Concrete Pipe Prods. v. Constr. Laborers Trust

7 Analyses of this case by attorneys

  1. Correcting the Pattern: Pattern Jury Instructions Can Be Challenged

    Troutman PepperFrederick KingOctober 26, 2023

    gar-jst/Jury-Trial-Standing-Order-JST-03.14.22.pdf.See White v. Stanley, A23A0986, 2023 WL 6413214, at *5 (Ga. Ct. App. Oct. 3, 2023). 75A Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 1096 (2023). 3C Fed. Jury Prac. & Instr. § 178:40 (6th ed. 2023).See id., at *2.See id., at *5. Georgia Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. I, 02.020, (Burden of Proof; Generally; Preponderance of Evidence, Defined). O.C.G.A. § 24-1-1 (2013).Id. See Olds v. State, 299 Ga. 65, 69 (2) n.5, 786 S.E.2d 633 (2016) ("The new Evidence Code applies in cases tried on or after January 1, 2013.").See Georgia Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. I, 02.020 (Burden of Proof; Generally; Preponderance of Evidence, Defined).See generally, Stanley, 2023 WL 6413214.See id., at *5.Id. at *4.See id., at *3-5.See Ga. L. 2011, pp. 99, 100 § 1 (The new Georgia evidence code largely adopts the Federal Rules of Evidence).Stanley, 2023 WL 6413214, * at 3 (quoting Concrete Pipe & Prod. of Cali., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr. for S. Cali., 508 U.S. 602, 622 (1993) (internal quotations omitted).SeeWhite v. State, 307 Ga. 601, 607 (2020).Id.See Stanley, 2023 WL 6413214, at *5.See Stanley, 2023 WL 6413214, at *5.See id.See id. Id.See, e.g., Spooner v. Cobb, 155 Ga. 458, (1923).SeeJohnson v. Friends of Weymouth, Inc., 461 S.E. 801, 804 (N.C. Ct. App. 1995); People v. Anderson, 977 N.E.2d 222, 239 (Ill. App. Ct. 2012).Benjamin Geller also contributed to this article. He is not licensed to practice law in any jurisdiction; application pending for admission to the Georgia Bar.

  2. Impact of Critical Withdrawal Liability Interest Rate Assumption on Construction Industry Employers

    Jackson Lewis P.C.Robert PerryJune 29, 2023

    olumbia Circuit in United Mine Workers of America 1974 Pension Plan v. Energy West Mining Co., 39 F.4th 730 (2022). A lower Withdrawal Liability Interest Rate generates greater withdrawal liability, which favors the MEPP and the employers not withdrawing from the plan.Unrelated to the withdrawal liability calculation, the MEPP actuary must select an interest rate (Funding Interest Rate) for measuring compliance with statutory minimum funding requirements. A higher Funding Interest Rate makes it easier for a MEPP to satisfy these requirements. Thus, while a low Withdrawal Liability Interest Rate favors the MEPPs when calculating withdrawal liability payments, a higher Funding Interest Rate is preferable for clearing statutory minimum funding requirements.Thirty years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court wrote, “[U]sing different assumptions [for different purposes] could very well be attacked as presumptively unreasonable.” Concrete Pipe and Products v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust Fund, 508 U.S. 602 at 633 (1993). Several federal courts have recently addressed whether using different interest rate assumptions (for different purposes) violates the law.Current Case LawTo date, three U.S. Courts of Appeals have held that a MEPP’s use of a Withdrawal Liability Interest Rate that is lower than the Funding Interest Rate violates MPPAA.Sixth CircuitIn Sofco Erectors, Inc. v. Ohio Operating Engineers Pension Fund, 15 F.4th 407 (2021), the U.S. Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit held a MEPP’s use of the “Segal Blend” violated ERISA.The Segal Blend is a method that determines the Withdrawal Liability Interest Rate by blending the Funding Interest Rate with certain risk-free rates published by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC Rates).The Sixth Circuit’s analysis focused on ERISA Section 4213(a), which requires that withdrawal liability be calculated using actuarial assumptions (including the Withdrawal Liability Interest Rate) that are “reasonable (taking into account the experience of the plan

  3. Appeal Argues AIA Proceedings Are Unconstitutional

    BakerHostetlerSteven BorsandFebruary 2, 2021

    The reply argues there is pecuniary interest in the outcomes based on this connection between institution decisions and ALJ pay.While the reply certainly seems to allege bias, it argues that actual bias need not be shown and that the USPTO has presented no real dispute regarding pecuniary interest in institution decisions. In response to SG’s argument that the trial phase does not implicate due process issues, New Vision argues that if the initial decision is tainted by potential bias, the due process violation cannot be cured by the trial phase, citing Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr. for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 617 (1993). If New Vision’s creative due process argument gains traction, this will have a significant impact on post-grant reviews.

  4. A PPP Borrower’s Predicament - When The SBA Denies Loan Forgiveness - Contest It - Appeal!

    Dorsey & Whitney LLPDouglas LangFebruary 2, 2021

    That is very difficult to prove because courts have ruled that “clear error of fact or law” means that “although there is evidence to support [the decision], the [administrative law judge] . . . is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Concrete Pipe & Prods. of California, Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr. for S. California, 508 U.S. 602, 622, 113 S. Ct. 2264, 124 L. Ed. 2d 539 (1993); see also, PGBA, LLC v. United States, 389 F.3d 1219, 1224 (Fed. Cir. 2004). All of that means that thorough preparation and diligent prosecution of the appeal is absolutely necessary.Deadlines are critical in this appeal process.

  5. Segal Blend Litigation, Part Two: New Jersey District Court Holds That Use Of Segal Blend Did Not Violate MPPAA

    Jackson Lewis P.C.Robert PerryAugust 13, 2018

    A Supreme Court decision on this issue would then become a real possibility. Both Judge Sweet and Judge McNulty looked at the same two potential bases for disallowing the use of the Segal Blend. Both judges initially looked at whether using different interest rates for different purposes (namely funding and withdrawal liability) is always impermissible under Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Tr. for S. Cal., 508 US 602 (1993), in which the Supreme Court discussed (albeit in dicta) “the necessity” of a Fund actuary to apply “the same assumptions and methods in more than one context” while highlighting the critical interest rate assumption. The significance of this issue is readily demonstrated by the fact that in both cases, using the 7.5% funding interest rate assumption would have generated zero withdrawal liability for each employer.

  6. Calculating Withdrawal Liability With ‘Segal Blend’ Violated Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act, Judge Rules

    Jackson Lewis P.C.Paul FriedmanApril 3, 2018

    The parties then cross-moved for summary judgment.Concrete Pipe Does Not Preclude Use of the Segal Blend as a Matter of Law Judge Robert W. Sweet of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York upheld the arbitrator’s finding that a withdrawal had in fact occurred before turning to the arbitrator’s findings regarding the use of the Segal Blend. NYT argued that the use of the Segal Blend violated U.S. Supreme Court precedent in Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust Fund for Southern Cal., 508 U.S. 602 (1993), and the applicable requirements of § 4213(a) of ERISA. This ERISA section requires that the actuarial assumptions and methods used to calculate withdrawal liability be both reasonable in the aggregate and “offer the actuary’s best estimate of anticipated experience under the plan.”

  7. Déjà Vu All Over Again: Ninth Circuit Rejects Yet Another Challenge To Rent Control, Including “Private Takings” Argument

    Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLPJune 11, 2013

    As the Ordinance was in place at the time of acquisition, the court noted that the correct analysis should have been the value of the Property with the Ordinance in place versus the value of the Property after amendment of the Ordinance. Further, relying on Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 645 (1993) the court also pointed out that even if the district court’s financial analysis had been appropriate, diminution in value of property less than 100%, the categorical taking established by the Supreme Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), is insufficient by itself to establish a taking.Similarly, the court determined that MHC’s expectation that it would be able to increase rents was, in essence, unreasonable. Since the Ordinance was in place at the time of acquisition, MHC’s expectation with regard to its investment in the Property had to take into account the value of the Property with the limited ability to increase rents.