Filed November 16, 2017
Mere conclusions or suppositions are insufficient to oppose a prima facie showing of summary judgment. See, S.J. Capelin Associates v. Globe Mfg. Co., 34 N.Y.2d 338, 341, 313 N.E.2d 776, 357 N.Y.S.2d 478 (1974); Ehrlich v. American Moninga Greenhouse Manufacturing Corp., 26 N.Y.2d 255, 259, 257 N.E.2d 890, 309 N.Y.S.2d 341(1970); Blankman v. Incorporated Village of Sands Point, 249 A.D.2d 349, 350, 670 N.Y.S.2d 802 (2d Dep’t 1998). We submit that what the plaintiff offered in opposition is fraught with innuendo and conjecture.
Filed September 14, 2009
Such would at least be needed to prevent summary judgment for the plaintiff. 26 N.Y.2d at 259. Just as in Ehrlich, all the documentary evidence presented by plaintiffs conclusively indicates that they are entitled to summary judgment.
Filed April 10, 2014
To the contrary, his allegations about his compensation merely help to explain the ambiguous terms “consideration received” and “compensation.” See Ehrlich v. Am. Moninger Greenhouse Mfg. Corp., 26 N.Y.2d 255, 258 (1970) (noting that the recital of “value received” on a note did not prevent defendants from rebutting the recital because “recitation of receipt of consideration is a mere admission of fact which, like all such admissions, may be explained or disputed by parol evidence” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). AXA offered little by way of contesting Mooney’s allegations under the Trademark Licensing Agreement except to say that the terms of that Agreement are not ambiguous.