From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

Clay v. County of Contra Costa

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Sep 30, 2014
No. C 14-2569 RMW (PR) (N.D. Cal. Sep. 30, 2014)

Opinion

No. C 14-2569 RMW (PR)

09-30-2014

WILLIE MORRIS CLAY, II, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF CONTRA COSTA, et al., Defendants.


ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH LEAVE TO AMEND

Plaintiff, a California state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis in a separate order. For the reasons stated below, the court dismisses the complaint with leave to amend.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

A federal court must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See id. § 1915A(b)(1), (2). Pro se pleadings must, however, be liberally construed. See Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988).

To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege two essential elements: (1) that a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States was violated, and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under the color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). B. Plaintiff's Claims

Plaintiff alleges that on May 3, 2011, plaintiff was incarcerated at Martinez Detention Facility in Contra Costa County. On or around that day, plaintiff was litigating a criminal case. Officer Aide D. Crews signed for a package addressed to plaintiff from Lisa Moret, and marked as "legal mail." D. Crews informed plaintiff that the package was received, but its contents were in violation of mail policy and placed on a shelf assignment for storage. Plaintiff complains that D. Crews violated plaintiff's right to equal protection and due process. Plaintiff also alleges that other "individuals with authority" neglected to prevent the deprivations that occurred, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1986. Plaintiff further claims that the "deprivations" were a custom or policy of the Contra Costa Sheriff's Office.

Plaintiff's complaint will be dismissed with leave to amend to cure the following deficiencies.

First, prisoners enjoy a First Amendment right to send and receive mail. See Witherow v. Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407 (1989)). A prison, however, may adopt regulations or practices which impinge on a prisoner's First Amendment rights as long as the regulations are "reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). The opening and inspecting of "legal mail" outside the presence of the prisoner may have an impermissible "chilling" effect on the constitutional right to petition the government. See O'Keefe v. Van Boening, 82 F.3d 322, 325 (9th Cir. 1996). However, the inspection for contraband of non-legal mail does not violate a prisoner's constitutional rights. See Witherow v. Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 265?66 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding inspection of outgoing mail); Smith v. Boyd, 945 F.2d 1041, 1043 (8th Cir. 1991) (upholding inspection of incoming mail).

Plaintiff is advised that "legal mail" is narrowly defined as mail between a prisoner and his attorney. See Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir. 1996) (mail from court is not legal mail); Mann v. Adams, 846 F.2d 589, 590 (9th Cir. 1998) (mail from public officials is not legal mail); see also United States v. Griffin, 440 F.3d 1138, 1144 (9th Cir. 2006) (letter from prisoner to his wife, an attorney, regarding non-legal matters not privileged legal mail). Thus, it appears that this was not legal mail because plaintiff does not describe Lisa Moret as his attorney, and plaintiff admits that he was proceeding pro se at the time.

Moreover, an "isolated incident, without a showing of actual injury or improper motive, cannot by itself establish a violation of [a prisoner's] right of access to the courts." Meador v. Pleasant Valley State Prison, No. 07-16409, 312 Fed. Appx. 954, 955 (9th Cir. Feb. 25, 2009) (unpublished memorandum disposition); see, e.g., Smith v. Maschner, 899 F.2d 940, 944 (10th Cir. 1990) (recognizing that isolated incidents of mail interference without any evidence of improper motive or resulting interference with the right to counsel or access to the courts, however, do not give rise to a constitutional violation); Morgan v. Montanye, 516 F.2d 1367, 1370-71 (2d Cir. 1975) (one incident of mail room opening letter from prisoner's attorney out of prisoner's presence insufficient to show constitutional violation). Here, plaintiff does not set forth any non-speculative reason for the mishandling of his incoming mail from Lisa Moret.

Second, although plaintiff asserts that the confiscation of his mail violation his right to equal protection and due process, plaintiff does not allege any facts to support those violations. To state a claim arising under federal law, it must be clear from the face of plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint that there is a federal question. See Easton v. Crossland Mortgage Corp., 114 F.3d 979, 982 (9th Cir. 1997). The mere reference to a federal statute in a pleading will not convert a state law claim into a federal cause of action if the federal statute is not a necessary element of the state law claim and no preemption exists. See id. (state law claims which include incidental references to federal statute and U.S. Constitution and seek remedies founded exclusively on state law improperly removed to federal court). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." In order to state a claim that is plausible on its face, a plaintiff must allege facts that "allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A plaintiff is not required to plead his evidence "or specific factual details not ascertainable in advance of discovery." Gibson v. United States, 781 F.2d 1334, 1340 (9th Cir. 1986). But a pleading will not be sufficient to state a claim under § 1983 if the allegations are mere conclusions. See Kennedy v. H & M Landing, Inc., 529 F.2d 987, 989 (9th Cir. 1976). Here, plaintiff's mere mention of "equal protection" and "due process" without more are too conclusory to state a claim for relief.

Third, to the extent plaintiff is attempting to assert a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1986, it is insufficient. Section 1986 provides a cause of action for damages where a valid claim for relief has been stated under § 1985. See 42 U.S.C. § 1986; Trerice v. Pedersen, 769 F.2d 1398 (9th Cir. 1985). Plaintiff has not alleged a violation of § 1985.

Finally, plaintiff alleges that the Contra Costa County Sheriff's Office had a policy that resulted in deprivations to plaintiff. However, to properly plead a municipal liability claim, it is insufficient to allege simply that a policy, custom, or practice exists that caused the constitutional violations. AE v. County of Tulare, 666 F.3d 631, 636-37 (9th Cir. 2012). Pursuant to the pleading requirements set forth in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1952 (2009), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 553-56 (2007), a plaintiff suing a municipal entity must allege sufficient facts regarding the specific nature of the alleged policy, custom or practice to allow the defendant to effectively defend itself, and these facts must plausibly suggest that plaintiff is entitled to relief. AE, 666 F.3d at 636-37 (citing Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011), which summarized new pleading standards derived from Iqbal, Twombly and related Supreme Court decisions). Plaintiff's complaint does not allege such facts.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court hereby orders as follows:

1. Plaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend if he can cure the above deficiencies in good fath.

2. If plaintiff can cure the pleading deficiencies described above, he shall file an AMENDED COMPLAINT within thirty days from the date this order is filed. The amended complaint must include the caption and civil case number used in this order (C 14-2569 RMW (PR)) and the words AMENDED COMPLAINT on the first page. The amended complaint must indicate which specific, named defendant(s) was involved in each cause of action, what each defendant did, what effect this had on plaintiff and what right plaintiff alleges was violated. Plaintiff may not incorporate material from the prior complaint by reference. If plaintiff files an amended complaint, he must allege, in good faith, facts - not merely conclusions of law - that demonstrate that he is entitled to relief under the applicable federal statutes. Failure to file an amended complaint within thirty days and in accordance with this order will result in a finding that further leave to amend would be futile and this action will be dismissed.

3. Plaintiff is advised that an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. "[A] plaintiff waives all causes of action alleged in the original complaint which are not alleged in the amended complaint." London v. Coopers & Lybrand, 644 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1981). Defendants not named in an amended complaint are no longer defendants. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992).

4. It is the plaintiff's responsibility to prosecute this case. Plaintiff must keep the court informed of any change of address by filing a separate paper with the clerk headed "Notice of Change of Address," and must comply with the court's orders in a timely fashion. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: 9/30/14

/s/_________

RONALD M. WHYTE

United States District Judge

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District Court, Northern District of California. That on October 1, 2014, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle located in the Clerk's office. Willie Morris Clay AR3562
Pelican Bay S.P., A7-117
P.O. Box 7500
Crescent City, CA 95531
Dated: October 1, 2014

Richard W. Wieking, Clerk

By: Jackie Lynn Garcia, Deputy Clerk


Summaries of

Clay v. County of Contra Costa

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
Sep 30, 2014
No. C 14-2569 RMW (PR) (N.D. Cal. Sep. 30, 2014)
Case details for

Clay v. County of Contra Costa

Case Details

Full title:WILLIE MORRIS CLAY, II, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF CONTRA COSTA, et al.…

Court:UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Date published: Sep 30, 2014

Citations

No. C 14-2569 RMW (PR) (N.D. Cal. Sep. 30, 2014)