CSX Transportation, Inc. v. McBride

2 Analyses of this case by attorneys

  1. Are the Supreme Court’s exceptions to patentability mandated by the Constitution, or are they just “statutory stare decisis”?

    Fenwick & West LLPStuart MeyerSeptember 22, 2014

    Judge Wu paused on the term “statutory stare decisis,” commenting in a footnote that it was apparently used for the first time by Justice Scalia in 2007 and adopted by Justice Ginsburg thereafter. After pointing to the several uses of this term and, in particular, its use in CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 131 S. Ct. 2630, 2641 (2011), Judge Wu made the following note: “The context there makes clear that the phrase refers to the principle that ‘[c]onsiderations of stare decisis have special force in the area of statutory interpretation, for here, unlike in the context of constitutional interpretation, the legislative power is implicated, and Congress remains free to alter what we have done.’ Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-173 (1989).

  2. Second Circuit Reaffirms Continued Use of the “Knowing Possession” Causation Standard in Rajaratnam Insider Trading Case

    Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLPJune 28, 2013

    Although that particular language in Teicher was dicta, in United States v. Royer, 549 F.3d 886 (2d Cir. 2008), the Second Circuit elevated the Teicher "knowing possession" standard to an applicable, precedential holding.Rajaratnam argued that the United States Supreme Court‘s decision in CSX Transportation, Inc. v. McBride, 131 S. Ct. 2630 (2011), casts doubt on the law of the Second Circuit. In CSX Transportation, the Supreme Court addressed the causation element in the Federal Employers’ Liability Act ("FELA"), holding that "a railroad worker need only demonstrate that the railroad’s negligence ‘played a part — no matter how small — in bringing about the injury.’