From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

Elliott v. Government of Virgin Islands

United States District Court, D. Virgin Islands, Division of St. Croix Appellate Division
Jun 2, 2008
D.C. CRIM. APP. NO. 2005/040, Re: Sup.Ct.Crim. 241/2004 (D.V.I. Jun. 2, 2008)

Opinion

D.C. CRIM. APP. NO. 2005/040, Re: Sup.Ct.Crim. 241/2004.

Considered: October 19, 2007

June 2, 2008

Martial A. Webster, Esq., St. Croix, U.S.V.I., Attorney for Appellant.

Tiffany V. Robinson, AAG, St. Thomas, U.S.V.I., Attorney for Appellee.

BEFORE: CURTIS V. GÓMEZ, Chief Judge, District Court of the Virgin Islands; RAYMOND L. FINCH, Judge of the District Court of the Virgin Islands; and LEON A. KENDALL Judge of the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands, Sitting by Designation.


On Appeal from the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands


Memorandum Opinion


I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE

Appellant, Joseph Elliott ("Elliott" or "Appellant") was arrested in connection with a Burglary on the island of St. Croix. Subsequently, Elliott was charged in a four count Amended Information with Burglary First Degree, Possession of a Dangerous Weapon During the Commission of a Crime of Violence, Assault Third Degree and Possession of Stolen Property.

On April 8, 2005, the trial court conducted a plea hearing. (App. pp. 47-62.) The court asked Elliott whether he read and understood the plea agreement, whether he discussed the charging document and plea agreement with his attorney and whether he understood that by entering a plea, he waived his right to a trial. (App. pp. 52-56.) Elliott answered the court's questions affirmatively. (Id.) Elliott also confirmed that he was not threatened or coerced into entering the plea and that he pled guilty because he was, in fact, guilty. The trial court explained the maximum terms of incarceration for the corresponding crimes to which Elliott would plea and the Government described the factual basis for the crimes alleged. (App. pp. 54, 56-59.) Elliott agreed with the Government's factual description of his illegal conduct and affirmed that he understood the maximum periods of incarceration for the felony offenses. After the trial court's various inquiries and colloquy, Elliott entered a guilty plea to Burglary in the Second Degree (Count One) and Assault in the Third Degree (Count Three). (App. pp. 47-63.) The trial court accepted the plea as knowing and voluntary and the remaining counts were dismissed.

On May 18, 2005, Elliott was sentenced to a period of fifteen (15) years imprisonment for Count One, and a period of five (5) years imprisonment for Count Three. These terms were to run consecutively. The Superior Court entered a written judgment and commitment on June 20, 2005. (App. pp. 64-87.) This timely appeal followed.

II. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court has jurisdiction to review the judgments and orders of the Superior Court in criminal cases. See the Omnibus Justice Act of 2005, Act No. 6730 § 54(d)(1) (2005). We review de novo questions of law, issues implicating rights protected under the U.S. Constitution, and the interpretation of statutes. However, we afford the more deferential clear error review to factual determinations. See Gov't of V.I. v. Albert, 89 F.Supp.2d 658, 663 (D.V.I. App. Div. 2001).

See also Revised Organic Act § 23A, 48 U.S.C. § 1613a. The complete Revised Organic Act of 1954 is found at 48 U.S.C. §§ 1541- 1645 (1994), reprinted in V.I. CODE ANN., Historical Documents, Organic Acts, and U.S. Constitution at 159-60 (1995 Supp. 2003) (preceding V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 1) ["Revised Organic Act"].

Elliott's notice of appeal was filed on July 21, 2005.

III. ISSUES PRESENTED

On appeal, Elliott argues that the trial court erred by accepting his plea that was not knowing, voluntary or intelligent. Elliott also argues that the trial court erred in sentencing because his sentence was disproportionate to his criminal conduct. Finally, Elliott argues that he was denied effective assistance of counsel.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Appellant's plea was knowing, voluntary and intelligent.

Elliott contends that his plea was neither knowing, voluntary nor intelligent because the trial court did not explain the elements of Second Degree Burglary or Assault Third Degree. Elliott never called this alleged error to the attention of the Superior Court. We, therefore, review the record for plain error only. United States v. Knobloch, 131 F.3d 366, 370 (3d Cir. 1997).

In order for an appellate court to find plain error, it must first find 1) an error, 2) that is plain and 3) that affects substantial rights. Even if all three of these prerequisites are met, an appellate court may correct an error to which no objection is made only if the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732, (1993); Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461 (1987); United States v. Hartman, 74 Fed. Appx. 159, 160 (3d Cir. 2003).

A guilty plea operates as a waiver of important rights, and is valid only if done voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently, with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and the likely consequences. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). Before accepting a plea of guilty, the court must address the defendant personally in open court and inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered. Id.; Fed.R.Crim.Proc. 11(c). In pertinent part, the court addressed Elliott in the following manner: (Id.) (Id.) (Id.)

COURT: [Y]our lawyer just handed to me a two-page document; and its called a plea agreement, and the second page has a typewritten name of Joseph Elliott Jr.; and it signed and dated April 8th of ths year. Is this your signature? (App. p. 53.) ELLIOTT: Yes, your honor. COURT: Did you go through this document with your lawyer before singing it? ELLIOTT: Yes. Additionally, the trial court required the Government to give a factual basis for the plea. (Id.) Id. Id. GOVERNMENT: Your honor, in this matter, the Government would have proven that on August 7, 2004, the defendant broke and entered into a house located at 100 Southgate Hills, which is here on the island of St. Croix. He had no permission to enter that house. And at the time he broke into the house, there were two human beings located in the house, Miss Sheets and another person. And his intent in breaking into the house, was to commit the crime of larceny in the house . . . . . . With respect to Count III, Judge, the Government would have proven that while Mr. Elliott as in the house, with unlawful violence and intent to injure, he assaulted Miss Sheets with a deadly weapon by throwing a metal paint can at Miss Sheets. (App. p. 58.) COURT: Mr. Elliott, did you hear the statements just made by Attorney Christensen? (App. p. 59.) ELLIOTT: Yes. COURT: Do you agree or disagree with what he stated? () ELLIOTT: Agree. () Elliott argues that because the court failed to spell-out the elements of the crime, his plea was not made knowingly or voluntarily. However, the Supreme Court has held that Rule 11(c) does not require that the trial court spell out the elements of the charge in order to inform the defendant. Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 544 U.S. 175, 183 (2005); United States v. Hartman, 74 Fed. Appx. 159, 163 (3d Cir. 2003); Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(1). All that is required is that the court inform the defendant of the charges and determine that the defendant understands the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered. Id.

In this matter, the charging document plainly describes the factual basis for the crimes. Elliott acknowledged reading and reviewing the charging document with his attorney. Any potential doubts whether Elliott understood the nature of the charges were eliminated when Elliott agreed that the Government could prove that he committed the specific acts which constitute the crimes alleged. Finally, the factual basis for the plea, which was provided by the Government, was agree to by Elliott. Indeed, Elliott conceded that he was pleading guilty because he was guilty.

We are satisfied that Elliott was advised of, and fully understood, the nature of the charges to which he pled. Nothing more is required. Hartman, 74 Fed. Appx. at 163. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in accepting Elliott's plea.

B. Whether Elliott's sentence was disproportionate to his criminal conduct.

Elliott pled guilty to Burglary in the Second Degree and Assault in the Third Degree. However, Elliott argues that his sentence violates the Eight Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, because, his sentence was excessive and not proportionate to the felony offenses to which he plead.

In reviewing challenges to sentences as excessive, courts are cautioned to honor the legislature's lawmaking function to establish suitable penalties. Hunt v. Gov't of the virgin Islands, 2005 WL 627798 at 3 (D.V.I. 2005). In light of the deference accorded to the legislature's determination of appropriate penalties, a sentence within the times prescribed by the legislature will not be disturbed absent a showing of improper procedure, illegality or abuse of discretion. Id.

As such, absent such abuse of discretion or procedural defects, appellate review is generally inappropriate. Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 370-375 (1982). In its consistent deference to the legislative function, the Supreme Court has held that when considering Eight Amendment challenges to sentencing for felony crimes, "the length of the sentence actually imposed is purely a matter of legislative prerogative." Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274 (U.S. 1980); Hutto, 454 U.S. at 373.

Successful challenges to the proportionality of particular sentences should be "exceedingly rare," Id. at 374.

The Virgin Islands Legislature has set a statutory maximum for a person convicted of Burglary in the Second Degree at fifteen years of imprisonment. V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14 § 443. Elliott was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment for Burglary in the Second Degree. The maximum sentence that may be invoked for Assault in the Third Degree is five years. V.I. Code Ann. tit. 14 § 297(1). Elliott was sentenced to five years imprisonment for Assault in the Third Degree. Thus, Elliott's sentence was squarely within its proper statutory parameters.

Moreover, the trial court expressly advised Elliott of the maximum time which could be imposed. (App. p. 54.) Id.) (Id.)

THE COURT: [T]he two charges that you are pleading guilty to, burglary in the second degree and assault in the third degree are felonies. Burglary in the second degree carries a maximum period of incarceration of fifteen years [sic] . . . . . . Assault in the second degree carries a maximum period of incarceration of five years. . . . . Now, at sentencing your lawyer and the government's lawyer are going to make recommendations to the Court as to what sort of sentence you should receive, Now, do you understand that the Court does not have to go along with the sentence of either of the two lawyers? (App. p. 53.) THE COURT: Do you understand that?" (App. p. 54.) MR. ELLIOTT: Yes. ( THE COURT: Which means you could be sentenced to something different. Do you understand that. MR. ELLIOTT: Yes. (App. p. 55.) The statute is clear, as is Elliott's acknowledgment that he understood the maximum periods of incarceration possible, prior to entering his plea. Hence, we cannot find that the Superior Court acted upon improper procedure, illegality or abuse of discretion when sentencing Elliott to the maximum time allowed by statute. See Hunt, 2005 WL 627798 at 3.

C. Whether Elliott was denied effective assistance of counsel

Eliot argues on direct appeal that he was denied effective assistance of counsel. Claims of ineffective counsel are generally not entertained on direct appeal. United States v. Haywood, 155 F.3d 674, 678 (3d Cir. 1988). Except where the ineffectiveness is plain on the face of the record, "the proper avenue for pursuing such claims is through a collateral proceeding in which the factual basis for the claim may be developed." United States v. Theodoropoulos, 866 F.2d 587, 598 (3d Cir. 1989).

Elliott argues that he was forced to enter into a plea agreement, by his court appointed public defender. (Appellant's Brief p. 12.) He also claims that he did not understand the plea and that he never read it or received a copy from counsel. However, at the plea hearing, Appellant represented to the court that he consulted with his attorney regarding the charges and plea agreement, prior to entering his plea. Elliott specifically acknowledged that he went through the document with his lawyer before signing it. (App. p. 54.) Additionally, Elliott explicitly informed the court that he was neither threatened nor forced to accept the plea agreement. (App. p. 57.) Considering the facts on review, the ineffectiveness of Elliott's counsel is not plain from the record. Accordingly, the proper avenue for pursuing Elliott's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is through a collateral proceeding where the factual basis for the alleged ineffectiveness may be developed.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons cited above, we affirm the Superior Court's finding that the Appellant's plea was knowing, intelligent and voluntary. We otherwise affirm the Appellant's conviction. An order consistent with this opinion shall follow.


Summaries of

Elliott v. Government of Virgin Islands

United States District Court, D. Virgin Islands, Division of St. Croix Appellate Division
Jun 2, 2008
D.C. CRIM. APP. NO. 2005/040, Re: Sup.Ct.Crim. 241/2004 (D.V.I. Jun. 2, 2008)
Case details for

Elliott v. Government of Virgin Islands

Case Details

Full title:JOSEPH ELLIOTT, Appellant, v. GOVERNMENT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS, Appellee

Court:United States District Court, D. Virgin Islands, Division of St. Croix Appellate Division

Date published: Jun 2, 2008

Citations

D.C. CRIM. APP. NO. 2005/040, Re: Sup.Ct.Crim. 241/2004 (D.V.I. Jun. 2, 2008)