Opinion
Argued February 4, 1876
Decided February 22, 1876
L.L. Bundy for the appellant. R.M. Townsend for the respondent.
This action is upon a promissory note made by one Mott, as the principal debtor, and by the defendant's intestate as his surety. The referee found that Mott, the principal debtor, some time after the note was due, went to the holder with the money to pay it, which the latter (by his wife acting for him with authority), declined to receive, giving as a reason that he had no use for the money, and requested that Mott would keep it. It is also found that Mott was then solvent, and afterwards became insolvent, and the question is, whether the surety is discharged. As a matter of abstract equity, the argument is plausible, at least, that inasmuch as the note was not paid by reason of the request of the holder, the latter ought not to enforce it against the surety after the principal debtor had become insolvent. The general rule applicable to the relation of creditor and surety is stated by Judge STORY as follows: "If a creditor does any act injurious to the surety, or inconsistent with his rights, or if he omits to do any act, when required by the surety, which his duty enjoins him to do, and the omission proves injurious to the surety, the latter will be discharged, and he may set up such conduct as a defence to any suit brought against him." (1 Story's Equity, §§ 325, 326, and cases cited in note.) The current of authority, which I think is quite harmonious, establishes that the act which will discharge a surety must be legally injurious or inconsistent with his legal rights. An agreement with the principal debtor extending the time of payment, or in any manner changing the contract made by the surety, will have that effect. So the release of a security held by the creditor and the like. The facts found by the referee do not present a case within the rule. The contract was not changed. The time was not extended by any binding agreement. An action might have been brought immediately after the transaction in respect to the payment, and the circumstances which took place would not have constituted a defence. It is well settled that mere indulgence will not discharge a surety. (45 Barb., 214; 3 N.Y., 446; 15 J.R., 433.) The holder preferred not to collect the note, and gave indulgence, but not a stipulated extension. The other principle referred to is, that the surety may be discharged from an omission of duty on the part of the creditor, but the surety must intervene and request the performance of the duty. It has been established, accordingly, that if a surety request the creditor to sue, and the latter neglects to do so, the surety will be discharged if the neglect has produced injury. ( 25 N.Y., 552.) Here there was no request. The surety did nothing. He was not prevented from demanding prosecution by the creditor, nor from paying the note and prosecuting the principal himself.
We are now asked to go a step further and hold that if a note is not paid because the creditor prefers to give indulgence rather than receive payment, the surety is discharged if the principal debtor happens to become insolvent. We have not been referred to any authority for such a precedent. The case of Lewis v. Van Dusen ( 25 Mich., 351) was upon a guaranty of collection. It does not appear distinctly upon what ground the court placed its decision; but the question of diligence was necessarily involved, besides the refusal to accept the money when offered, and there was a neglect to prosecute for two years, during which the guarantor became insolvent. The decision was clearly right without the fact of the offer to pay, and that circumstance only aggravated the laches. In the case cited from 46 Vermont (258) there was a tender of the money due, which was held to discharge the surety, although not accepted. On the other side, the recent case in this court of The Second National Bank of Oswego v. Poucher ( 56 N.Y., 348) decided that where a debtor owing two demands offered to pay one of them, and was induced by the creditor to pay the other, the indorsers upon the demand not paid were not discharged. The circumstances which will discharge a surety are well defined by repeated adjudications, viz.: The doing an act which is legally injurious to the surety, or which impairs his legal rights, or the omission to perform a duty when required by a surety, which omission results in injury to the surety. Indulgence to a debtor is not sufficient, and the distinction is not apparent between indulgence, with the expressed consent or even request of the creditor, and mere silent delay, provided the contract is not changed or impaired. It is a common occurrence for debtors to ask indulgence without any specified time, and creditors would constantly be in danger of losing their debts by mere negative acquiescence. The facts presented in this case rarely occur. It is not often that the debtor omits to pay at the request of the creditor, but if we enlarge the grounds for discharging a surety in such a case, we shall establish a precedent which may prove highly injurious in unsettling and weakening the obligations of written instruments. It is better to adhere to established general rules than to attempt to work out equity in exceptional cases.
It is quite evident that the creditor had no idea of discharging the surety. He did not prevent the payment of the note. He did not refuse to receive the money. He only expressed a desire that it should not be paid. There was no tender or attempt to tender the money. The contract was not changed. The surety did not intervene and request any action on the part of the creditor; and although loss has occurred in consequence of the indulgence, it cannot be affirmed that the creditor did any act impairing the legal rights of the surety, nor did the latter take any action to relieve himself from liability.
The judgment must be affirmed.
All concur.
Judgment affirmed.