Filed January 12, 2016
25 It is well settled that lawmakers do not intend legislation to produce absurd results. See Clements v. T. R. Bechtel Co., 43 Cal. 2d 227, 233 (1954). Failing to apply section 1170.18 to apply to section 1170.126 cases would produce absurd results for at least two reasons.
Filed January 12, 2016
25 It is well settled that lawmakers do notintend legislation to produce absurd results. See Clements v. T. R. Bechtel Co., 43 Cal. 2d 227, 233 (1954). Failing to apply section 1170.18 to apply to section 1170.126 cases would produce absurdresults for at least two reasons.
Filed October 23, 2015
Per this Court: "[Where] the language of a statutory provision is susceptible of two constructions, one of which, in application, will render it reasonable, fair and harmonious with its manifest purpose, and another which would be productive of absurd consequences, the former construction will be adopted." (Clements v. T. R. Bechtel Co. (1954) 43 Cal.2d 227, 233 [273 P.2d 5].) This principle has been called a "golden rule of statutory interpretation."
Filed June 13, 2013
21 Wemust presumethat the Legislature intended the advisement to perform a meaningful and useful function. (See Clements v. T.R. Bechtel Co. (1954) 43 Cal.2d 227, 233.) The purpose and function appear in the waiver provision, which requires jury trial unless waived by “the person.”
Filed June 12, 2013
21 We must presumethat the Legislature intended the advisement to perform a meaningful anduseful function. (See Clements v. T.R. Bechtel Co. (1 954) 43 Cal.2d 227, 233.) The purpose and function appear in the waiverprovision, which requires jury trial unless waived by “the person.”
Filed May 31, 2013
12 Wepresumethat the Legislature intended the advisement to perform a meaningful and useful function. (See Clements v. T.R. Bechtel Co, (1954) 43 Cal.2d 227, 233.) The purposeand function appearin the waiver provision, which requires jury trial unless waived by “the person.”