Filed March 21, 2019
See, e.g., Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409 (“Although imminence is concededly a somewhat elastic concept, it cannot be stretched beyond its purpose, which is to ensure that the alleged injury is not too speculative for Article III purposes—that the injury is certainly impending.”) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 565 n.2); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Dep’t of Interior, 563 F.3d 466, 478 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (holding that where petitioners could only aver that “any significant adverse effects . . . ‘may’ occur at some point in the future,” it did “not amount to the . . . ‘certainly impending’ injury required to establish standing.”).
Filed April 4, 2012
244 The Court noted that 244 Two other Courts of Appeals have found allegations similar to plaintiffs sufficient to confer standing under OCSLA. First, in Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dept. of Interior, 563 F.3d 466, 479, 483-4 (D.C. 83 Case 4:09-cv-01193 Document 337 Filed in TXSD on 04/04/12 Page 99 of 127 Abbott is a Texas native and has a direct interest in the protection, preservation and enhancement of the Gulf of Mexico environment. Further, Abbott and FWW members are ‘directly and beneficially interested in the continued protection, preservation and enhancement of’ values derived from the Gulf of Mexico environment.
Filed December 7, 2009
See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520, n.17 (2007). See also Center for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 563 F.3d 466, 477 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“As the [Supreme] Court has long recognized, only the United States, and not the states, may represent its citizens and ensure their protection under federal law in federal matters.”). Third, even if Alaska’s alleged injuries were sufficient to demonstrate injury-in-fact, it has not adequately established causation. To establish standing, a plaintiff must allege “a fairly traceable connection between [its] injury and the complained-of conduct of the defendant.”
Filed April 9, 2015
62 Id. 63 See Center for Biological Diversity v. United States Dep’t of Interior, 563 F.3d 466 (D.C. Cir. 2009). 64 See id.
Filed September 24, 2010
In Gulf Restoration Network, this Court noted the D.C. Circuit’s repeated conclusion that “an injury is not ‘actual, imminent, or ‘certainly impending’’ for standing purposes where a party ‘can only aver that any significant adverse effects . . . ‘may’ occur at some point in the future.’” 2010 WL 3184327 at *8 (quoting Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 563 F.3d 466, 478 (D.C.Cir.2009)); id. (“Plaintiffs’ claims in the instant case are equally general and attenuated since they describe possible future harms instead of concrete present injury.”)
Filed March 31, 2010
Where injuries result only indirectly, “from the independent action of some third party not before the court,” then “the presence of intervening factors interrupts the chain of traceability” and there is no standing. See, e.g., Center for Biological Diversity v. Dep’t of Interior, 563 F.3d 466, 478 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Miami Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, AFL/CIO v. Secr'y of Defense, 493 F.3d 201, 205-06 (D.C. Cir. 2007); International Labor Rights Educ. & Research Fund v. Bush, 954 F.2d 745, 751 (D.C. Cir. 1992). In her application for a preliminary injunction, Plaintiff raises the prospect of another type of harm: that her “law license” will be “undermine[d]” or “endanger[ed].”