed that the defendant soughtto plead guilty to shield an alleged coconspirator in order to protect herself and her family. (Alfaro, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 1295- 1296.)
Filed February 11, 2014
As described below,key to the enactmentof section 686.1 in 1972 was recognition by the Legislature and voters of the importance ofprovidingfair trials and an adequate defenseto criminal defendants in capital cases. Just a few yearslater, the United States Supreme Court issuedits opinion in Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806 (Faretta). As appellant argued in ArgumentIX,ante, the Faretta decisionis limited and does not cover capital cases.