In Evans, however, although, as here, an executive order was involved, no contention was made that a statute, rather than an executive order, was necessary to compel the desired financial disclosure or prohibit the described activities.Summary of this case from Rapp v. Carey
Argued November 17, 1976
Decided December 16, 1976
Appeal from the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Fourth Judicial Department, JOSEPH S. MATTINA, J.
Charles R. Sandler and Ronald L. Jaros for appellants.
Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney-General (Michael F. Colligan and Ruth Kessler Toch of counsel), for respondents.
MEMORANDUM. We affirm the order of the Appellate Division and its upholding of the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 10 (9 N.Y.CRR 3.10). In such affirmance we, as did the Appellate Division, distinguish Griswold v Connecticut ( 381 U.S. 479), a case which recognized and broadly delineated a right to privacy but in a vastly different situation. Rather than rely on such cases as California Bankers Assn. v Shultz ( 416 U.S. 21), United States v Miller ( 425 U.S. 434), Fisher v United States ( 425 U.S. 391), and Buckley v Valeo ( 424 U.S. 1), each of which involves an unsuccessful challenge to a governmental requirement or governmental demand directing a third party to maintain records or disclose information, we rest instead on the authority of cases such as United Public Workers v Mitchell ( 330 U.S. 75), Civil Serv. Comm. v Letter Carriers ( 413 U.S. 548), Broadrick v Oklahoma ( 413 U.S. 601), and Illinois State Employees Assn. v Walker ( 57 Ill.2d 512, cert den sub nom. Troopers Lodge No. 41 v Walker, 419 U.S. 1058) where, as here, the rights and interests of government employees, as citizens, were balanced against the rights and interests of the government, as employer. The Executive Order requiring financial disclosure was designed to eliminate inefficiency and deter official corruption, significant public interests, and does not infringe upon individual employees' constitutional rights.
Judges JASEN, JONES, WACHTLER and COOKE concur;
Although the opinion of Mr. Presiding Justice JOHN MARSH at the Appellate Division cogently justifies on constitutional grounds a statute requiring financial disclosures by public employees and officers, it does not address itself to whether a statute, as distinguished from an "executive order", is required to accomplish such objective. But appellants have never contended otherwise and, indeed, none of the parties has briefed that question. Hence, we do not reach it.
Order affirmed, with costs, in a memorandum.