The rule on searches in questionable areas of law is simple and unequivocal: Get a warrant. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971) (“[T]he most basic constitutional rule in this area is that ‘searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.'” (emphasis added)); see also Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493, 189 L. Ed. 2d 430 (2014) (“Our cases have historically recognized that the warrant requirement is ‘an important working part of our machinery of government,’ not merely ‘an inconvenience to be somehow “weighed” against the claims of police efficiency.'”
Ordinary burglars or nosy roommates cannot violate the Fourth Amendment, no matter how invasive they become. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971); United States v. Bowers, 594 F.3d 522, 525-26 (6th Cir. 2010). The private-search doctrine was imposed to prevent the police from covertly deputizing private citizens to break the law, thereby circumventing the state-action requirement and the Fourth Amendment’s strictures.
However, the Supreme Court has stated that “plain view alone is never enough to justify the warrantless seizure of evidence.” Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 468, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564. (1971). Construing the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, it does not appear that there were any exigencies that would have justified a warrantless seizure, or that any recognized exception to the warrant requirement applied.
A search conducted at night is more intrusive than a search conducted during the day. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 477, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971) (describing midnight entry into a dwelling as an “extremely serious intrusion”). The Supreme Court has found it “difficult to imagine a more severe invasion of privacy than the nighttime intrusion into a private home.”
(pp. 15-16)2. The United States Supreme Court established the factual predicates necessary to satisfy the plain-view exception in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-72, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2037-41, 29 L. Ed. 2d 695, 582-87 (1984). … 3.
No doubt there are always forces inducing a person to cooperate with the police, including “the simple but often powerful convention of openness and honesty, the fear that secretive behavior will intensify suspicion, and uncertainty as to what course is most likely to be helpful ….” See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487-88, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971). Here, there may have been multiple incentives motivating Collins to be cooperative.
In cases involving contraband, the Supreme Court has continued to ask whether a seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment: A warrantless seizure of contraband is not reasonable if it was not “immediately apparent” to an officer that the item was contraband. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136-37 (1990); see also Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326-28 (1987); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 587 (1980); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 (1971).Just like it applied to the stolen stereo equipment in Hicks, the Fourth Amendment applies to the unlicensed dogs here.
Id. (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-475 (1971)). Therefore, Defendant has standing to challenge the search.
However, SCOTUS has not applied that rule on private, residential property. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474-75, 479-80, 482 (1971) (majority opinion); 458-64 (plurality opinion); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985). The 5th Circuit, 10th Circuit, Georgia and Illinois require a warrant for the search of an automobile parked at a residence.
( A barebones complaint that only cites the statutory elements of the offense satisfies the Fourth Amendment.)(overruled)Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (the Fourth Amendment has been interpreted to mean that probable cause must be determined by a neutral and detached magistrate rather than by an official of the executive branch whose duty is to enforce the law, to investigate, and to prosecute.)United States v. United States Dist. Court for E. Dist. of Michigan, S. Div., 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (The requirement that probable cause must be determined by a neutral and detached magistrate reflects “our basic constitutional doctrine that individual freedoms will best be preserved through a separation of powers and division of functions among the different branches and levels of Government.”)