Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment Housing Com

56 Citing briefs

  1. SHAW v. S.C. (THC-ORANGE COUNTY, INC.)

    Real Parties in Interest, THC-Orange County, Inc., Kindred Healthcare Operating, Inc., Kindred Hospitals West, LLC, Kindred Healthcare, Inc., and Jeffrey Sopko, Opening Brief on the Merits

    Filed January 12, 2015

    This Court, applying the canonsof construction discussed above, held that the “including but not limited to” language wasrestricted by the specifically listed items. See Dyna-Med, 43 Cal. 3d at 1391 (“Their application here to limit the commission’s authority to the ordering of corrective, nonpunitive actionis consistent with both the remedial purpose of the Act and the ordinary import of the statutory language.”). Soon thereafter, this Court applied the same statutory construction principles to hold that the Commission did not have authority to award compensatory damages, such as monetary damages for emotionaldistress: In authorizing the Commission to take such action, “including, but not limited to,” the enumerated remedies, the Legislature intended to authorize the Commission tofashion such other corrective or equitable remedies as, in its expertise, it may devise to eliminate the discriminatory practice and make the employee whole in relation to the employment.

  2. De La TORRE v. CASHCALL

    Respondent’s Answer Brief on the Merits

    Filed October 16, 2017

    The third step of statutory analysis requires the Court to examine the “consequences that will follow from a particular interpretation.” (Ailanto Properties, Inc. v. City ofHalfMoon Bay (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 572, 583 [citing Dyna-Med, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1387].) In Harris, this Court, after considering the statutory language, legislative history, and other factors, reached the “consequences” step when analyzing the Unruh Actto determine whether it encompassed a claim for economic discrimination.

  3. De La TORRE v. CASHCALL

    Appellants’ Opening Brief on the Merits

    Filed August 14, 2017

    To the contrary, courts are the ultimate arbiters of the construction ofa statute. (Dyna-Med 43 Cal. 3d at 1389.) (“The final meaning of a statute, moreover, rests with the courts.”

  4. M., BIANKA v. S.C.

    Amicus Curiae Brief of Anthony Rendon, Kevin de Leon, Toni Atkins, Ben Hueso, and Ricardo Lara

    Filed April 18, 2017

    Furthermore, Bianka M.’s “bona fide” determination is directly contrary to the purpose of section 155 as passed by the Legislature. (California Teachers Assn. v. Governing Bd.ofRialto Unified School Dist. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 627, 632 [statute should be interpreted to effectuate the intent of the Legislature]; Dyna-Med, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1386 [same].) The Legislature enacted section 155 to facilitate a child’s access to SIJS relief from the USCIS, by allowingchildren to seek SIJS-predicate findings in the superior courts, including the family courts.

  5. PEOPLE v. VALENCIA

    Respondent’s Answer Brief on the Merits

    Filed October 30, 2015

    Therefore, the in pari materiacanon should not be applied. In any event, canonsof statutory construction are merely aidsto ascertaining the probableintent of the electorate (see Stone v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 503, 521, fn. 10 [legislative intent]), and shall not be applied to defeat a contrary intent otherwise determined (Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com., supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 1391). Based on the statutory language of section 1170.18 as a whole andthe different scopes and purposes ofPropositions 36 and 47, this Court should determine that the electorate did not intend for the definition of “unreasonable risk of 32 dangerto public safety” in section 1170.18, subdivision (c), to apply to section 1170.126. 6.

  6. MENDOZA v. NORDSTROM

    Respondent, Meagan Gordon, Reply Brief on the Merits

    Filed October 23, 2015

    Stated differently, "Where uncertainty exists consideration should be given to the consequences that will flow from a particular interpretation." (Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal. 3d 1379, 1387 [241 Cal. Rptr. 67, 743 P.2d 1323].) A court should not adopt a statutory construction that will lead to results contrary to the Legislature's apparent purpose.

  7. SHAW v. S.C. (THC-ORANGE COUNTY, INC.)

    Real Parties in Interest, THC-Orange County, Inc., Kindred Healthcare Operating, Inc., Kindred Hospitals West, LLC, Kindred Healthcare, Inc., and Jeffrey Sopko, Petition of Review

    Filed September 29, 2014

    We must determine whetherthe legislature’s intent in enacting this language was to provide for a jury trial. If the language provided only for “reinstatement, reimbursement for lost wages and workbenefits caused by the acts of the employer, and the legal costs associated with pursuing the case,” an argument could be made that these remedies were only equitable, and did not provide a jurytrial right. (See, e.g., Dyna-Med, Inc, v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1387 [reinstatement with back pay is a wholly equitable remedy].) But the statutory language goes on to provide for “any remedy deemed warranted by the court pursuant to this | chapter or any other applicable provision of statutory or common law.”

  8. WILLIAMS v. CHINO VALLEY INDEPENDENT FIRE DISTRICT

    Appellant’s Opening Brief on the Merits

    Filed January 15, 2014

    By reading the FEHA’s fee and costs provisions together for this purpose, the approach ofthe Cummings court: @ Internally harmonized the FEHA’s fee and cost provisions (found in the same sentence ofthe statute) ensuring that the standard used to determine entitlement to each of them be the same when soughtagainst an unsuccessful plaintiff. (Dyna-Med, 43 Cal.3d at 1387 [“statutory sections -19- relating to the same subject matter must be harmonized, both internally and with each other, to the extent possible”’].) © Promoted the overall purpose of the FEHA by ensuring that FEHA plaintiffs freely stand-up to vindicatetheir civil rights and enforce the important public policies that underlie FEHA rights without fear of serious economic consequencesifthey should fail to prevail on unsuccessful — but notfrivolous — claims.

  9. PEOPLE v. CORNETT

    Respondent's Opening Brief on the Merits

    Filed May 23, 2011

    D. The History and Purposeof Penal Codesection 288.7 Support the View That Subdivision (b) Was Intended to Apply to Offenses Before the Victim Reachesthe 11th Birthday Assumingthe statutory language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, the court may considerthe legislative history of the statute and the wider historical circumstances of its enactment. (Dyna-Med v. Fair Employment & Housing Com., supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 1386-1387.) Consideration of these factors also support a conclusion that section 288.7 appliesto all victims molested before their 11th birthdays.

  10. In re Roundup Products Liability Litigation

    MOTION for Summary Judgment re: Tier 1 Plaintiffs on Non-Causation Grounds

    Filed January 3, 2019

    E.g., Morgan v. Woessner, 997 F.2d 1244, 1259 (9th Case 3:16-md-02741-VC Document 2419 Filed 01/03/19 Page 26 of 36 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 18 DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE: TIER 1 PLAINTIFFS ON NON-CAUSATION GROUNDS Cir. 1993); Chronicle Publ’g. Co. v. Legrand, No. C-88-1897-DLJ, 1992 WL 420808, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 3, 1992). California law “does not favor punitive damages and they should only be granted with the greatest of caution,” Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Empp’t & Hous. Comm’n., 43 Cal. 3d 1379, 1392 (1987), and in the “clearest of cases,” Henderson v. Sec. Nat’l. Bank, 72 Cal. App. 3d 764, 771 (1977); see also Lackner v. North, 135 Cal. App. 4th 1188, 1210, (2006) (Punitive damages are appropriate only when the Defendant’s actions are “reprehensible, fraudulent or in blatant violation of law or policy”). The elements of liability for punitive damages bear out this background principle.