(emphasis added); see also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973) (“‘Travellers may be so stopped in crossing an international boundary because of national self protection reasonably requiring one entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and his belongings as effects which may be lawfully brought in.'” (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925)). The sealed packages that arrived in the United States Virgin Islands did not come from “without” the country.
“[P]robable cause is a flexible, common-sense standard. It merely requires that the facts available to the officer would ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief,’ Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162, 45 S.Ct. 280, 288, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), that certain items may be contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime; it does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than false. A ‘practical, nontechnical’ probability that incriminating evidence is involved is all that is required.
The analysis regarding which expectations of privacy are entitled to protection is informed by historical understandings “of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when [the Fourth Amendment] was adopted.”Carrollv.United States,267 U. S. 132, 149. These Founding-era understandings continue to inform this Court when applying the Fourth Amendment to innovations in surveillance tools.
The analysis regarding which expectations of privacy are entitled to protection is informed by historical understandings “of what was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when [the Fourth Amendment] was adopted.” Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 149. These Founding-era understandings continue to inform this Court when applying the Fourth Amendment to innovations in surveillance tools.
The Eighth District Court of Appeals affirmed in a split decision.Read the oral argument preview of the case here.Key Precedent Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution (“The right of the people to be secure…against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated…”)Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution (“The right of the people to be secure…against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated…”)Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (Established the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on warrantless searches. Under this exception, an automobile may be searched without a warrant if the law enforcement officer has reasonable or probable cause.
And in making that assessment it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that the action taken was appropriate? Cf. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96-97 (1964). Anything less would invite intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more substantial than inarticulate hunches, a result this Court has consistently refused to sanction.”
Judge Stewart also found that the amount of time that passed was reasonable and any delay in obtaining the services of a drug-sniffing dog was irrelevant.The State brought this jurisdictional appeal.Votes to Accept the Case*Yes: Justices O’Donnell, Kennedy, French, Fischer, and DeWineNo: Chief Justice O’Connor*Then-Justice O’Neill not participatingKey Statutes and PrecedentFourth Amendment of the United States Constitution (“The right of the people to be secure…against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated…”)Article I, Section 14 of the Ohio Constitution (“The right of the people to be secure…against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated…”)Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (Established the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on warrantless searches. Under this exception, an automobile may be searched without a warrant if the law enforcement officer has reasonable or probable cause.)Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999) (“When there is probable cause to search for contraband in a car, it is reasonable for police officers […] to examine packages and containers without a showing of individualized probable cause for each one.”
Key PrecedentFourth Amendment of the United States Constitution (The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.)Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (An automobile may be searched without a warrant if the law enforcement officer has reasonable or probable cause.)Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (“Searches conducted without warrants have been held unlawful ‘notwithstanding facts unquestionably showing probable cause,’ for the Constitution requires ‘that the deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer . . . be interposed between the citizen and the police . . . .’”(Citations omitted))Athens v. Wolf, 38 Ohio St.2d 237 (1974) (The state holds the burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a search falls within the defined exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of a warrant.)South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976) (Routine practices of securing and inventorying the contents of an automobile serves three distinct needs: (1) the protection of the owner’s property while it remains in police custody, (2) the protection of the police against claims or disputes over lost or stolen property,
Well, what if CBP confiscates an I-Phone from an individual about to depart the United States, at an airport, without a warrant, and the individual is convicted of criminal charges partially based upon information obtained from that I-Phone. That is the question raised in U.S. v. Hamza Kolsuz in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.The Border Search Exception We discussed in a prior blog post how CBP relies on the “Border Search Exception” cited in Carroll v. United States 267 U.S. 132 (1925) concluding that it is “reasonable” to conduct such border searches without a warrant given national security interests. In addition, individuals have a lesser expectation of privacy when they seek entry into the United States at a port of entry.
Officers could not conduct warrantless searches of their vehicles because a search warrant cannot be issued for civil offenses. A warrantless search is permissible only where reasonable.Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) and other cases do not answer the question of whether it is reasonable for an officer to search for items, the possession of which is not criminal. Whether a search is reasonable does not depend on the Maryland General Assembly’s intent in decriminalizing possession of a small amount of marijuana.