An objection by the defendant was sustained and the judge told the jury to disregard the question. The United States Supreme Court holds that this does not constitute a violation of Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), because the defendant’s silence was not used against him. The state trial court specifically ruled that evidence inadmissible and told the jury to disregard the statement.
Appellant contends that the use of his silence against him to obtain a death sentence, after he had been assured that he could exercise his right to silence without it being used against him, violated his due process and Fifth Amendment rights. Appellant relies on Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 49 L. Ed. 2d 91, 96 S. Ct. 2240 (1976), and Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 88 L. Ed. 2d 623, 106 S. Ct. 634 (1986), for the proposition that the use of a defendant's post-Miranda warnings silence to rebut a mental health defense violates due process.In Doyle, the defendants offered an exculpatory story for their participation in a drug transaction. On cross-examination, the prosecutor impeached their testimony by asking them why they had not explained their conduct at the time of arrest.
It has been held improper for the State to comment upon a defendant’s choice to remain silent at or before trial. Id. at 7-8 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n.37 (1966) (defendant claiming privilege in face of accusation); Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976) (constitutional error to impeach a defendant with his or her post-arrest, post-Miranda silence)).¶32. If, however, the defendant opens the door to government questioning by his own remarks about his post-arrest behavior or by defense counsel’s questioning, see Doyle, 426 U.S. at 619 n.11 (discussing prosecution’s permissible use of post-arrest silence to “challenge the defendant’s testimony as to his behavior following arrest”), the government may use the defendant’s silence for the limited purpose of impeaching his testimony. United States v. Gant, 17 F.3d 935, 941 (7th Cir. 1994).
. Combs's statement is best understood as communicating a desire to remain silent outside the presence of an attorney.Combs grounds his argument about the admissibility of the statement in the Supreme Court's decision in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976). In Doyle, the petitioner took the stand at his trial for selling marijuana and explained, for the first time, that he had been framed.
After invoking his Miranda rights at the time of arrest, he was asked if he had any medical problems and he answered, “no.” The government should not have been permitted to use his post-Miranda silence to impeach him.United States v. Caruto, 532 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2008)Generally, a defendant who invokes his Miranda rights may not be impeached by evidence that he invoked his rights or that he remained silent. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976); Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284 (1986). In this case, the defendant started making a statement – waiving her right to remain silent – but then stopped and invoked her right to remain silent. At trial, when she was cross-examined, she expanded on her statement.
Ford v. Wilson, 747 F.3d 944 (7th Cir. 2014)Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) prohibits impeaching a defendant with the defendant’s post-Miranda silence (i.e., “You didn’ tell this story after you were arrested, did you?”). In Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor may not comment during closing argument about the defendant’s failure to testify at trial.
And when the defendant does assert the right to remain silent, this fact may not be used against him. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976). The Ninth Circuit distinguished Berghuis v. Thompkins, which, according to the Ninth Circuit, only held that the police may continue to ask questions after an ambiguous request to remain silent.
This instruction was an improper invitation to consider the defendant’s post-Miranda silence. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976). Conviction reversed.
This instruction was an improper invitation to consider the defendant’s post-Miranda silence. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976). Conviction reversed.
Over Edwards’s objection, the Government emphasized in its closing that Edwards had remained silent after law enforcement showed him the contents of the suitcase, suggesting a culpable state of mind. The Government in its brief and at oral argument concedes that this was error under Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), but urges that the error was harmless.So says the Third in United States v. Edwards. Result–new trial.And, for those who follow this issue of how the prosecution and appellate courts seek to forgive such error. The court noted:Nor did the District Court’s belated and ineffective curative instruction after the parties’ closings had been completed mitigate the effects of the Government’s conduct.