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Doe v. U.S.

United States District Court, W.D. Texas, El Paso Division
Apr 17, 2001
EP-00-CA-349-DB (W.D. Tex. Apr. 17, 2001)

Opinion

EP-00-CA-349-DB.

April 17, 2001.


MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER


On this day, the Court considered Defendant the United States of America's "Motion to Dismiss," filed in the in the above-captioned cause on January 16, 2001. Plaintiff John Doe ("Doe" or "Plaintiff") filed a Response on February 5, 2001. After due consideration, the Court is of the opinion that the Motion should be granted for the reasons set forth below.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff allegedly provided services as a confidential informant to the United States of America and its agency, the Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA") on three separate occasions. On November 18, 1998; January 27, 1999; and February 15, 1999, Doe divulged confidential information to the DEA which resulted in the seizure of over 2,600 pounds of marijuana, 118 pounds of amphetamines, and 1.7 to 1.8 million dollars in United States currency. Doe was never paid for his services, which he values in excess of $600,000. Doe commenced this suit on November 15, 2000, alleging that the United States is liable to Plaintiff under a quantum meruit theory of recovery. The instant motion followed.

STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows a party to move to dismiss an action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On a motion brought under Rule 12(b)(1), which the Court must consider before any other challenge, see Moran v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 27 F.3d 169, 172 (5th Cir. 1994), a court must dismiss a cause for lack of subject matter jurisdiction "when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case." Home Builders Ass'n of Miss. v. City of Madison, Miss., 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks removed) (quoting Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 1187 (2d Cir. 1996)). Further, the Court applies the same familiar standard used in ruling on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6). In that respect, the Court must limit its inquiry to facts stated in the complaint and the documents either attached to or incorporated in the complaint. See Lovelace v. Software Spectrum, Inc., 78 F.3d 1015, 1017 (5th Cir. 1996). Further, the Court must accept as true all material allegations in the complaint, as well as any reasonable inference to be drawn from them, see Kaiser Aluminum Chem. Sales, Inc., v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 677 F.2d 1045, 1050 (5th Cir. 1982), and must review those allegations in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 51 F.3d 512, 514 (5th Cir. 1995); Garrett v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp. of Am., 938 F.2d 591, 593 (5th Cir. 1991). The Court also may "consider matters of which [it] may take judicial notice," Lovelace, 78 F.3d at 1017-18, and matters of public record. See 5A CHARLES A. WRIGHT ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1357 (2d ed. 1990).

DISCUSSION

The Government contends that the Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims because the Government has not waived its sovereign immunity as to claims based on a theory of quantum meruit. Plaintiff for his part argues that this Court may exercise jurisdiction over the suit pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), 2671-2680.

As sovereign, the United States is presumptively immune from suit unless it consents to be sued. See Truman v. United States, 26 F.3d 592, 594 (5th Cir. 1994) ("As the sovereign, the United States is immune from suit unless, and only to the extent that, it has consented to be sued."); Williamson v. United States Dep't of Agric., 815 F.2d 368, 373-74 (5th Cir. 1987). Sovereign immunity is jurisdictional. See United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538, 100 S.Ct. 1349, 1351, 63 L.Ed.2d 607 (1980). Hence, Plaintiff bears the burden of showing that the United States has waived its immunity in this case.

The FTCA is one limited way the United States has waived sovereign immunity. See Williamson, 815 F.2d at 374. The FTCA provides that the United States can be liable

for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b)(1) (West Supp. 2000). Plaintiff alleges that his claim comes under the FTCA and, therefore, provides the Court with subject matter jurisdiction notwithstanding the United States' sovereign immunity.

In Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 92 S.Ct. 1899, 32 L.Ed.2d 499 (1972), the Supreme Court held that the "statutory language `negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the government,' is a uniform federal limitation on the types of acts committed by its employees for which the United States has consented to be sued." Laird, 406 U.S. at 799, 92 S.Ct. at 1901. In other words, the Court held that the FTCA precludes the imposition of liability if there has been no negligence on the part of the Government or its employees. See also Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 45, 73 S.Ct. 956, 972, 97 L.Ed. 1427 (1953); United States v. Page, 350 F.2d 28, 33 (10th Cir. 1965). The FTCA, therefore, may be invoked only where an employee of the Government has committed a negligent or wrongful act. If negligence is not shown, the action cannot arise under the FTCA.

Here, Plaintiff sues the Government on a theory of quantum meruit, "an equitable remedy which does not arise out of a contract, but is independent of it." Vortt Exploration Co. v. Chevron U.S.A., 787 S.W.2d 942, 944 (Tex. 1990) (citing Colbert v. Dallas Joint Stock Land Bank, 102 S.W.2d 1031, 1034 (Tex. 1937)). A plaintiff may recover in quantum meruit when failure to pay for services rendered results in "an unjust enrichment to the party benefited [sic] by the work." Id.; see also Bashara v. Baptist Mem'l Hosp. Sys., 685 S.W.2d 307, 310 (Tex. 1985). "Generally, a party may recover under quantum meruit only when there is no express contract covering the services or materials furnished." Truly v. Austin, 744 S.W.2d 934, 936 (Tex. 1988).

Plaintiff alleges no express contract in his Complaint and, hence, could theoretically proceed on a theory of quantum meruit. However, even if Plaintiff were successful in showing that the Government's failure to compensate him for his services resulted in unjust enrichment to the Government, Plaintiff would still not have shown that such failure was a negligent act or omission on the part of the Government which sounds in tort. Texas law requires a plaintiff alleging negligence to prove "(1) the existence of a legal duty owed by one person to another to protect the latter against injury; (2) a breach of that duty; and (3) damages (4) proximately resulting from the breach." 53 TEX. JUR. 3D Negligence § 5 (1997). In his pleadings, Plaintiff points to no legal duty, no breach of that legal duty by an employee of the Government, and no causal relationship between breach and injury.

Plaintiff has failed to allege the negligence under which the United States can be liable under the FTCA. As a result, he fails to demonstrate that the Government has agreed to be liable for the injury alleged — i.e. that it has waived its sovereign immunity as to that injury. Therefore, the Court is of the opinion that the Government's Motion to Dismiss should be granted.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff John Doe's claim grounded on the equitable remedy of quantum meruit is DISMISSED FOR LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION.


Summaries of

Doe v. U.S.

United States District Court, W.D. Texas, El Paso Division
Apr 17, 2001
EP-00-CA-349-DB (W.D. Tex. Apr. 17, 2001)
Case details for

Doe v. U.S.

Case Details

Full title:JOHN DOE v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Court:United States District Court, W.D. Texas, El Paso Division

Date published: Apr 17, 2001

Citations

EP-00-CA-349-DB (W.D. Tex. Apr. 17, 2001)